Buddha.

Bodhisattva Samanta Bhadra, Representing the principle of particularity or love.

Bodhisattva Manjüśri, Representing the principle of universality or wisdom.

Ānanda. Mahākāśyapa.

A TYPICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE MAHĀYĀNA FAITH.
PUBLISHER'S PREFACE.

AÇVAGHOSHA is the philosopher of Buddhism. His treatise on The Awakening of Faith is recognised by all Northern schools and sects as orthodox and used even to-day in Chinese translations as a text-book for the instruction of Buddhist priests.

The original Sanskrit text has not been found as yet, and if it should not be discovered somewhere in India or in one of the numerous libraries of the Buddhist vihâras, it would be a great loss; for then our knowledge of AÇvaghosha's philosophy would remain limited to its Chinese translation.

AÇvaghosha's treatise on The Awakening of Faith is a small booklet, a monograph of the usual size of Chinese fascicles, comprising in its Chinese dress no more than about 10,800 characters, and may be read through in a few hours. But the importance of this monograph stands in no relation to its brev-
ity, and it is very strange that no translation of it has appeared as yet in any European language. I was therefore exceedingly glad that Mr. Teitaro Suzuki, a Japanese Buddhist and a disciple of the Rev. Shaku Soyen, the distinguished Abbot of Kamakura, who was one of the delegates of the Parliament of Religions at Chicago in 1893, undertook the work of rendering Aśvaghosha's monograph into English form. I watched the progress of his translation and my interest in the work increased the more I became familiar with the thoughts of the great philosopher of Buddhism. Not only is my own interpretation of Buddhism, as stated in the Gospel of Buddha and elsewhere, here fully justified, but there are striking similarities between the very terms of Aśvaghosha's system and expressions which I have used in my own philosophical writings. The main coincidence is the idea of Suchness, which is pure form, or the purely formal aspect of things, determining their nature according to mathematical and mechanical laws.¹

¹ This coincidence of some salient points need of course not exclude disagreements in other important matters.
Suchness, according to Açvaghosha, is the cosmic order or Gesetzmässigkeit of the world; it is the sum total of all those factors which shape the universe and determine the destinies of its creatures. It is the norm of existence and is compared to a womb in which all things take shape and from which they are born. It is Plato’s realm of ideas and Goethe’s “Mothers” of the second part of Faust.

Suchness which in its absolute sense means the total system of the abstractly formal laws, including the moral order of the universe, is contrasted with the realm of Birth and Death. This realm of Birth and Death, is the material world of concrete objects. While Suchness is the domain of the universal, the realm of Birth and Death is the domain of the particular; and it is characteristic of the Mahayana school that the bodily, the particular, the concrete is not rejected as a state of sin, but only characterised as impure or defiled, imperfect, and implicated with sorrow and pain, on account of its limitedness and the illusions which naturally attach to it.

Suchness and the realm of Birth and Death
are not two hostile empires but two names of the same thing. There is but one world with two aspects describing two opposed phases of one and the same existence. These two aspects form a contrast, not a contradiction. Suchness (or the good law, the normative factor) dominates the realm of Birth and Death, which latter therefore, in a certain sense, belongs to Suchness throughout in its entirety as well as in its details.

But sentient beings are apt to overlook the significance of the universal, for the senses depict only the particular. Thus to a superficial consideration of sensual beings, the world presents itself as a conglomeration of isolated objects and beings, and the unity that consists in the oneness of law which dominates all, is lost sight of. It is the mind (or spiritual insight into the nature of things) which traces the unity of being and learns to appreciate the significance of the universal.

Universals, i.e., those factors which constitute the suchness of things are not substances, not entities, but relations, pure forms, or determinants, i.e., general laws. Thus
they are not things, but ideas; and the most important one among them, the suchness of man or his soul, is not a concrete self, an âtman, but "name and form."

It is well known what an important rôle the denial of the existence of the âtman plays in the Abhidharma, and we need not repeat here that it is the least understood and most misrepresented doctrine of Buddhism.

Thus the essential feature of existence, of that which presents itself to the senses, is not the material, but the formal; not that which makes it concrete and particular, but that which constitutes its nature and applies generally; not that which happens to be here, so that it is this, but that which makes it to be thus; not its Thisness, but its Suchness.

Particularity is not denounced as evil, but it is set forth as limited; and we might add (an idea which is not expressed in the Mahâyâna, but implied) that the universal would be unmeaning if it were not realised in the particular. Absolute Suchness without reference to the world of concrete Particularity is like a Pratyekabuddha, and the Pratyeka-
buddha, a sage whose wisdom does not go out into the world to seek and to save, is regarded as inferior to the Bodhisattvas, who with inferior knowledge combine a greater love and do practical work that is of help to their fellow beings.

How highly Particularity is considered appears from the Mahayana picture in which it stands contrasted to Universality on perfectly equal terms.¹

The world-process starts in ignorance, perhaps through ignorance or at least through some commotion void of enlightenment, but from the start it is enveloped by the good law of cosmic order. Suchness, the norm of being, guides its steps. It is shaped in the womb of the Tathâgata and is in the progress of evolution more and more tinged, or, as Acâvaghosha says, perfumed, with the cognition of Suchness. Thus life will necessarily march onward to Buddhahood, actualising in the course of its development the eternal in the transient, the omnipresent in the special, the universal in the concrete and particular, and unchange-

¹ See the frontispiece.
able perfection in the imperfect haphazards of the kaleidoscopic world of changes, in which things originate by being compounded, and perish according to the law that all compounds are doomed to dissolution. Hence it becomes apparent that the realm of Birth and Death is the realisation only of that which in itself is immortal; it is the appearance in time and space, the actualisation, the materialisation, the incarnation, of that which is everlasting and permanent in the absolute sense. Says Goethe:

"'Alles Vergängliche
Ist nur ein Gleichniss,
Das Unzulängliche
Hier wird's Ereigniss.'"

The reading of Aśyaghosha's treatise may in some of its parts present difficulties, and Western thinkers would undoubtedly express themselves in other terms than this thinker of India who lived almost two thousand years ago; but the underlying ideas of his philosophy will be found simple enough, if the reader will take the trouble patiently to consider the significance of every sentence in its relation to the whole system.

Paul Carus.
TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE.

THE study of Buddhism has recently made gigantic strides, on this side of the Atlantic as well as on the other. Not only is the importance of the science of comparative religion making itself felt, but the advance of our Pali and Sanskrit knowledge has greatly contributed to a better understanding of things Oriental. Even Christians who were without sympathy for “heathen” religions have now taken up the study of Buddhism in earnest. Nevertheless, it appears to me that the teachings of Sakyamuni are not yet known in their full significance and that they do not yet command just appreciation. Though intolerant critics lose no chance of vigorously and often wrongly attacking the weak points of Buddhism, which are naturally seen at the surface, clear-sighted people have been very slow to perceive its innermost truth. This is especially the case with the Mahayana school.
The main reasons for this are, in my opinion, evident. While the canonical books of the Hinayana Buddhism have been systematically preserved in the Pali language, those of the Mahayana Buddhism are scattered promiscuously all over the fields and valleys of Asia and in half a dozen different languages. Further, while most of the Sanskrit originals have been destroyed, their translations in Tibetan, Mongolian, and Chinese have never been thoroughly studied. And, lastly, the Mahayana system is so intricate, so perplexingly abstruse, that scholars not accustomed to this form of thought and expression are entirely at a loss to find their way through it.

Among the false charges which have been constantly poured upon the Mahayana Buddhism, we find the following: Some say, "It is a nihilism, denying God, the soul, the world and all"; some say, "It is a polytheism: Avalokiteśvâra, Târa, Vajrapâni, Mañjuśrî, Amitâbha, and what not, are all worshipped by its followers"; still others declare, "It is nothing but sophistry, quibbling, hair-splitting subtlety, and a mocking of the innermost
yearnings of humanity''; while those who attack it from the historical side proclaim, "It is not the genuine teaching of Buddha; it is on the contrary the pure invention of Nāgārjuna, who devised the system by ingeniously mixing up his negative philosophy with the non-âtman theory of his predecessor''; or, "The Mahayana is a queer mixture of the Indian mythology that grew most freely in the Tantric period, with a degenerated form of the noble ethical teachings of primitive Buddhism.''

Though no one who is familiar with Mahayanistic ideas will admit these one-sided and superficial judgments, the majority of people are so credulous as to lend their ear to these falsified reports and to believe them.

The present English translation of Ācāghosha's principal work is therefore dedicated to the Western public by a Buddhist from Japan, with a view to dispelling the denunciations so ungraciously heaped upon the Mahayana Buddhism. The name of Ācāghosha is not very well known to the readers of this country, but there is no doubt that he was the first champion, promulgator, and expounder
of this doctrine, so far as we can judge from all our available historical records. Besides, in this book almost all the Mahayanistic thoughts, as distinguished from the other religious systems in India, are traceable, so that we can take it as the representative text of this school. If the reader will carefully and patiently go through the entire book, unmindful of its peculiar terminology and occasional obscurity, I believe he will be amply and satisfactorily repaid for his labor, and will find that the underlying ideas are quite simple, showing occasionally a strong resemblance to the Upanishad philosophy as well as to the Samkhya system, though of course retaining its own independent thought throughout.

In conclusion let me say a word about the difficulty of translating such an abstruse religio-philosophic discourse as the present text. It is comparatively easy to translate works of travels or of historical events or to make abstracts from philosophical works. But a translator of the Mahayanistic writings, which are full of specific phraseology and highly abstruse speculations, will find himself like a
wanderer in some unknown region, not knowing how to obtain any communicable means to express what he perceives and feels. To reproduce the original as faithfully as possible and at the same time to make it intelligible enough to the outside reader, who has perhaps never come in contact with this form of thought, the translator must be perfectly acquainted with the Mahayanistic doctrine as it is understood in the East, while he must not be lacking in adequate knowledge of Western philosophy and mode of thinking. The present translator has done his best to make the Mahayanistic thoughts of Aśvaghosha as clear and intelligible as his limited knowledge and lack of philosophic training allow him. He is confident, however, that he has interpreted the Chinese text correctly. In spite of this, some errors may have crept into the present translation, and the translator will gladly avail himself of the criticisms of the Mahayana scholars to make corrections in case a second edition of the work is needed.

Teitaro Suzuki.

La Salle, Ill., May, 1900.
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NOTE.

The method of transliteration for Sanskrit words adopted in the present book is one used in Whitney's Sanskrit Grammar, but from lack of type $sh$ has been substituted for $s$, $r$ for the vowel $r$, $n$ for all the different kinds of nasal $n$'s, and $m$ for $\dot{m}$. Further, no distinction has been made in the footnotes between the dentals and the cerebrals; $c$ and $\zeta$ are also often used indiscriminately there.

As to the method of transliteration for Chinese words, almost every Sinologue has his own; but the one used in this book is that of Sir T. Wade, which I think has been adopted more generally than others.
INTRODUCTION.

Aceptar, the first expounder of the Mahāyānistic doctrine and one of the deepest thinkers among the Buddhist patriarchs, is known to most Western Buddhist scholars simply as the author of the Buddha-caritakāvyā,¹ the famous poem on the life of Buddha. The accounts of his life and of the significance of his philosophy are so few that the important influence exercised by him upon the development of the Mahāyāna Buddhism has been left almost entirely unnoticed. That he was one of the most eminent leaders among earlier Buddhists; that he was in some way or other connected with the third convocation in Kashmir, probably presided over by the Bhikṣu Parçva; that he had a wonderful poetical genius which rendered great service in the propagation of Buddhism,—these facts sum up almost all the knowledge possessed by scholars about Açvaghosha. The reason why he is not known as he ought to be, is principally that the Sanskrit sources are extremely mea-

gre, while the accounts obtainable from Chinese and Tibetan traditions are confusing and full of legends.

This fact has led Professor Kern to say that Açvaghosha was not an historical man, but a personification of Kåla, a form of Çiva.¹ But the sources from which the Professor draws his conclusion are rather too meagre and I fear are not worth serious consideration. In the following pages we shall see by what traditions Açvaghosha's life is known to the Buddhists of the East.

DATE.

Let us first decide the date, which varies according to different authorities from three hundred to six hundred years after the Parinirvâna of Buddha.

¹. The Li tai san pao chi (fas.. 1),² quoting the Record of the Sarvâstivâdin school, says: "Açvaghosha Bodhisattva was born a Brahman in Eastern India some three hundred years after the Nirvâna. After he abandoned his worldly life, he refuted all the doctrines held by the tîrthakas (heathen),³ and writing

¹Der Buddhismus und seine Geschichte in Indien, authorised German translation, Leipsic, 1884, Vol. II., p. 464.

²歷史 三 實記 Records of the Triratna Under Successive Dynasties, compiled by 長房 Fe Chang-fang, A. D. 597; 15 fasciculi.

³Tîrthaka, which literally means "ascetics," was first applied to a definite sect, viz., the naked ascetics of the Jains, but was later on extended to all dissenters and has therefore been translated "heretics or heathen." The Chinese translation of the term literally means "[followers of] a doctrine other than Buddhism."
the *Mahā-alamkāra-čāstra*¹ in several hundred verses (*ghātās*) greatly propagated the teachings of Buddha."

2. Hui-yuen² states in his commentary (*fas.* 1) on the *Mahā-prajñā-pāramitā-čāstra*,³ on the authority of Kumārajīva 姚麾摩什 (A. D. 339–413), that Aśvaghošha flourished about three hundred and seventy years after the Nirvāṇa.

3. In the *Life of Vasubandhu*,⁴ Aśvaghošha is mentioned as a contemporary of Kātyāyana who is said in the same book to have been living in the fifth century after the Nirvāṇa.

4. The writer⁵ of the preface to the second Chinese translation of the *Mahāyāna-čuddhatpadā-čāstra*⁶ says that this Čāstra "is the deepest of the Mahāyāna texts. Five hundred years after the Nirvāṇa, Aśvaghošha appeared in the world. He was numbered.

¹ Translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva, circa A. D. 405. 15 *fas.*


⁴ The original Sanskrit author is unknown. The present Chinese translation is by Paramārtha who came to China from Western India A. D. 546.

⁵ The writer's name is not mentioned there, nor the date; but judging from the knowledge he shows in treating the subject, as we shall see later, he must have been living either at the time of this second translation or immediately after it.

⁶ *Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna*, the principal work of Aśvaghošha.
among the four suns [of Buddhists], and his teachings stood most prominently [among the doctrines prevailing] in the five countries of India."

5. Sang-ying¹ states in his preface to the Chinese translation of the *Mahā-prajñā-pāramitā-çāstra* that Aśvaghosha appeared towards the end of the period of Orthodoxy, i. e., five hundred years after the Nirvāṇa.

6. The *Fu tso t'ung chi*² (Vol. V.) says that it was the fulfilment of the Tathāgata’s prophecy that six hundred years after the Nirvāṇa the Dharma was transmitted to Aśvaghosha.

7. This six hundred year prophecy is adopted as if it were an unquestionable fact, by Fa-tsang,³ a learned commentator of the *Craddhotpādaçāstra (Discourse on the Awakening of Faith)*.

8. Chih-k’ai 智懌, who was the copyist for Paramārtha when he translated the *Craddhotpādaçāstra*, also adheres to the six hundred year tradition in his preface to the book just mentioned, saying that some six hundred years after the Nirvāṇa of the Tathāgata, many devilish heretical leaders clamorously protested their false doctrines against the good law of Buddha,

¹ 僧敘 A. D. 362–439. One of the four famous disciples of Kumārajīva.

² 佛祖統記 A history of Buddhism, compiled by Chih-p’an 志磐, a Chinese priest, during the latter half of the thirteenth century. 54f. as.

when a Črādana of very high virtue, called Ācārya, thoroughly versed in the philosophy of the Mahāyāna Buddhism and highly compassionate for those ignorant people, wrote this Discourse (the Ācārya-pādaçāstra), in order that he might increase the brilliancy of the Triratna, etc., etc.

9. The six hundred year tradition is very popular among Chinese and Japanese Buddhists. The Fa tsu li tai tung tsai (fas. 5) also follows it.

10. The prophecy above referred to (see No. 8), which is doubtless a later invention, appears in the Mahāmāyā sūtra (fas. 2) as follows:

"After the death of Buddha, Mahāmāya asked Ānanda if Buddha had ever told him in his life anything concerning the future of Buddhism. Responding to this, Ānanda said: 'I heard one time Buddha say this with regard to the future decline of Buddhism: "After the Nirvāṇa Mahākāśyapa with Ānanda will compile the Dharma-piṭaka, and when it is settled Mahākāśyapa will enter into a Nirodha-samāpatti in the Lang chi shan [i.e., Mount of Wolf's Track, Kukkurapadagiri], and Ānanda too obtaining the fruit

1 藩祖騾代通載 A History of Buddha and the Patriarchs Through Successive Dynasties, by Nien chang 念常, A. D. 1333. 36 fas.

2 The Sūtra is also called the Sūtra on Buddha’s Ascent to the Trayastrimsha Heaven, to Teach the Dharma to His Mother 2 fas. A second Chinese translation by Shih T‘an-ching 雪曼景 of the Ch‘i dynasty 齊 (A. D. 479–502). His nationality and life both are unknown.
of enlightenment will in turn enter into Parinirvâna, when the right doctrine will be transmitted to Upagupta who will in an excellent manner teach the essence of the Dharma. . . . When five hundred years are passed [after Buddha’s death] a Bhikshu named Pao-tien [Ratnadeva?] will in an excellent manner teach the essence of the Dharma, converting twenty thousand people and causing all sentient beings in the eight creations to awaken the Anuttarasamayak-sambodhicitta [most-perfect-knowledge-mind]. The right doctrine will then go to decline. When six hundred years [after Buddha’s death] are expired, ninety different schools of the tîrthakas will arise and proclaiming false doctrines, each will struggle against the other to destroy the law of Buddha. Then a Bhikshu, Açvaghosha by name, will in an excellent manner teach the essence of the Dharma and defeat all the followers of the tîrthakas. When seven hundred years [after Buddha’s death] are expired, a Bhikshu, Nâgârjuna by name, will in an excellent manner teach the essence of the Dharma, destroying the banner of false philosophy and lighting the torch of the right doctrine.”’”

11. Referring to the statement of the above mentioned Sûtra, Nâgârjuna, a famous Buddhist philosopher who wrote a commentary on Açvaghosha’s work, called Çraddhotpâdaçâstra, claims that there were six Açvaghoshas at different times, to fulfil the prophecy of Buddha and that the author of the book on which
he writes a commentary\(^1\) was one who appeared on earth according to the prophecy in the *Mahāmdyād sutra*. Nāgārjuna even states that he was a disciple of Aśvaghosha, but the work itself is regarded as spu-

\(^1\) The Sanskritised title is the *Mahāyāna-pātra-vyākhyā*, trans. into Chinese by Pa-ti-mo-to 筱提摩多, an Indian priest, A. D. 401-402. The statements in full run as follows:

"In all there were six Aśvaghoshas, owing to different predictions in the sūtras; each of them appeared to fulfil his mission according to the necessity of the time, and there is no contradiction in them."

The author then proceeds to make particular references to those sūtras:

"When we examine all different predictions in the sūtras taught by Buddha through his whole life, we find six different [personages all called Aśvaghosha]. What are those six? (1) According to the 大乘本法契經 Tai ch'êng pên fa ch'i ching (*Mahāyānapātra-vadharmasūtra?*) we have the following: When the peerless, great, enlightened, honored one was speaking about his intention of entering into Nirvāṇa, Aśvaghosha rising from the seat knelt down, saluted Buddha's feet, and respectively joining his hands together turned towards Buddha, the world-honored one, and said this in verse: 'The peerless one whose heart is filled with great love and whose immeasurable virtues have been accumulated through æons which are like a boundless ocean, the Buddha, only on account of love and compassion for all sentient beings, now speaks about his entering into Nirvāṇa, and I and all the other members of the Samgha feel an unspeakable despair, utterly confused in mind and spirit. If even the world-honored one, full of great love, is going to another world, leaving his own children behind him, why then could not I who am not yet full of love and compassion go to another world following Buddha's steps? Who can blame me? ' When finished uttering these words, Aśvaghosha gazed at the pupil of Buddha's eye and gradually passed out of life. (2) The 變化功德契經 *Pien 'hua kung tê ch'i ching* (*Vikriyāpunyasūtra?*) says: Then the Bhagavat said to Aśvaghosha: 'Three hundred years after my Nirvāṇa thou shalt obtain an inspiration from me and with various methods (upāya)
rious, on account of some obvious contradictions, though the followers of the Mantra sect (Shingonshyu) insist on its genuineness, because they are anxious to have an ancient authority for their own mystic doctrines, which are here supported.

benefit and make happy all beings in coming generations. When thou dost not have any inspiration from me, thou canst not do this by thyself.' (3) The Mahāmāyāsūtra says as follows: 'When six hundred years are passed after the disappearance of the Tathāgata, ninety-six different schools of the tirthakas will arise, and professing false doctrines, each will struggle against the other to destroy the law of Buddha. A Bhikshu called Aśvaghosha, however, will in an excellent manner proclaim the essence of the Dharma and defeat all followers of the tirthakas. (4) In the Ch'ang tê san mei ch'i ching (Sūtra on the Samādhi of Eternal Merit) we read: In the eight hundredth year after the Nirvāṇa there will be a wise man, Aśvaghosha by name. Among the followers of the tirthakas as well as those of Buddhism, he will refute all those who cherish heretical views and will establish the Dharma taught by Buddha. (5) In the Mo ni ch'ing ching ch'i ching (Mani-vimālasūtra?) is said thus: About one hundred years after the Nirvāṇa of Buddha, Aśvaghosha Mahāsattva will appear on earth protect the right doctrine and safely hoist the banner of Buddhism. (6) In the Sheng ting wang ch'i ching (Crimārdharājasūtra?) is said thus: On the seventeenth day after the enlightenment of Buddha there was a tirthaka called Chia-lo-no-chiu-shih-to (Kālanakṣiṭa?), who transforming himself into the figure of a great nāgarāja (i.e., snake-king) with 86,000 heads and 86,000 tongues, simultaneously proposed 86,000 contradicting questions and asked the Tathāgata [for the solution]. He then gave him a triple answer explaining all those paradoxes. The nāgarāja then proposed tenfold questions, again asking the Tathāgata [for their solution], to which he gave a hundredfold answers and explained their paradoxes. When this dialogue came to an end, Buddha said to the nāgarāja: 'Very good, very good. O Aśvaghosha Črāmana! in order to guard the castle of the Dharma, thou hast assumed this form of destruction, estab-
Deeply absorbed in metaphysical speculation, the inhabitants of India paid very little attention to history, and whenever we endeavor to ascertain the date of important historical figures we are sure to find our way to certainty barred. So we cannot decide which of the conflicting traditions above enumerated is to be considered as authentic. When taken independently of other historical events which are connected with them and whose dates have been already fixed, they have no value whatever. Besides it should be observed, the chronology of Buddha, to which every one of the traditions makes reference, is as yet unsettled and must have been still more so at the time when those traditions were current in India as well as in China. If they differed as to the date of Buddha, they might have maintained the same date for Ācārya; no one can tell. We have to seek a light from another source.

Another group of traditions centering around Ācārya is his connexion with a most powerful king of Yüeh chih 月氏國, who established his extensive kingdom in Northwestern India. Who was this king? In the 雜寶藏經 Tsa pao tsang ching (Samyuktaratnak-

lishing the doctrine of Buddha. Be patient, be patient, always discipline thyself in this way, always behave thyself in this way, do not go round in a small circle, but make a universal tour.' The nagârâja then abandoning his assumed beast-form revealed his own real character and approaching the peerless, honored one and saluting him said rejoicingly in verse, etc., etc. This is the sixth Ācârya.
\textit{pitaka-sūtra?})\textsuperscript{1}, \textit{fas. 7}, we read: "A king of Tukhāra, Candana Kanishṭha\textsuperscript{2} (or Kanīta? Chinese 蘇瓣扇呢呟 chan-tan-chi-ni ch'a) had a close friendship with three wise men: the first one was a Bodhisattva, called Ācyaghosha; the second, a minister of state called Mo-cha-lo (Maṭhara or Madara?); the third, an experienced physician called Chê-lo-chia (Caṛaka). With these three the king was on most intimate terms and treated them with the utmost cordiality, permitting them to approach his person. Ācyaghosha said [one day] to him that if he [the king] would follow his advice, he would obtain in his coming life everything that was good, eternally put an end to all his misfortunes and forever be free from evil." ... \textsuperscript{3}

\textit{Sutra on the Casket of Miscellaneous Jewels}. The original Sanskrit author is unknown. Translated into Chinese by Chi-chia-yeh (吉迦夜 Kimkara?) of the Western country and T'anyao 善曜, A. D. 472. 8 \textit{fas}. The original text is said to have existed at the time when the \textit{Chêng-yüan Catalogue} 貞元錄 was compiled (A. D. 785-804) by Yüan-chao 國朝, a Buddhist priest of the Tang 唐 dynasty (A. D. 618-907).

\textsuperscript{2} Does Kanishṭha, which literally means "youngest," refer to the youngest of the three brothers who successively governed the Tukhāra district of India? If so, there is no question about the identity of him and King Kanishka.

\textsuperscript{3} The \textit{Fu fa tsang ch'uan} (Transmission of the Dharmapitaka), \textit{fas. 5}, also seems to refer to the same tradition, for it is stated that when a king of Tukhāra (probably Kanishka) was very much afflicted on account of his having committed many atrocious deeds in the war with Parthia (Eastern Persia), Ācyaghosha told him that if he would follow the Dharma with a sincere heart, his sin would gradually be attenuated; and also that the same king had a physician called Caraka "who thoroughly understood phar-
Açvaghosha's relation with King Candana Kanishtha (or Kanîta? Chinese Chi-ni-ch'a) is told also in the Fu fa tsang yin yüan ch'üan,¹ fas. 5:

"[At that time] the king of Tukhâra was very powerful. He was called Candana Kanishtha [or Kanîta? Chinese Chi-ni-ch'a]. Being very ambitious and bold, and far superior in courage to all his contemporaries, every country he invaded was sure to be trampled down under his feet. So when he advanced his four armies towards Pâtaliputra [Hua shih ch'êng in Chinese], the latter was doomed to defeat in spite of some desperate engagements. The king demanded an indemnity of 900,000,000 gold pieces, for which the defeated king offered Açvaghosha, the Buddha-bowl and a compassionate fowl, each being considered worth 300,000,000 gold pieces. The Bodhisattva Açvaghosha had intellectual powers inferior to none; the Buddha-bowl having been carried by the Tathâgata himself is full of merits; the fowl being of compassionate nature, would not drink any water with worms in it,—thus all these having merits enough to keep off all enemies, they are on that account worth macy, and who was clever, learned, intelligent, elegant, meek, and compassionate," etc.

¹ Accounts Relating to the Transmission of the Dharma Pitaka. 6 fas. The original Sanskrit author is unknown. The third Chinese translation now existent is by Chichia-yeh (Kimkara?) of the Western country, A. D. 472. The original text is said to have been existing when the Chêng yüan Catalogue (A. D. 785–804) was compiled.
The king [of Tukhâra] was greatly pleased at receiving them, and immediately withdrawing his army from the land went back to his own kingdom."

We have the same legend stated in a brief biography of Āvaghosha as follows:

"After that a king of the smaller Yüeh chih country [i.e., Tukhâra] in North India invaded the Middle country [i.e., Magadha]. When the besieging had continued for some time, the king of Central India sent a message [to the invader] saying: 'If there be anything you want, I will supply it; do not disturb the piece of my people by thus long staying here,' to which this reply was given: 'If you really ask a surrender, send me 300,000,000 gold pieces; I will release you.' The [besieged] king said: 'Even this entire kingdom cannot produce 100,000,000 gold pieces, how can I supply you with 300,000,000?' The answer was: 'There are in your country two great treasures: (1) the Buddha-bowl, (2) a Bhikshu of

1 This is a comical feature of the legend, for if these treasures could ward off all enemies why did they not protect the unfortunate king of Pâtaliputra against Kanishtha?

2 Life of Āvaghosha 阿毘格若傳, translated into Chinese by Kumārajiva. Very short. The author is unknown. The original Sanskrit text is stated in the Chêng yüan Catalogue to have been existing at that time Cf. Wassijew's Buddhismus, German edition, p. 231 et seq.

3 Fa-hien 法顯 states that Kanishka (which is transliterated by him into Chinese Chi-ni-chia 賈尼迦, corresponding to Sanskrit Kanika) as if a different person from the king of Yüeh chih
wonderful talent (i. e., Açvaghosha). Give them to me, they are worth 300,000,000 gold pieces.' The [besieged] king said: 'Those two treasures are what I most revere, I cannot give them up.' Thereupon the Bhikshu said to the king in explanation of the Dharma:

"'All sentient beings are everywhere the same, while Buddhism, deep and comprehensive, aims at universal salvation, and the highest virtue of a great man consists in delivering [all] beings. As our temporal administration is very liable to meet obstructions, even your rule does not extend itself outside of this one kingdom. If you, on the other hand, propose a wide propagation of Buddhism, you would naturally be a Dharmarâja over the four oceans. The duty of a Bhikshu is to save [all] the people and not to give preference to one or the other. Merits lie in our heart; truth makes no distinction. Pray, be far-sighted, and do not think only of the present.'

"The king who was from the first a great admirer of him, respectfully followed his advice and delivered him to the king of Yüeh chih who returned with him to his own kingdom."

Comparing all these traditions, we are naturally led to the conclusion that Açvaghosha, who was numbered as one of the four suns of Buddhism, must have who invaded Gandhâra to get the Buddha-bowl. Vide Legge's translation of Fa-hien, pp. 33 and 34.

¹ Hsüen-tsang's 玄奘, Records of Western Countries, Beal's English translation, Vol. II., p. 302.
had a very powerful influence over the spiritual India of the time, that the king who wished to have him as a spiritual adviser must have been a very devoted Buddhist so as to accept a Bhikshu instead of an enormous sum of money, and that such a devoted Buddhist king, ruling over the vast domain which extended from the bank of the Indus towards the lower Ganges, must have been living sometime between the third and sixth century after the Nirvana, whatever the authentic date of Buddha might be. The next conclusion we can advance therefore will be the identification of this king who is called Candana Kanishṭha or Kanîta in the above stories, with Kanishka,\(^1\) the originator of the third Buddhist convocation in Kashmir.

As to the difference of the name, we have to say this. While Hsüen-tsang’s transliteration for Kanishka is Chia-ni-shê-chia which is quite an approximate reproduction of the original sounds, the Chinese method of transliteration before his time by the so-called “old translators” was rather irregular, loose and therefore often misleading. Add to this the liability to error on the part of local dialects, and we do not improperly identify Chi-ni-ch’a, with Kanishka, while the former may be Sanskritised Kanishta or Kanîta.\(^2\)

\(^1\) A. D. 85–106, according to Müller.

\(^2\) One objection to identifying Chi-ni-ch’a (Kanishṭha or Kanîta) with Kanishka is a single Chinese character appearing in the Mahādīvamkhaṇḍa (Book of Great Glory), the work ascribed to Āevaghosha. In fas. 3 as well as fas. 6 of the
In further support of this view, we quote from the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society*, Vol. I., Part 3, an article on King Kanishka, taken from a Tibetan source, which bears a more historical appearance than the legends above referred to. The abstract is:

"Kanishka, king of Palhâva and Delhi,¹ was born four hundred years after the Nirvâna. When he learned that Simha, king of Kashmir, abandoned the worldly life to become a Buddhist priest under the name of Sudarçana and obtained Arhatship, he went to Kashmir and heard a sermon delivered by Sudarçana.² At that time a Mahâyâna priest who held a most prom-

same book referring to Candana Kanîshtha or Kanîta, the writer says: "我昔昔聞旃檀葛泥吒 Wo hsi ch'ang wen, chan-t'an chi-ni-châ wang," i. e., "I heard of old that King Candana Kanîshtha," etc. (in fas. 6., chia-ni-ch'a), etc. The Chinese character hsi usually means "of yore" or "in olden times," but it also signifies the past indefinitely, near as well as distant. If we thus understand the term in the sense of "some time ago," or simply "once," there will be no difficulty in demonstrating that Açvaghosha was an elder contemporary of Kanishka, though we cannot apparently accept the Chinese tradition which says they were intimately known to each other. Because in that case Açvaghosha would not refer to the king in such a hearsay manner as stated in the book above mentioned. Taking all in all, this does not prevent us asserting that they were contemporaneous.

¹ Cf. A. Schiefner’s German translation of Târanâtha’s *History of Buddhism*, p. 89: "Nachdem König Çîntschandra die Herrschaft ausgeübt hatte, waren viele Jahre vergangen, als im Westen im Lande Tili und Mâlava ein an Jahren junger König Kanika in die Herrschaft gewählt wurde."

² Târanâtha’s statement differs from this. According to him Kanika and Kanishka are not the same king, the former being that of Tili and Mâlava, while the latter that of Jâlamdhara. *Vide* pp. 58 and 90. Târanâtha might have confused them.
inent position in northern countries was called Aśvaghoṣa. His influence in the spiritual world was as incomparable as the temporal power of Kanishka who conquered Kashmir and Jālamdhara. The king sent a message to Aśvaghoṣa to come to his kingdom, who, however, owing to his old age, could not accept the invitation, but sent him a leading disciple of his called Jñānayaṇa, accompanied with a letter treating the essential points of Buddhism.”

Though the Tibetan tradition considerably differs in many respects from the Chinese accounts above mentioned, they both agree in this point that Aśvaghoṣa and Kanishka had some intercourse, or that at least they were contemporaneous and known to each other. So we may take it as an established fact that Aśvaghoṣa, the author of the 大乘起信論 Mahāyāna-graddhotpāda-çāstra (Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna), was living at the time of Kanishka.

I do not think there is any need here to enumerate all different opinions about the time of Kanishka, which has been already approximately fixed by the untiring investigation of European scholars, such as Princep, Lassen, Cunningham, Wilson, Fergusson,

1 Tāranātha also states this event (Geschichte des Buddhis-
mus, p. 92). But the king is not Kanishka, but Kanika; and the name of the disciple is not Jñānayaṇa, but Dßchnânakriya.

2 A further corroboration of this view will be met with when we treat later on of the conversion of Aśvaghoṣa by Parśva or his disciple Puṇyayaṇaṇaças.
Max Müller, and others. So long as our present aim is to assign the time of Açvaghosha more definitely than stating vaguely some three or five hundred years after the Nirvâna of Buddha, suffice it to say that he lived at the time extending from the latter half of the first century before Christ to about 50 or 80 A. D. If we fix the date of Buddha's death in the fifth century before Christ, Açvaghosha must be said to have lived during the six hundredth year after the Nirvana. At the very most his time cannot be placed later than the first century of the Christian era.

I have spared no pains, even at the risk of tediousness, in gathering all the information obtainable from Chinese sources relative to the date of Açvaghosha, because this date is of paramount importance when we enter into the discussion of the development of the Mahâyâna Buddhism, which is commonly and erroneously considered to be the sole work of Nâgârjuna.

NATIVITY AND PEREGRINATIONS.

There is not so much discordance in the traditions about the wanderings of Açvaghosha as about his date, though indeed we do not have as yet any means of ascertaining his birth-place, other than the statements

1 Max Müller's opinion, as stated before, is that Kanishka lived A. D. 85–106; Lassen thinks the Gondopharean dynasty was succeeded by Kanishka, king of the Yüeh chih, about one hundred years before Christ; Princep places his reign during the first century A. D.; Cunningham thinks his consecration was 58 A. D.; Fergusson, 79 A. D.; Rhys Davids, about 10 A. D., etc.

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of discordant authorities. According to Tāranātha,¹ he was a son of a rich Brahman called Samghaguhya who married the tenth and youngest daughter of a merchant in Khorta. As a youth, when thoroughly familiar with every department of knowledge, he went to Odiviça, Gaura, Tīrahuti, Kāmarûpa, and some other places, defeating everywhere his Buddhist opponents by his ingenious logic.

All these places are situated in Eastern India, and among the Chinese traditions the Record of the Tri-ratna (Li tai san pao chi) as well as the Accounts of Buddha and the Patriarchs (Fo tsu tung chi) agree with Tāranātha in placing Ācāvaghosha’s native land in the East; but the Life of Vasubandhu makes Ācāvaghosha a native of Bhâshita in Črâvasti, while in Nâgârjuna’s work, the Mahdyânaçdstravyâkhya 郧摩訶衍論 (Shih mo ho yen lun), he is mentioned as having been born in Western India, Loka being the father and Ghoṇâ the mother. The Record of Buddha and the Patriarchs Under Successive Dynasties (Fo tsu li tai t‘ung tsai) agrees with neither of the above statements, for it says (fasciculi 5): “The twelfth patriarch, Ācāvaghosha Mahâsattva was a native of Vârâṇasî.” A further contradicting tradition is pointed out by Prof. S. Murakami in one of his articles on the history of Buddhism,² quoting the Shittanzô 悉曼藏 (fas. 1), which makes Ācāvaghosha a man of South India.

¹ Gesichts des Buddhismus, p. 90.
A majority of the traditions place his native country in East India; but there is no means of confirming these. One thing, however, seems to be certain, namely, that Ācāvaghosha was not born in the northern part of India, which place is supposed by most Western Buddhist scholars to be the cradle of the Mahāyāna school.

Wherever the native country of Ācāvaghosha may have been, both the Chinese and Tibetan records agree that he made a journey to Central India, or Magadha. It seems that every intellectual man in India, the people of which, living in affluence, were not occupied with the cares of making a living, sought to gain renown by dialectics and subtle reasonings, and Ācāvaghosha, as a Brahman whose "intellectual acquirements were wonderfully deep," and whose "penetrating insight was matchless,"¹ could not resist the temptation. Not satisfied with his intellectual campaign against commonplace Buddhists in his neighborhood, who were crushed down as "rotten wood before a raging hurricane,"² he went, according to a Chinese tradition, to Pāṭaliputra, and according to the Tibetan, to Nālanda. The Life of Ācāvaghosha evidently refers to this fact when it states that Pṛṇava, the eleventh patriarch and eventual teacher of Ācāvaghosha, on being informed of the paramount influence of the Brah-

¹ The Transmission of the Dharmaṭilaka (Fu fa tsang ch'üan, fas. 5).
² The same as above.
man tirthaka (i.e., Aśvaghosha) in Central India and of the fact that his conquest over Buddhists had silenced the bell (ghanta) in some monastery (vihāra), journeyed from Northern India to convert the bitterest opponent into a faithful follower of Buddha. He adds that Aśvaghosha left his home and lived henceforth in Central India. But according to the Transmittion of the Dharma-pitaka (Fu fa tsang ch'uan, fas. 5) we find Aśvaghosha even after his conversion still in Pātāliputra, from which he was taken by King Kanishka to the latter's own capital, Gandhāra, in the Northwest of India.

Thus all that we can say about the birth-place and wanderings of Aśvaghosha is: (1) he was a Brahman by birth either of South, or of West, or of East, but not of North India; (2) he acquired in Central India his highest reputation as a Brahman disputant, and, after his conversion, as the greatest Buddha follower of the time, intellectually as well as morally; (3) his later life was spent according to the Chinese authority in the North where he wrote probably the Mahālām-kāra-sūtra-āstrā (Book of Great Glory) which describes matters mostly relating to Western India.

APPELLATIONS.

The author of the Mahāyāna-candratāpāda-āstrā (Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna) is most commonly known in the Chinese Buddhist literature by the name of Aśvaghosha. But according
to his Life he was also called Kung-tê-jih 功徳日 (i.e., merit-sun; in Sanskrit, Puṇyaditya?). For he was not only a philosopher, but a preacher and an organiser, for "while in North India he widely propagated the doctrine of Buddha, led and benefited the masses, and through good and excellent [missionary] methods perfected the merits of the people." The Record of Buddha and the Patriarchs (Fo tsou t'ung tsai), where it is stated that his other name was Kung-chang 功勝 (Puṇyaçrīka?), can be said almost to agree with the above. While thus no other name or appellation of his is known in China, Târanâtha mentions nine more names: Kâla (Time), Durdarsha (Hard-to-be-seen), Durdarshakâla (Hard-to-be-seen-time), Mâtrceta (Mother-child), Pitṛceta (Father-child), Çûra (Hero), Dharmika-Subhûti (Virtuous-mighty), and Maticitra (Intelligence-bright). ¹

In I-tsing's Correspondence from the South Sea (Nan hai chi kuei ch'uan,² Chap. 32, "On chanting"), the name Mâtrceta is mentioned, but I-tsing does not identify him with Açvaghosha, though the legend attached to the former closely resembles that of the latter told in Târanâtha. Târanâtha states that when Açvaghosha became a sthavira and advocate of the

¹ Gesclzichte des Buddhismus, p. 90.
² 南海寄歸傳 by I-tsing 義浹 who left China A.D. 671 for a pilgrimage to India and came back A.D. 695. The book is a work on the vinaya as observed by the Sarvâstivādin, which the pilgrim witnessed in India as well as in Ceylon. An English translation by J. Takakusu, London.
Tripitaka, he had a dream one night in which the venerable Târâ gave him the instruction to write hymns on Buddha for the expiation of his former sinful deeds; that according to this admonition he wrote many hymns praising the virtues of Buddha, amongst which one containing one hundred and fifty çlokas\(^1\) is the best of all; that the hymns composed by him are full of benediction like the very words of Buddha, because he was predicted by the Blessed One to be a hymnist.\(^2\)

Compare the above with this from I-tsing:

"The venerable Mâtrceṭa (Mother-child) was a man of great intellect, of excellent virtue, eminently standing above all sages in India. A tradition says that when Buddha was taking a walk one time with his kinsmen, disciples, and many other people, a nightingale (?), observing his personal feature as elegant and majestic as a gold mountain, uttered in the wood some pleasant, harmonious notes that sounded like praising the virtues of Buddha. Buddha then turning towards the disciples said: 'The bird overcome by the joy of seeing me utters a pitiful cry. By this merit it will after my death obtain a human form, Mâtrceṭa by name, and praise and adore my intrinsic virtues with a number of hymns.' This man first followed the doctrine of a śrīthaka worshipping Maheṣ-

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\(^1\) Schiefner notes: Çatapantschâçatika nāma stotra, Tandjur B. 1, unter den Stotra's.

\(^2\) Geschichte des Buddhismus, p. 91.
vara\(^1\) and composed many hymns to adore him. But in the meantime he came across his own name recorded [in a Buddhist writing]; inspired by this, he took refuge in Buddha, changed his garb, abandoned his laymanship, and in many ways praised, honored and adored Buddha. Regretting his misbehavior in the past and desiring to perform good deeds in the future and also lamenting the unfortunate fate that prevented him from having a personal interview with the Great Teacher rather than bowing before his bequeathed image, he at last decided with all his rhetorical talent and in solemn fulfilment of the Lord's prophecy, to praise his virtues and merits [in hymns]. He first composed four hundred çlokas and then one hundred and fifty çlokas;\(^2\) all of which describe the six Pâramitâs [Perfections] and state the excellent virtues possessed by the World-Honored-One,” etc.

At the end of the same Chapter (i.e., Chap. 32) in I-tsing’s Correspondence he refers to Āçvaghosha and Nagârjuna both of whom composed some beautiful and popular hymns that were sung by Buddhists throughout India at the time of his pilgrimage. But if the Tibetan statement is reliable, I-tsing may have

\(^1\) Cf. the following statement in Târanâtha, p. 90: “Als er (Āçvaghosha) in den Mantra- und Tantra-Formeln und in der Dialektik sehr bewandert wurde, gab ihm Maheśvara selbst Anleitung.”

\(^2\) “Hymn of One Hundred and Fifty Çlokas” (Catapañcâshad-buddhastotra), translated into Chinese by I-tsing during his stay in the Nâlanda-vihâra, Central India. At the time of the compilation of the Chêng yüan catalogue the original is said to have existed.
been mistaken in recording Aśvaghosha and Mātrceṭa as different characters. The Tibetan and Chinese version of the one hundred and fifty ćloka hymn being still existent, the comparison of which, however, I have not yet been able to make, will furnish an interesting testimony for the identification.

Many legendary explanations have been invented about the name of Aśvaghosha, as might be expected of the imaginative Indian mind, but not being worth while quoting from the materials at my command, no reference will be made to them here.

CONVERSIONS.

A consensus of traditions both Tibetan and Chinese maintains that Aśvaghosha was in his earlier life a most powerful adherent of Brahmanism, though we are tempted to discredit it on the ground that later Buddhist writers may have wished to exaggerate the superiority of Buddhism to all other Indian philosophical and religious doctrines, by chronicling the conversion of one of its strongest opponents to their side. Whatever the origin of the legend may be, how did his conversion take place? By whom was he converted? About these points the Tibetan and the Chinese tradition by no means agree, the one standing in a direct contradiction to the other. While the Tibetan account is full of mystery and irrationality, the Chinese is natural enough to convince us of its probable occurrence.
According to Târanâtha, the most eminent disciple of Nâgârjuna, defeated and proselyted Ācâvaghosha, not by his usual subtlety in dialectics, but by the superiority of his magical arts. Ācâvaghosha made use of every tantric formula he could command, in order to free himself from the enchantment in which he was held by his enemy, but all to no purpose whatever. Thus when he was in an utterly desperate condition, he happened to read the Buddhist Sûtra which was kept in his place of confinement and in which he found his destiny prophesied by Buddha, he was seized with deep regret for his former hostile attitude toward the Dharma, and immediately renouncing his tîrthakism, professed the doctrine of Çâkyamuni.

The Tibetan tradition presents some unmistakable indications of a later invention: the use of tantric formulæ, the so-called prophecy of the Tathâgata, and the anachronism of Āryadeva. On the other hand, the Chinese records are worth crediting, though they are not unanimous as to how the conversion took place and who was the proselytist.

According to the Life of Ācâvaghosha, Parçva was

1 Geschichtes des Buddhismus, German translation by Schiefner, pp. 84–85.
2 He is mentioned there by the name of Durdarshakâla.
3 Cf. this with the accounts of Mâtrceita-Ācâvaghosha told in I-tsing.
4 The conversion of Ācâvaghosha by Parçva as here stated may be considered an addition to the proof already demonstrated for the contemporaneousness of Ācâvaghosha and King Kanishka; for
the man who converted him. They agreed at their first meeting that on the seventh day thence they should have the king, ministers, çrâmanas, tirthakas and all great teachers of the Dharma gathered in the Vihâra and have their discussion there before all those people. "In the sixth night the sthavira entered into a samâdhi and meditated on what he had to do [in the morning]. When the seventh day dawned, a great crowd was gathered like clouds. The Sthavira Parçva arrived first and ascended a high platform with an unusually pleasant countenance. The tirthaka [i.e., Açvaghosha] came later and took a seat opposite him. When he observed the çrâmana with a pleasant countenance and in good spirits, and when he also observed his whole attitude showing the manner of an able opponent, he thought: 'May he not be Bhikshu Chin? His mind is calm and pleasant, and besides he bears the manner of an able antagonist. We shall indeed have an excellent discussion to-day.'

"They then proposed the question how the defeated one should be punished. The tirthaka [ Açvaghosha] said: 'The defeated one shall have his tongue cut out.' The sthavira replied: 'No, he shall become a disciple [of the winner] as the acknowledgement of defeat.' The tirthaka then replied: 'Let it be so,' and asked, 'Who will begin the discussion?' The Parçva, according to the Tibetan as well as the Chinese authority, was a co-operator at least, if not the president, of the third Buddhist convocation promoted by the King of Kashmir.
Sthavira Parṣva said: ‘I am more advanced in age; I came from afar for the purpose [of challenging you]; and moreover I was here this morning earlier than you. So it will be most natural for me to speak first.’ The tīrthaka said: ‘Let it be so. Following the subject of your argument, I shall completely baffle you.’

‘The Sthavira Parṣva then said: ‘What shall we have to do, in order to keep the kingdom in perfect peace, to have the king live long, to let the people enjoy abundance and prosperity, all free from evils and catastrophies?’ The tīrthaka was silent, not knowing what to reply. As now according to the rule of discussion one who could not make a response is defeated, Ācārvaghoṣha was obliged to bow [before the opponent] as a disciple of his. He had his head shaved, was converted to a çrāmana, and instructed in the perfection-precepts.

‘When he [Ācārvaghoṣha] was alone in his room, he was absorbed in gloomy, unpleasant reflection as to why he, possessing a bright intellect and far-sighted discretion, and having his reputation widely spread all over the world, could be defeated with a single question and be made a disciple of another. Parṣva well knew his mind and ordered him to come to his room where the master manifested himself in several supernatural transformations. Ācārvaghoṣha now fully recognised that his master was not a man of ordinary type, and thus feeling happy and contented, thought it his duty to become one of his disciples.
"The master told him: 'Your intellect is bright enough, hard to find its equal; but it wants a final touch. If you study the doctrine I have mastered, attend to my capability and insight into the Bodhi, and if you become thoroughly versed in the method of discussion and clearly understand the principle of things, there will be no one who can match you in the whole world.'

"The master returned to his own country [North India]; the disciple remained in Central India, making an extensive study of the Sūtras, seeking a clear comprehension of the doctrine, Buddhistic as well as non-Buddhistic. His oratorical genius swept everything before him, and he was reverentially honored by the four classes of the people, including the king of [Central] India who treated him as a man of distinction."

According to the Transmission of the Dharmapitaka (Fu fa tsang chuan), however, Aśvaghosha was not converted by Parśva, but by his disciple and patriarchal successor, Puṇyayaças. Though the two works, Life of Aśvaghosha and the book just mentioned, differ in some other points, they are evidently two different versions of the one original legend. As the book is not as yet accessible to English readers, I here produce the whole matter translated from the Chinese version. The comparison will prove interesting.

"Full of a proud and arrogant spirit that speedily grew like a wild plant, he [Aśvaghosha] firmly be-
lieved in the existence of an ego-entity and cherished the ultra-egotistic idea. Being informed that an Âcarya called Puñyayaças, who, deep in knowledge and wide in learning, proclaimed that all things are relative [=ćūnya, lit. empty], there is no ātman, no ādga; Açıvaghosha’s arrogant spirit asserted itself, and presenting himself to Puñyayaças challenged him saying: ‘I confute all [false] opinions and doctrines in the world, as hailstones strike tender grass. If my declaration prove false and not true, I will have my own tongue cut out in acknowledgment of defeat.’

Thereupon Puñyayaças explained to him that Buddhism distinguishes two kinds of truth, that while ‘practical truth’ hypothetically admits the existence of an ātman, there is nothing conditional in ‘pure [or absolute] truth,’ all being calm and tranquil, and that therefore we cannot prove the ego as an absolute entity.

‘Açıvaghosha would not yet surrender himself, because being over-confident of his own intellectual power he considered himself to have gained the point. Puñyayaças said: ‘Carefully think of yourself; tell not a lie. We will see which of us has really won.’

‘Açıvaghosha meanwhile came to think that while ‘practical truth’ being only conditional has no reality at all, ‘pure truth’ is calm and tranquil in its nature, and that therefore these two forms of truth are all unobtainable, and that if they have thus no actuality
[or existence], how could they be refuted [as false]?
So feeling now the superiority of his opponent, he
tried to cut out his tongue in acknowledgement of the
defeat. But Puṇyayaṇaḥ stopped him, saying: 'We
teach a doctrine of love and compassion, and do not
demand that you cut out your tongue. Have your
head shaved instead and be my disciple.' Āčvaghoṣha
thus converted was made a çrāmana by Puṇyayaṇaḥ.

'But Āčvaghoṣha who felt extremely ashamed of
his [former] self-assumption was thinking of attempt­
ing his own life. Puṇyayaṇaḥ, however, attaining
arhatship, entered into a samādhi and divined what
was going on in the mind of Āčvaghoṣha. He ordered
him to go and bring some books out of the library.
Āčvaghoṣha said to the Ācarya: 'The room is per­
fectly dark; how can I get in there?' To this Puṇya­
ayaṇaḥ answered: 'Just go in, and I shall let you have
light.' Then the Ācarya through his supernatural
power stretched far into the room his right hand
whose five fingers each radiating with light illumi­
nated everything inside of the walls. Āčvaghoṣha
thought it a mental hallucination, and knowing the
dfact that a hallucination as a rule disappears when
one is conscious of it, he was surprised to see the

¹ The reasoning is somewhat unintelligible. The passages
must be defective, and although I might venture to supply the
necessary words to make them more logical and intelligible to the
general reader who is not acquainted with the çūnyaṭād philosophy.
I have not tried to do so, thinking that it is enough here if we see
in what the subject of the discussion consisted.
light glowing more and more. He tried his magical arts to extinguish it till he felt utterly exhausted, for the mysterious light suffered no change whatever. Finally coming to realise that it was the work of no other person than his teacher, his spirit was filled with remorse, and he thenceforth applied himself diligently to religious discipline and never relapsed.”

The Record of Buddha and the Patriarchs (Fo tsou tung tsai) agrees with the Transmission of the Dharma-pitaka (Fu fa tsang chuan) in making Punyayaças, instead of Parçva, the master of the conversion. But the former does not state how Açvaghosha was converted.

Though so far it remains an open question who was the real master of Açvaghosha, we can be sure of this, that he had intimate spiritual communication with both Parçva and Punyayaças. Parçva, who was an older contemporary of Punyayaças, was probably already advanced in age when Açvaghosha came to be personally acquainted with him, and so he did not have time enough to lead the young promising disciple to a consummate understanding of the doctrine of Buddha. After the demise of this venerable old patriarch, Açvaghosha therefore had to go to Punyayaças for a further study of his religion, till he was capable of forming his own original thoughts, which are set forth in his principal work, the Discourse of

1 The Transmission of the Dharma-pitaka (Fu fa tsang chuan) fas. 5.
the Awakening of Faith (Craddhotpāda-yastra). This assumption is justified when we notice that Añvagho-
sha in the Book of Great Glory pays his homage to Parśva as well as to Puṇyayaças.

Now by way of a supplementary note to the above, let us say a word about Wassiljew’s observation,1 which states that while Hīnayānists or Çrāvakas ascribe the conversion of Añvaghoša to Parśva, the Mahāyānistic record says that Āryadeva converted him. This assertion is evidently incorrect, for the Life of Añvaghoša as well as the Transmission of the Dharmapitaka (Fu fa tsang chuan) in which the honor of his conversion is given to the successor of Parśva as aforesaid, do not certainly belong to the work of the Hīnayāna school. It is the Tibetan tradition only, and not the general Mahāyāniste statement, that Āryadeva converted Añvaghoša, and there is no ground at all for the assertion of Wassiljew, which practically leads us to take everything Tibetan for Mahāyānistic and everything Chinese for Hīnayānistic.

LISTS OF PATRIARCHS.

The incorrectness of the Tibetan story, as to the conversion of Añvaghoša by Āryadeva above referred to, is further shown by a list of the Buddhist patri-
archs in India appearing in various Buddhist books either translated from Sanskrit into Chinese or com-

1 Buddhismus, German edition, p. 222, and also see Tāra-
nātha, translated by Schiefner, p. 311.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE FO TSU T'UNG TSAI</th>
<th>THE FO TSU T'UNG CHI</th>
<th>THE FU FA TSANG CHUAN</th>
<th>BUDDHABHADRA</th>
<th>SARVAŚTI-VADIN</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 Mahákācyapa</td>
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<td>4 Upagupta</td>
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<td>5 Dr̥taka</td>
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<td>6 Micchaka</td>
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<td>Vasumitra</td>
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<td>7 Vasumitra</td>
<td>Buddhanandi</td>
<td>Buddhanandi</td>
<td>Parśva</td>
<td>Maitreya</td>
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<td>8 Buddhanandi</td>
<td>Buddhamitra</td>
<td>Buddhamitra</td>
<td>Aćvaghosha</td>
<td>Kātyāyana</td>
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<td>9 Buddhamitra</td>
<td>Parśva</td>
<td>Parśva</td>
<td>Ghosha</td>
<td>Vasumitra</td>
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<td>10 Parśva</td>
<td>Punyayaças</td>
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<td>Kātyāyana</td>
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<td>11 Punyayaças</td>
<td>Aćvaghosha</td>
<td>Aćvaghosha</td>
<td>Parśva</td>
<td>Vasaṁitra</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 Aćvaghosha</td>
<td>Kapi</td>
<td>Kapimala</td>
<td>Aćvaghosha</td>
<td>Kṛṣṇa</td>
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<td>13 Kapimala</td>
<td>Nāgārjuna</td>
<td>Nāgārjuna</td>
<td>Kapi</td>
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<td>14 Nāgārjuna</td>
<td>Kanadeva</td>
<td>Nāgārjuna</td>
<td>Kapi</td>
<td>Aćvaghosha</td>
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<td>15 Kanadeva</td>
<td>(Āryadeva)</td>
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<td>Nāgārjuna</td>
<td>Kumārata</td>
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<td>34</td>
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<td>35</td>
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<td>Deva</td>
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yaças, and before both Nâgârjuna and Âryadeva, the most brilliant disciple of the former. The list on the opposite page, therefore, as noticed elsewhere, will furnish good material for fixing the time of Açvaghosha. It does not make any practical difference whether he was converted by Parṣva himself or his immediate successor and disciple Punyayaças, because it is most probable they all were contemporaneous. The list generally gives twenty-three or twenty-eight patriarchs beginning with Mahâkâśyapa, but not deeming it necessary to give a complete list, I have cut it short at Deva.

Chi-hsung ¹ refutes in his Chuan fa chang tsung lun (A Treatise on the Right Transmission of the Dharma) the authority of the Transmission of the Dharmapitaka (Fu fa tsang chuan), but he agrees with it down to the seventeenth patriarch. The principal point of his refutation is simply that Bodhidharma, the founder of the Chinese Dhyâna school, should be included in the list.

AS AN ARTIST.

We cannot conclude the accounts concerning Açvaghosha without mentioning an anecdote from a Chinese source.² The Çraddhotpâdaçâstra (The Awak-

¹ Chi-hsung, a priest of the Dhyâna school who died A. D. 1071 or 1072. He wrote among other works one on the fundamental identicalness of Confucianism and Buddhism.

² The Transmission of the Dharmapitaka (Fu fa tsang chuan, fas. 5).
en of Faith,) proves he was a philosopher of a high grade; the Buddhacaritakāvya (The Life of Buddha) and the Mahālakṣaṇastra (The Book of Great Glory) reveal his poetical genius; and the following story indicates that he was a musician: ¹

"He [Aśvaghosha] then went to Pātaliputra for his propaganda-tour, where he composed an excellent tune called Lai cha huo lo (ingga 江 "Rāstavara?), that he might by this means convert the people of the city. Its melody was classical, mournful, and melodi­ous, inducing the audience to ponder on the misery, emptiness, and non-ātman-ness of life. That is to say, the music roused in the mind of the hearer the thought that all aggregates are visionary and subject to trans­formation; that the triple world is a jail and a bond­age, with nothing enjoyable in it; that since royalty, nobility, and the exercise of supreme power, are all characterised with transitoriness, nothing can prevent their decline, which will be as sure as the dispersion of the clouds in the sky; that this corporeal existence is a sham, is as hollow as a plantain tree, is an enemy, a foe, one not to be intimately related with; and again that like a box in which a cobra is kept, it should

¹ The fact agrees well with Tāranātha’s statement which in its German translation reads as follows: "Die von ihm verfassten Loblieder sind auch in allen Ländern verbreitet; da zuletzt Sänger und Possenreisser dieselben vortrugen und bei allen Menschen des Landes mit Macht Glauben an den Buddha entstand, erwuchs durch die Loblieder grösserer Nutzen zur Verbreitung der Lehre." Geschichte des Buddhismus, German translation, p. 91.
never be cherished by anybody; that therefore all Buddhas denounce persons clinging to a corporeal existence. Thus explaining in detail the doctrine of the none-âtman and the çûnyatâ, Açvaghosha had the melody played by musicians, who, however, not being able to grasp the significance of the piece, failed to produce the intended tune and harmony. He then donned a white woolen dress, joined the band of musicians, beating the drum, ringing the bell, and tuning the lyre, and this done, the melody in full perfection gave a note at once mournful and soothing, so as to arouse in the mind of the audience the idea of the misery, emptiness, and non-âtman-ness of all things. The five hundred royal princes in the city thus moved all at once were fully awakened, and abhorring the curse of the five evil passions abandoned their worldly life and took refuge in the Bodhi. The king of Pâtali­putra was very much terrified by the event, thinking that if the people who listen to this music would abandon their homes [like the princes], his country would be depopulated and his royal business ruined. So he warned the people never to play this music hereafter.

WORKS IN CHINESE TRANSLATIONS.

The works ascribed to Açvaghosha and still existing in Chinese translations are eight in number. They are: (1) The 大乘起信論 Tai shêng ch'i hsin lun (Mahâ-yânaçraddhôtapâdaçâstra): discourse on the awakening of
faith in the Mahāyāna. It is the principal work of Aśvaghosha, and through this we are able to recognise what an important position he occupies in the development of the Mahāyānistic world-conception and theory of final emancipation. Its outlines and the accounts of its Chinese translation will be given below.

(2) The 大宗地玄文 本論 Ta sung ti hsüan wen pên lun, a fundamental treatise on the spiritual stages for reaching final deliverance. The book has a decided tendency to mysticism, explaining a gradual development of religious consciousness through fifty-one different spiritual stages. It may be considered a precursory work out of which Vajrabodhi’s Mantrism finally made a full manifestation. It was translated by Paramârtha between A. D. 557–569. Twenty fasciculi, forty chapters.

(3) The 大莊嚴論經 Ta chuang yen lun ching (Mahālamkārasūtra-cāstra), the Book of Great Glory, or a compilation of stories illustrating the retribution of karma. The stories relate mostly to the events that occurred in Western India. Beal translated some of them in his Buddhist Literature in China. The Chinese translator is Kumārajīva, circa A. D. 405. Fifteen fasciculi.

(4) The 佛所行讃 Fo shu hing tsan (Buddha-caritatākāvya), a well known poem on the life of Buddha. The Chinese translation is by Dharmaraksha between A. D. 414-421. Five fasciculi, twenty eight chapters, Beal’s English translation forms Vol. XIX. of The Sacred Books of the East; and Cowell’s translation from Sanskrit, Vol. XLIX of the same.
AŚVAGHOSHA'S

Ni kan tzü wen wu wu i ching, a sūtra on a Nirgrantha's asking about the theory of non-ego. The book foreshadows the Mādhyamika philosophy of Nāgārjuna, for the two forms of truth are distinguished there, Pure Truth (Parmārtha-satya) and Practical Truth (Samvṛtti-satya),¹ and the Ĉānyatā theory also is proclaimed. (6) The 十不善業道經 Shih pu shan yeh tao ching, a sūtra on the ten no-good deeds. (7) The 事師法五十頌 Shih shih fa wu shih sung, fifty verses on the rules of serving a master or teacher. (8) The 六趣輪廻經 Lu tao lun 'hui ching, a sūtra on transmigration through the six states of existence. These last four works are very short, all translated by Jih-ch'êng (Divayaças?), between A. D. 1004–1058.

CHINESE TRANSLATIONS OF THE “DISCOURSE ON THE AWAKENING OF FAITH.”

Let us give here some remarks on the Chinese translations of Āśvaghosha's principal and best known work The Awakening of Faith. The Sanskrit original is long lost, probably owing to the repeated persecutions of Buddhism by Chinese emperors at different times. According to the Chêng yiüan catalogue 貞元録 (compiled between A. D. 785–804) the Sanskrit text is said to have existed at that time. It is a great pity that such an important Buddhist philosophical work

¹ Notice Āśvaghosha's discussion with Puṇyayaças as above mentioned.
as the present āṣṭra can be studied only through translations.\(^1\)

There are two Chinese translations still existing in the Tripitaka collection. The first translation was made by Paramārtha (婆羅末陀), otherwise called Kulanātha (狗羅那陀), of Ujjayana (or Ujjayini, modern Oujein) in Western India. He came to China A. D. 546 and died A. D. 569 when he was 71 years old. Among many other translations, the present one came from his pen on the tenth day of September, A. D. 554.

The second one is by Čikșhānanda (實叉難陀), of Kusutana (Khoten), who began his work on the eighth of October, A. D. 700. He died in China A. D. 710 at the age of 59.

As to the problem whether the original of the two Chinese translations is the same or different, my impression is that they were not the same text, the one having been brought from Ujjayana and the other from Khoten. But the difference, as far as we can judge from the comparison of the two versions, is not fundamental.

In the preface to the second translation of the Kao

\(^1\)An inquiry has been made by the present English translator as to whether the original Sanskrit copy could be found either in India or in Nepal; but Prof. Satis Chandra Āchāryya, of the Buddhist Text Society, Calcutta, with whom he has been communicating on the subject, informs him that as far as India is concerned there is almost no hope of securing it, and also that his friend in Nepal has been unable so far to discover the original.
li edition, the unknown writer states to the following effect: “The present Çâstra has two translations. The first one is by Paramârtha and the second one is from the Sanskrit text brought by Çikshânanda who found also the older Sanskrit original in the Tz'u an tower. As soon as he had finished the rendering of the Ava-tamsakasûtra into Chinese, he began a translation of his own text with the assistance of several native Buddhist priests. The new translation occasionally deviates from the older one, partly because each translator had his own views and partly because the texts themselves were not the same.”

Though the Chêng yüan 聖元錄 as well as the K'ai yüan¹ 聖元錄 catalogue affirm that the two translations were from the same text, this can only mean that they were not radically divergent. For if any two editions differ so slightly as not to affect the essential points, they can be said to be practically the same text.

Which of the two translations then is the more correct? To this question we cannot give any definite answer as the originals are missing. The first translation has found a more popular acceptance in Japan as well as in China, not because it is more faithful to the original, but because a most learned and illustrious Buddhist scholar called Fa tsang 法藏 (A. D.

¹ A catalogue of Buddhist books collected in the K'ai yüan period (A. D. 713–741) of the Tung Dynasty, by Chih-shang, A. D. 730. Its full name K'ai yüan shih chiao lu. Twenty fasciculi.
643–712) wrote a commentary on it. And on that account the commentary is more studied than the text itself. Fa tsang assisted Çikshânanda in preparing the second translation, but he preferred the first one for his commentary work, partly because the first one had already found a wide circulation and some commentators before his time, and partly because both translations agreeing in all their important points, he did not like to show his “partiality,” as a commentator on Fa tsang says, to the one in the preparation of which he himself took part.

The present English translation is made from the second Chinese version by Çikshânanda, but the first version has been carefully compared with it, and wherever disagreements occur between them they have been noticed in footnotes.

OUTLINES OF THE “DISCOURSE ON THE AWAKENING OF FAITH.”

I cannot help saying a few words here about the importance of Açvaghosha’s main work which is scarcely known in the West, and if so, wrongly. Even Samuel Beal who is considered one of the best authorities on Chinese Buddhism, makes a misleading reference to our author in his Buddhism in China. The following quotation from the same apparently shows that at least when he wrote it, in 1884, he had a very insufficient knowledge of the subject. He says (page 138):
"His (Ačvaghosha's) writings still survive in a Chinese form, and when examined will probably be found to be much tinged by a pseudo-Christian element. . . . But there is one book, the K‘i-sin-lun, or 'Treatise for Awakening Faith,' which has never yet been properly examined, but, so far as is known, is based on doctrines foreign to Buddhism and allied to a perverted form of Christian dogma." The incorrectness of this statement will readily be seen by the reader when we proceed further on.

Wassiljew, another of the highest Western authorities on the subject, seems to be entirely ignorant of the existence of the present work. It is very strange that those who are considered to be quite well acquainted with the development of the Mahāyānistic thought, do not place in the right light a prominent, if not the principal, actor, who, so far as is known to us, practically initiated this great spiritual and intellectual movement in India. Wassiljew says in his *Buddhismus* (pp. 83-84):

"Zu welcher besonderen Schule Ačvaghosha gehörte, wird nicht mit Bestimmtheit überliefert: aus der Legende, nach welcher er sich bei der Abfassung der Vibhâshâ betheiligte, dürfen wir jedoch den Schluss ziehen, dass er zu den Repräsentanten der Vaibhâschika's gerechnet ward."

It is true that in the *Life of Vasubandhu* Ačvaghosha is said to have taken part in the compilation of the Vibhâshâ, but it is of no account whatever in the
face of the present book in which we can clearly trace almost all elements of the thought fully developed afterwards by Nâgârjuna and other later Mahâyâna representatives.

I wish here, in order to show the significance of AÇvaghosha, to call the attention of the reader to the three most salient points in his doctrine which will distinguish him from all Hînayâna schools. The three points constituting the gist of this Çâstra then are: (1) the conception of suchness (Bhûtatathatâ); (2) the theory of the triple personality; (3) the salvation by faith or the Sukhâvati doctrine.

The conception of suchness assumes other names, namely, The Womb of the Tathâgata (Thatâgatagarbha), when considered from its embracing all possible merits, and the All-Conserving Mind (Âlayavijñâna), when it becomes the principle of evolution and is said to have developed from the teaching of Buddha as expounded in the old canonical sûtras, such as the Lankâvatâra and the Çrimalâ. Whatever the origin of the idea of suchness might have been, its "absolute aspect" evidently foreshadows the Çunyatâ philosophy of the Mâdhyaamika school. It is very doubtful whether Nâgârjuna, as told in a Chinese tradition, was a personal disciple of AÇvaghosha, but it is highly probable that he was much influenced by him in forming his system.

The second thesis, the theory of the triple personality, that is one of the most distinctive characteris-
tics of the Mahâyâna Buddhism, seems to have been first established by Açvaghosha. The pantheistic idea of suchness (Bhūtatathatā), and the religious consciousness which always tends to demand something embodied in infinite love (karund) and infinite wisdom (jñāna), and the scientific conception of the law of causation regulating our ethical as well as physical world, or in short the doctrine of karma,—these three factors working together in the mind of Açvaghosha, culminated in his theory of the triple personality.

The doctrine of salvation by faith whereon the Japanese Shin Shyu (True Sect) and Jôdô Shyu (Pure Land Sect) laid down their foundation also, appears first in the present çâstra. If the quotation in the Mahâyânaçraddhotpâda actually refers to the Sukhāvatī Sûtras, as we may fairly assume, there is a great probability in the statement that during the first four centuries after the Nirvâna there was already a variety of free interpretations about the teaching of the Master, which, commingled with the other religio-philosophical thoughts in India, eventually made a full development under the general names of the Mahâyâna and the Hînayâna schools.

A supplementary point to be noticed in Açvaghosha is the abundance of similar thoughts and passages with those in the Bhagavadgita. The coincidence between the latter and the Saddharma-pûndarika has been pointed out by Kern in his Buddhismus und seine Geschichte (Vol. II., p. 500, footnote). While it is an
open question which of the two has an earlier date, the Mahâyâna Buddhism as a whole must be permitted to have some common points with the canonical book of Çivaism.

In conclusion I wish to state that as this book, the *Awakening of Faith*, is of paramount importance in its being the first attempt of systematising the fundamental thoughts of the Mahâyâna Buddhism, as well as in its forming a main authority of all the Mahâyânistic schools, those who study the doctrinal history of Buddhism cannot dispense with it; and that, in spite of its highest importance, no attempt has yet been made to make it accessible to the reader who is not familiar with the Chinese language, and so I here offer to the public an English translation of the entire text.
ADORATION.

ADORATION to the World-honored Ones (*Bhagavat*)\(^1\) in all the ten quarters, who universally produce great benefits, whose wisdom is infinite and transcendent, and who save and guard [all beings].

[Adoration] to the Dharma\(^2\) whose essence and

\(^1\) There are ten appellations most commonly given to a Buddha: (1) *Tathāgata* (the one who thus comes, or he who has been expected and fulfils all expectations, the perfect one); (2) *Arhat* (the worthy one, but according to Nāgārjuna's *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra*, Chinese translation by Kumārajīva, Vol. III., p. 17, one who has destroyed all enemies of evil passions, or one who is revered by gods and men, or one who will not be reborn; see also Vol. II., p. 20); (3) *Samyaksambuddha* (one who is perfect by enlightenment); (4) *Vidyācaranasampanna* (one who is perfect in knowledge and conduct); (5) *Sugata* (one who goes well); (6) *Lokavid* (one who knows the world); (7) *Anuttara* (one who has no superior); (8) *Purushadāmysārathi* (the tamer of all beings); (9) *Cātūdevāmanushyāndm* (the teacher of gods and men); (10) *Buddha* (the enlightened one). When *Lokavid* and *Anuttara* are considered to be one title, as in the *Sutra on the Ten Appellations*, *Bhagavat* is added to make the tenth.

\(^2\) According to a general interpretation of Mahāyāna Buddhists dharma means: (1) that which exists; (2) the object of understanding. Dharma may therefore be rendered in the first sense by "object," or "thing," or "substance," or "being," including everything mental as well as physical in its broadest sense, and so sarvadharma will designate all possible existences in the uni-
attributes are like the ocean, revealing to us the principle of anâtman and forming the storage of infinite merits.

[Adoration] to the congregation (samgha) of those who assiduously aspire after perfect knowledge (samvakśambodhi).

That all beings (sarvasattva) may rid themselves of doubt, become free from evil attachment, and, by the awakening of faith (graddha), inherit Buddha-seeds, I write this Discourse.¹

verse; while dharma in the second sense may safely be rendered by "law" or "doctrine" as generally understood by Western Buddhist scholars, to most of whom, however, the first significance of the term is strangely unknown. Max Müller fitly remarks in his introduction to the English translation of the Vajracchedikâ, p. xiv: "Dharma in its ordinary Buddhist phraseology may be correctly rendered by law. Thus the whole teaching of Buddha is called the good law, Saddharma. But in our treatise dharma is generally used in a different sense. It means form (cîdoç) and likewise what is possessed of form, what is therefore different from other things, what is individual, in fact, what we mean by a thing or an object. This meaning has escaped most of the translators, both Oriental and Western, but if we were always to translate dharma by law, it seems to me that the whole drift of our treatise would become unintelligible." In this translation dharma is rendered sometimes by "thing," sometimes by "law," sometimes by "truth" or "doctrine," according to the context. But when it is synonymous with suchness (bhûlatatthatâ), I have retained its original Sanskrit form, capitalised.

¹An almost similar passage is repeated in the succeeding paragraph, while it does not occur in the older translation. It may be a mistake on the part of the new translation, but I have left it as it stands in the text.
DISCOURSE.

FOR the purpose of awakening in all beings a pure faith in the Mahāyāna,¹ of destroying their doubts and attachment to false doctrines, and of affording them an uninterrupted inheritance of Buddha-seeds, I write this Discourse.

There is a principle whereby the root of faith in the Mahāyāna can be produced, and I shall explain it.

The explanation consists of five parts:

¹ The term Mahāyāna here seems not to have been used as it usually is in contrast to the Hinayāna. Açvaghosha adopts it simply to denote the greatness of suchness (bhūtatatthātā) as well as to prove its being the safest and surest means of salvation. It is therefore the name given to the first principle itself, and not to any philosophical system or religious dogmatics. But the term used in this wise by Açvaghosha and perhaps in earlier Mahāyāna texts gradually lost its original sense in the course of the development of this progressive religious view. It was then transferred to distinguish the system at large from that of the so-called Çrāvakas, to which the followers of the former gave in contrast to their own the rather humiliating name Hinayāna. At the time of Açvaghosha the controversy between them was probably not as vehement as it proved later on. And this fact may be seen from the tolerant spirit shown in the third convocation under the reign of King Kanishka. By the Mahāyāna followers Açvaghosha is unanimously recognised as the forerunner of Nāgārjuna by whose marvellous genius the system was brought to maturity.
THE AWAKENING OF FAITH.

I. Introductory.

II. General Statement of Principles.

III. The Explanation Itself.

IV. The Practice of Faith.

V. Benefits [derived therefrom].

I. INTRODUCTORY.

There are eight inducements [to write this Dis­course]:

1. A general object, i. e., that the author might induce all beings to liberate themselves from misery and to enjoy blessing, and not that he might gain thereby some worldly advantages, etc.

2. That he might unfold the fundamental truth of the Tathâgata and let all beings have a right comprehension of it.

3. That he might enable those who have brought their root of merit (kuçalamûla) to maturity and obtained immovable faith, to have a philosophical grasp of the doctrine of the Mahâyâna.

4. That he might enable those whose root of merit is weak and insignificant, to acquire faith and to advance to the stage of immovable firmness (avaivarti-katva).¹

5. That he might induce all beings to obliterate

¹Avaivartikatva means literally "never retreat." Faith is said to become immovably firm when one enters into the group of those who cannot be shaken in the possession of absolute truth (samyaktvaniyatarâçi). For a further explanation see the reference in the Index to samyaktvaniyatarâçi.
the previously acquired evils (durgati or karmāvarana),
to restrain their own thoughts, and to free themselves
from the three venomous passions.¹

6. That he might induce all beings to practise the
orthodox method of cessation [or tranquilisation ca-
matha] and of intellectual insight (vidarṣana),² to be
fortified against the commission of mental trespasses
due to inferiority of mind.

7. That he might induce all beings in the right
way to ponder on the doctrine of the Mahāyāna, for
thus they will be born in the presence of Buddhas,³
and acquire the absolutely immovable Mahāyāna-
faith.

8. That he might, by disclosing those benefits
which are produced by joyfully believing in the Mahā-
yāna, let sentient beings become acquainted with the
final aim of their efforts.

Though all these doctrines are sufficiently set forth

¹ They are: (1) covetousness (lobha); (2) malice (dvesha); (3)
ignorance (moha).

² Camathā and Vidarṣana or Vipaṣyana constitute one of
the five methods of discipline, for whose full explanation see the
reference in the Index to these terms.

³ This passage, which is considered to be a reference to the
Sukhāvatī Sūtras, such as the Larger and the Smaller Sukhāvati-
vyāha, or the Amitāyur-dhyāna, seems to prove that some of the
Mahāyāna texts of the Pure Land Sect had been in existence be-
fore the time of Aśvaghosha who gives towards the end of his Dis-
course a quotation apparently taken from one of the above-men-
tioned Sūtras. The Sūtras therefore must be at least one or two
hundred years older than Aśvaghosha, in order that they might be
quoted as an authentic teaching of Buddha.
in the Mahâyâna Sûtras,¹ yet as the predispositions and inclinations of the people² are not the same, and the conditions for obtaining enlightenment vary, I now write this Discourse.

There is another reason for doing so. At the time of the Tathâgata the people were unusually gifted, and the Buddha's presence, majestic both in mind and body, served to unfold the infinite significances of the Dharma with simplicity and yet in perfection. Accordingly there was no need for a philosophical discourse (çâstra).

After the Nirvâna of the Buddha there were men who possessed in themselves the intellectual power to understand the many-sided meanings of the Sûtras,³

¹ The view here proposed by Aśvaghosha, which is called by Chinese Buddhists the theory of the evolution of the Tathâgata-garbha, is considered to be an elucidation of the doctrine taught by Buddha in such Mahâyâna Sûtras as the Lankâvatâra, Ghanavîhâra, CûRVâna, Çrîmâlâ, etc.

² Literally, those who are to be converted.

³ There are twelve divisions called Angas in the Mahâyânist writings, while in the Pâli only nine are counted. The twelve angas are: (1) sūtra (aphorisms); (2) geya (verses in which the same thing is repeated as in the prose part); (3) vyâkarana (Buddha's prophecy about Bodhisattva's attainment of Buddhahood in the future); (4) gîthâ (independent verses); (5) udâna (sermons on Buddha's own account); (6) nidâna (sermons as the occasion required); (7) avadâna (legends, but according to Chinese interpretation parables); (8) ityukta (speeches relating to the former deeds of Bodhisattvas); (9) jûtaka (accounts of Buddha's own former lives); (10) vaipulya (doctrines of deep significance); (11) adbhutadharma (extraordinary phenomena); (12) upâdeśa (expositions).
even if they read only a few of them. There were others who by their own intellectual powers could understand the meanings of the Sūtras only after an extensive reading of many of them. Still others lacking in intellectual powers of their own could understand the meanings of the Sūtras only through the assistance of elaborate commentaries. But there are some who, lacking in intellectual powers of their own, shun the perusal of elaborate commentaries and take delight in studying and cultivating enquiries which present the many-sidedness and universality of the doctrine in a concise form.

For the sake of the people of the last class I write this Discourse, in which the most excellent, the deepest, and the most inexhaustible Doctrine of the Tathāgata will be treated in comprehensive brevity.

II. GENERAL STATEMENT.

In what does the general statement consist?

The Mahāyāna can be briefly treated as to two aspects, namely, What it is, and What it signifies.¹

¹ "What is" and "What signifies" are respectively in Chinese 有法 and 法, but in the older translation 有法 and 義. This is a little puzzling, but if we bear in mind that in Chinese as well as in Sanskrit 有法 or dharma means both the substance itself and its attribute or significance, or law that regulates its movements, we will understand that Paramārtha, the first translator, used 有法 here in the sense of substance or "what is," while Čikshānanda, the second translator, used the word in the sense of significance or that by which a thing is conceived, the ordinary meaning of 義.
What is the Mahâyâna? It is the soul\(^1\) of all sentient beings (sarvasattva), that constitutes all things in the world, phenomenal and supra-phenomenal; and through this soul we can disclose what the Mahâyâna signifies.

Because the soul in itself, involving the quintessence of the Mahâyâna, is suchness (bhûtatathâtâ), but it becomes [in its relative or transitory aspect, through the law of causation] birth-and-death (samsâra) in which are revealed the quintessence, the attributes, and the activity of the Mahâyâna.

The Mahâyâna has a triple significance.\(^3\)

The first is the greatness of quintessence. Because the quintessence of the Mahâyâna as suchness

\(^1\) "Soul" is not used here in a dualistic sense, but as Dr. Paul Carus defines it in the last chapter of *The Soul of Man*. Speaking of the soul of the universe he defines the term as "the formative principle which gave and still gives shape to the world" (*loc. cit.,* first edition, p. 437). The literal translation of the Chinese character 心 hsin is kernel, or heart, or essence of all things. The Chinese hsin, however, is rather indiscriminately used in our text for both Sanskrit terms, *Hrdaya* (kernel or heart) and *Citta* (mind, the thinking faculty). These terms are more or less synonymous, especially from Açvaghosha's standpoint, that does not allow the transcendental existence of a metaphysical soul-entity. In this translation soul denotes the absolute aspect of suchness, and mind its relative aspect, wherever this distinction is noticeable.

\(^2\) This is a literal translation of the Chinese *chu shi chien* 出世間. It signifies anything transcending conditionality or worldliness.

\(^3\) This triad which has a striking similarity to Spinoza's conception of substance, attributes and modes, also reminds us of the first principles (*padârtha*) of the Vaiçeshika philosophy, that is, substance (*dravya*), qualities (*guna*), and action (*karma*).
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exists in all things, remains unchanged in the pure as well as in the defiled, is always one and the same (samatā), neither increases nor decreases, and is void of distinction.

The second is the greatness of attributes. Here we have the Tathāgata's womb (tathāgatagarbha) which in exuberance contains immeasurable and innumerable merits (punya) as its characteristics.

The third is the greatness of activity, for it [i.e., Mahāyāna] produces all kinds of good work in the world, phenomenal and supra-phenomenal. [Hence the name Mahāyāna (great vehicle).]

[Again this Dharma is called the Mahāyāna; because it is the vehicle (yāna) in which all Buddhas

1 Tathāgata literally means one who thus or truly comes. That the omnipresent principle of suchness could come or go appeared contradictory and seemed to render an explanation necessary. The Vajracchedikā-Sūtra, Max Müller's English translation, Chap. XXIX: "And again, O Subhūti, if anybody were to say that the Tathāgata goes, or comes, or stands, or sits, or lies down, he, O Subhūti, does not understand the meaning of my preaching. And why? Because the word Tathāgata means one who does not go anywhere, and does not come from anywhere; and therefore he is called the Tathāgata (truly come), holy and fully enlightened."

2 Cf. the Bhavadgītā (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. VIII., Chap. XIV., p. 107): "The great Brahman is a womb for me, in which I cast the seed. From that, O descendant of Bharata! is the birth of all things. Of the bodies, O son of Kuntī! which are born from all wombs, the main womb is the great Brahman, and I am the father, the giver of the seed."

3 Cf. the Saddharma-pundarika, Chap. II. (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XXI., p. 40): "'By means of one sole vehicle, to wit, the Buddha-vehicle, Čāriputra, do I teach creatures the law; there is no second, nor a third."

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from the beginning have been riding, and Bodhisattvas\(^1\) when riding in it will enter into the state of Buddhahood.

### III. THE EXPLANATION.

In what does the explanation of the general statement consist?

This part consists of three subdivisions:

1. The Revelation of the True Doctrine.
2. The Refutation of False Doctrines.
3. The Practice of the Right Path.

#### \(1\). The Revelation of the True Doctrine.

In the one soul we may distinguish two aspects. The one is the Soul as suchness (bhūtatatthatā), the other is the soul as birth-and-death (samsāra). Each in itself constitutes all things, and both are so closely interrelated that one cannot be separated from the other.

#### A. The Soul as Suchness.

What is meant by the soul as suchness (bhūtatatthatā), is the oneness of the totality of things (dharmanadhātu),\(^2\) the great all-including whole, the quintes-

\(1\) Literally, one who seeks perfect enlightenment, or one who is full of wisdom and compassion.

\(2\) S. Beal in his English translation of Aśvaghosha’s Buddhacarita (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XIX., p. 324, footnote) considers dharmanadhātu to be “the mystic or ideal world of the Northern Buddhists” and says it means literally the “limit of dharma.” The interpretation is evidently wrong, not only because dhātu according to the Madhyanta-vibhāga-ṭātra by Vasubandhu.
sence of the Doctrine. For the essential nature of the soul is uncreate and eternal.

All things, simply on account of our confused subjectivity (smrti),\(^1\) appear under the forms of individuation. If we could overcome our confused subjectivity, the signs of individuation would disappear, and there would be no trace of a world of [individual and isolated] objects.\(^2\)

Therefore all things in their fundamental nature are not namable or explicable. They cannot be adequately expressed in any form of language. They are

(two Chinese translations: one by Paramârtha A. D. 557–569, and the other by Hsüan-tsang A. D. 691) means root, base, cause, or principle; but because Dharmadhâtu, fa kai 法界 in Chinese, is not used by the Northern Buddhists in the sense that Beal gives. It means on the other hand this actual world considered from the point of its forming the basis of the law; or, to use modern scientific terminology, it is existence in its organised totality. Açvaghosha uses the term here in this sense.

\(^1\) The term is usually rendered by recollection or memory, but Açvaghosha uses it apparently in a different sense. It must mean subjectivity, or the perception of particularity, or that mental activity which is not in accordance with the suchness of things; if otherwise, the whole drift of the present Discourse becomes totally unintelligible. Smrti is in some degree obviously synonymous with Avidya (ignorance) which is more general and more primordial than the former. Ignorance appears first and when it starts the world-process, "subjectivity" is evolved, which in its turn causes particularisation to take place. Particularisation does not annihilate suchness, but it overshadows the light of its perfect spiritual wisdom.

\(^2\) Schopenhauer who says, "no subject without object," seems to express a similar idea that without subjectivity, "the objective world," i. e., "the world as Vorstellung, as representation of objects" would vanish.
without the range of apperception. [They are universals.] They [things in their fundamental nature] have no signs of distinction. [They are not particulars.] They possess absolute sameness (samatā). [They are universals.] They are subject neither to transformation, nor to destruction. They are nothing but the one soul, for which suchness is another designation. Therefore they cannot be [fully] explained by words or exhausted by reasoning.

While all words and expressions are nothing but representations and not realities, and their existence depends simply on our confused subjectivity, suchness has no attribute [of particularity] to speak of. But the term suchness is all that can be expressed in language, and through this term all other terms may be disposed of.

In the essence of suchness, there is neither anything which has to be excluded, nor anything which has to be added.¹

¹ If I understand Āśvaghosha correctly, he intends to say that to the sentient subject the world consists of a number of isolated objects. The nature of subjectivity is sense-apperception; and in sense-apperception the particular things are represented in the particularity only, not in their suchness as momentarily materialised universals. We must overcome subjectivity in order to discover suchness; but when suchness is recognised, it is at once understood to constitute the essence and only true reality of things.

² The older translation has: "In the essence of suchness, there is nothing to be excluded, for all things are true; nor is there anything to be added, for all things are such as they are. Be it known therefore that as thus all things are undemonstrable and
Now the question arises: If that be so, how can all beings conform to and have an insight into [suchness]?

The answer is: As soon as you understand that when the totality of existence is spoken of, or thought of, there is neither that which speaks nor that which is spoken of, there is neither that which thinks nor that which is thought of; then you conform to suchness; and when your subjectivity is thus completely obliterated, it is said to have the insight.

Again there is a twofold aspect in suchness if viewed from the point of its explicable. The first is trueness as negation (ङ्ययतः),¹ in the sense that unrepresentable [by our confused understanding], they are called suchness."

¹ The term ङ्ययतः which means literally void or emptiness, has suffered a great deal of misunderstanding by those who are not well acquainted with Buddhist phraseology. If Mahāyānists used the term, as imagined by some critics, in the sense of absolute nothingness, denying the existence of everything conditional as well as unconditional, relative as well as independent, how could they speak about the highest truth (परमार्थसत्य) or the most excellent perfect enlightenment (अनुत्तरसमयाक-सम्बोधि) which all conveys the sense of affirmation? What the ङ्ययतः doctrine positively insists on, is the denial of sensationalism, and the annihilation of the imagination that weaves a dualistic world-conception. If this could be called a nihilism, every intellectual attempt to reach a unitary view of the universe would be nihilistic, for it declares the untenability of a separate existence of matter and thought, me and not-me, etc. It is odd enough that such a self-evident truth should have escaped the keen observance of Christian critics. Ācārya here states that the भूततत्ततः is at once ङ्यया and अङ्यया. It is ङ्यया because it transcends all forms of separation and individuation; it is अङ्यया because all possible things in the world emanate from it. Even Nāgārjuna
it is completely set apart from the attributes of all things unreal, that it is the real reality. The second is trueness as affirmation (açûñyatâ), in the sense that it contains infinite merits, that it is self-existent.

And again by trueness as negation we mean that in its [metaphysical] origin it has nothing to do with things defiled [i.e., conditional], that it is free from all signs of distinction existing among phenomenal objects, that it is independent of unreal, particularising consciousness.

Thus we understand that suchness (bhûtatatathatâ) is neither that which is existence, nor that which is non-existence, nor that which is at once existence and non-existence, nor that which is not at once existence and non-existence; that it is neither that which is unity, nor that which is plurality, nor that which is at once unity and plurality, nor that which is not at once unity and plurality.¹

who is supposed to be the founder of the nihilistic Prajâpâramitâ system by Christian students of Buddhism, says in his Mâdhyamika-cûstra, Chap. XXII., that the idea of çûnyatâ and that of açûnyatâ are both wrong, but that from the deficiency of language to denote the exact state of things he has made use of these terms. (Observe that Açvaghosha says the very same thing in the preceding passages.) Nâgârjuna therefore apparently had something in his mind to define, but that something having nothing in common with things we daily encounter in our sense-world, he designated it çûnya, empty, and he hoped by thus abnegating all phenomenal existences, we could reach the highest reality, for ignorant minds are deeply saturated with wrong affirmations and false judgements.

¹ Cf. Nâgârjuna's "Eight No's" doctrine which says: "There is no production (utpâda), no destruction (uccheda), no annihilation (nirodha), no persistence (çâvata), no unity (ekârtha), no
In a word, as suchness cannot be comprehended by the particularising consciousness of all beings, we call it the negation [or nothingness, \( \text{c\'unyata} \)].

The truth is that subjectivity does not exist by itself, that the negation (\( \text{c\'unyata} \)) is also void (\( \text{c\'unya} \)) in its nature, that neither that which is negated [viz., the external world] nor that which negates [viz., the mind] is an independent entity.

By the so-called trueness as affirmation, we mean that [as soon as we understand] subjectivity is empty and unreal, we perceive the pure soul manifesting itself as eternal, permanent, immutable and completely comprising all things that are pure. On that account we call it affirmation [or reality, or non-emptiness, \( \text{a\'c\'unyata} \)]. Nevertheless, there is no trace of affirmation in it, because it is not the product of a confused subjectivity, because only by transcending subjectivity (\( \text{smrti} \)) can it be grasped.

b. The Soul as Birth-and-Death.

The soul as birth-and-death (\( \text{sams\'ara} \)) comes forth [as the law of causation] from the Tath\'agata's womb (\( \text{Tath\'agatagarbha} \)). But the immortal [i.e., such-plurality (\( \text{n\'an\'artha} \))], no coming in (\( \text{\'agama} \)), no going out (\( \text{nir\'gama} \))." The statement means that pure truth (\( \text{\'param\'artha} \)) transcends all modes of relativity. (See the first chapter of the \( \text{M\'adhyamika-p\'astra} \).)

1 In the Kantian sense of "things in themselves." The M\'adhyamika school would say they are all \( \text{A\'tyanta-\'unyata} \), complete void, meaning that things are subject to transformation and have no absolute existence.
ness] and the mortal [i.e., birth-and-death] coincide with each other. Though they are not identical, they are not a duality. [Thus when the absolute soul assumes a relative aspect by its self-affirmation] it is called the all-conserving mind (ālaya-vijñāna).

The same mind has a twofold significance as the organiser and the producer of all things.

Again it embraces two principles: (1) Enlightenment; (2) Non-enlightenment.

Enlightenment is the highest quality of the mind; it is free from all [the limiting] attributes of subjectivity (smrti). As it is free from all [limiting] attri-

1 Cf. the Bhagavadgītā, Chap. IX., p. 84: "I am immortality and also death; and I, O Arjuna! am that which is and that which is not." See also Chap. X., p. 90.

2 Ālaya or Alaya comes from the root lt, which means: adhere; melt, dissolve; sit upon, dwell in, stay in, etc.; while its nominal form laya means: act of clinging; melting, fusion, solution, dissolution; rest, repose; place of rest, residence, house, dwelling. According to Paramārtha, who belongs to the so-called "Older Translators," the original Sanskrit equivalent of the "all-conserving mind" seems to be alaya or aliya, for he translates it by Wu mo shíh, not-disappearing mind, in the sense that this mind retains everything in it. But Hsüan-tsang, the leader of the "New Translators," renders it by tsang shíh, that is, the mind that hoards or preserves, or dwelling-mind or receptacle-mind, according to which the original seems to be ālaya, or laya with the prefix ā instead of its negative form with the particle a. The ultimate significance of the term in question, however, does not materially differ, whether it is wu mo, not-disappearing, or tsang, house, place of keeping things. My translation of the same is rather liberal, in order to make it more intelligible to the general reader. Some other names given to the ālaya-vijñāna are citta, mind; ādāna, the supporting; ādṛaya, foundation or seeds.
butes of subjectivity, it is like unto space (ākāśa), penetrating everywhere, as the unity of all (dharma-dhātu). That is to say, it is the universal Dharma-kāya\(^1\) of all Tathāgatas.

On account of this Dharma-kāya, all Tathāgatas are spoken of as abiding in enlightenment \textit{a priori}.

Enlightenment \textit{a priori} is contrasted with enlightenment \textit{a posteriori}. Through enlightenment \textit{a posteriori} is gained no more than enlightenment \textit{a priori}.

Now we speak of enlightenment \textit{a posteriori}; because there is enlightenment \textit{a priori}, there is non-

\(^{1}\text{There seems to be a general misconception about the exact significance of the term Dharma-kāya which constitutes the central point of the Mahāyāna system. Most Western Buddhist scholars render it the Body or Personality of the Law, understanding by law the doctrine of Buddha. This may be correct in the Southern Buddhism as well as in its historical sense, because after the Nirvāṇa of Buddha it was quite natural for his disciples to personify the doctrine of their teacher, as their now only living spiritual leader. But in the course of time it acquired entirely different significance and ceased to mean the personification of the Doctrine. Now dharma, as aforesaid, does not only mean law or doctrine, but also it means an individual object, an idea, a substance, or, when it is used in its broadest sense, existence in general. Kāya means a body or person, but not in the sense of an animated, sentient being; it denotes a system in which parts are connected, a unified whole, that which forms a basis, etc. Dharma-kāya therefore signifies that which constitutes the ultimate foundation of existence, one great whole in which all forms of individualization are obliterated, in a word, the Absolute. This objective absolute being meanwhile has been idealised by Mahāyānists so that that which knows is now identical with that which is known, because they say that the essence of existence is nothing but intelligence pure, perfect, and free from all possible worries and evils.}
enlightenment, and because there is non-enlightenment we can speak of enlightenment *a posteriori*.

Again, when the mind is enlightened as to its own ultimate nature, it is called perfect enlightenment; when it is not enlightened as to its ultimate nature, it is not perfect enlightenment.

Common people\(^1\) (*prthagjana*), who, becoming conscious of errors that occur in a succession of their mental states, abstain from making conclusions, may be spoken of as enlightened; but in reality theirs is non-enlightenment.

Črâvakas,\(^2\) Pratyekabuddhas, and those Bodhisattvas.

\(^1\) *Prthagjana* has a technical sense in Buddhism, for any one that is ignorant of the doctrine of non-ātman and commits all those actions which lead one to a constant transmigration, is counted among the *profanum vulgus*, to distinguish him from the Črâvaka, Pratyekabuddha, and Bodhisattva.

\(^2\) The *Saddharma-pundarika-Sūtra* contains an explanation of these terms generally adopted by Mahāyānists, which read as follows (see Kern's English translation of the same, Chap. III., p. 80): "Now, Čâriputra, the beings who have become wise have faith in the Tathāgata, the father of the world, and consequently apply themselves to his commandments. Amongst them there are some who, wishing to follow the dictates of an authoritative voice, apply themselves to the commandment of the Tathāgata to acquire the knowledge of the *four great truths*, for the sake of *their own* complete Nirvāṇa. These one may say to be those who, coveting the vehicle of the disciple (*Črâvaka*), fly from the triple world." . . . This is the definition given to the Črâvakayāna. We proceed next to that of the Pratyekabuddhayāna: "Other beings, desirous of the science without a master, of self-restraint and tranquillity, apply themselves to the commandment of the Tathāgata to learn to understand *causes and effects* (*i. e.*, the twelve chains of relation) for the sake of *their own* complete Nirvāṇa. These one may say to be those who, coveting the vehicle of the Pratyekabuddha,
sattvas who have just entered their course, recognising the difference between subjectivity and the transcending of subjectivity both in essence and attributes, have become emancipated from the coarse form of particularisation. This is called enlightenment in appearance.

Bodhisattvas of the Dharmakāya, having recognised that subjectivity and the transcending of subjectivity have no reality of their own [i.e., are relative], have become emancipated from the intermediate form of particularisation. This is called approximate enlightenment.

Those who have transcended the stage of Bodhisattvahood and attained the ultimate goal, possess a consciousness which is consistent and harmonious; fly from the triple world. ... Those who belong to these two classes desire to achieve only the salvation of their own, and not that of all mankind, in which respect Bodhisattvas stand far superior to them. We read in the same Sūtra to the following effect: "Others again, desirous of the knowledge of the all-knowing, the knowledge of Buddha, the knowledge of the self-born one, the science without a master, apply themselves to the commandment of the Tathāgata to learn to understand the knowledge, powers, and freedom from hesitation, of the Tathāgata, for the sake of the common weal and happiness, out of compassion to the world, for the benefit, weal, and happiness of the world at large, both gods and men, for the sake of the complete Nirvāṇa of all beings. These one may say to be those who, coveting the great vehicle (mahāyāna), fly from the triple world. Therefore they are called Bodhisattva Mahāsattva." (The italics are mine.)

1 Those who have recognised the all-prevailing Dharmakāya, but who have not as yet been able to perfectly identify themselves with it.
they have recognised the origin from which consciousness [or mentation] starts. This will truly be called enlightenment.

Having transcended the attributes of enlightenment and the subtlest form of particularisation, they [i.e., Buddhas] have gained a perfect and eternal insight into the very nature of the soul [i.e., suchness], because the latter now presents itself to them in its absolute and immutable form. Therefore they are called Tathagatas, and theirs is perfect enlightenment; and therefore it is said in the Sutra that those who have an insight into the non-reality of all subjectivity, attain to the wisdom of the Tathagata.

In the preceding statement we referred to the origin from which consciousness [or mentation] starts according to the popular expression. In truth there is no such thing as the origin of consciousness [or mentation]; for consciousness [being purely subjective] has no absolute [but only a phenomenal] existence. How can we then speak of its origin?

The multitude of people (bahujana) are said to be

1 Consciousness, i.e., mentation or mental activity, is transient, it takes place in time, and must not be confused with soul, or suchness, or eternal wisdom.

2 In the older translation these passages are somewhat simplified.

3 The Lankavatara Sutra. There are three Chinese translations of the same still extant among the Japanese Tripitaka collection: (1) by Guṇabhadra, A. D. 443, four fasciculi; (2) by Bodhiruci, A. D. 513, ten fasciculi; (3) by Čikṣṇananda, A. D. 700–704, seven fasciculi.
lacking in enlightenment, because ignorance (avidya) prevails there from all eternity, because there is a constant succession of confused subjective states (smrti) from which they have never been emancipated.

But when they transcend their subjectivity, they can then recognise that all states of mentation, viz., their appearance, presence, change, and disappearance [in the field of consciousness] have no [genuine] reality.¹ They are neither in a temporal nor in a spatial relation with the one soul,² for they are not self-existent.

When you understand this, you also understand that enlightenment a posteriori cannot be manufactured, for it is no other thing than enlightenment a priori [which is uncreate and must be discovered].³

And again enlightenment a priori, when implicated in the domain of defilement [i.e., relativity], is differentiated into two kinds of attributes:

(1) Pure wisdom (prajñā); (2) Incomprehensible activity (karma).⁴

¹ The older translation differs a little, but agrees in the main.
² The older translation reads: "The four states of mentation are simultaneous [they belong together in time, i.e., they are in uninterrupted succession], but have no self-existence, because enlightenment a priori always remains in its sameness."
³ This passage is wanting in the older translation.
⁴ The differentiation of enlightenment into two distinct qualities, wisdom and action, or, according to the terminology of later Mahāyānists, wisdom and love, constitutes one of the principal thoughts of the Mahāyāna Buddhism and shows a striking similarity to the Christian conception of God who is considered to be full of infinite love and wisdom.
By pure wisdom we understand that when one, by virtue of the perfuming\(^1\) power of the Dharma, disciplines himself truthfully [i. e., according to the Dharma], and accomplishes meritorious deeds, the mind [i. e., \(ālaya-vijñāna\)] which implicates itself with birth-and-death will be broken down, and the modes of the evolving-consciousness\(^2\) will be annulled; while the pure and genuine wisdom of the Dharmak\(ā\)ya manifests itself.\(^3\)

Though all modes of consciousness and mentation are mere products of ignorance, ignorance in its ultimate nature is identical and not-identical\(^4\) with enlightenment \(a\) \(p\)riori; and therefore ignorance in one sense is destructible, while in the other sense it is indestructible.

This may be illustrated by [the simile of] the water and the waves which are stirred up in the ocean. Here the water can be said to be identical [in one sense] and not-identical [in the other sense]\(^5\) with the waves. The waves are stirred up by the wind, but the water remains the same. When the wind ceases, the motion of the waves subsides; but the water remains the same.

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\(^1\) This term will be explained later on. See p. 84.

\(^2\) For the explanation see below, p. 76.

\(^3\) Note that the Dharmak\(ā\)ya is not the "Body of the Law," but suchness (\(bhūtatatthatā\)) itself, which transcends the limits of time and space as well as the law of causation.

\(^4\) Literally, "neither identical nor not-identical."

\(^5\) Literally, "neither identical nor not-identical."
Likewise, when the mind of all creatures which in its own nature is pure and clean, is stirred up by the wind of ignorance (avidya), the waves of mentality (vijñāna) make their appearance. These three [i.e., the mind, ignorance, and mentality], however, have no [absolute] existence, and they are neither unity nor plurality.¹

But the mind though pure in its essence is the source of the awakened [or disturbed] mentality. When ignorance is annihilated, the awakened mentality is tranquilised, whilst the essence of the wisdom remains unmolested.²

Incomprehensible activity which we know proceeds from pure wisdom, uninterruptedly produces all excellent spiritual states. That is to say, the personality (kāya) of the Tathāgata,³ which in exuberance contains immeasurable and ever-growing merits, reveals itself to all beings according to their various predispositions [or characters], and accomplishes for them innumerable [spiritual] benefits.

Further there is a fourfold significance in the na-

¹ That is, they are one in one sense, but different in the other sense.
² In the older translation the last two paragraphs read:

"Likewise the mind of all beings though clean and pure in its own nature is disturbed [or awakened] through the wind of ignorance. Neither the mind nor ignorance has any form and attribute [of its own]. They condition each other. But the mind itself not being the principle of disturbance its movability will cease when ignorance is gone, though its essence, wisdom, remains unmolested."
³ Or the Tathāgatagarbha.
ture of enlightenment whose purity may be likened unto space or a bright mirror.

The first great significance which may be likened unto space and a bright mirror, is trueness as negation (cûñyatā), in the sense that enlightenment is absolutely unobtainable by any modes of relativity or by any outward signs of enlightenment.

The second great significance which may be likened unto space and a bright mirror, is trueness as affirmation (acûñyatā), in the sense that all things [in their ultimate nature] are perfect and complete, and not subject to destruction; in the sense that all events in the phenomenal world are reflected in enlightenment, so that they neither pass out of it, nor enter into it, and that they neither disappear nor are destroyed; that they are in one eternal and immutable soul which by none of the defiled things can be defiled and whose wisdom-essence enveloping immeasurable and innumerable merits, becomes the cause of perfuming the minds of all beings.

The third great significance which may be likened unto space and a bright mirror, is the affirmation as free from the hindrances (âvarana), in the sense that enlightenment is forever cut off from the hindrances both affectional (kleçâvarana) and intellectual (jñeyâ-varana), as well as from the mind [i. e., ālaya-vijñāna] which implicates itself with birth-and-death, since it is in its true nature clean, pure, eternal, calm, and immutable.
The fourth great significance which may be likened unto space and a bright mirror, is the affirmation as unfolding itself, in the sense that on account of a liberation from the hindrances, it transforms and unfolds itself, wherever conditions are favorable, in the form of a Tathâgata or in some other forms, in order that all beings might be induced thereby to bring their root\(^1\) of merit (kuçalamûla) to maturity.\(^2\)

By the so-called non-enlightenment, we mean that as the true Dharma [i.e., suchness] is from all eternity not truthfully recognised in its oneness, there issues forth an unenlightened mind and then subjectivity (smrti). But this subjectivity has no self-existence independent of enlightenment a priori.

To illustrate: a man who is lost goes astray because he is bent on pursuing a certain direction; and his confusion has no valid foundation other than that he is bent on a certain direction.

It is even the same with all beings. They become

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\(^1\) Max Müller renders the term by "stock of merit," but I think "stock" is not very fitly adopted to denote the sense usually attached to it by Buddhists. According to them, karma, be it meritorious or not-meritorious, has an efficient power to bear the fruit; therefore every act done by us like the root of a plant has a regenerative force potentially reserved within itself, and does not, like a stock of things which are not necessarily alive, remain dormant lacking productive powers in it.

\(^2\) According to the older translation, the first significance is called the "mirror of transcendent (or empty) trueness"; the second, the "mirror of the perfuming principle"; the third, the "mirror of the dharma of liberation"; and the fourth, the "mirror of the perfuming cause."
unenlightened, foster their subjectivity and go astray, because they are bent on enlightenment. But non-enlightenment has no existence of its own, aside from its relation with enlightenment \textit{a priori}. And as enlightenment \textit{a priori} is spoken of only in contrast to non-enlightenment, and as non-enlightenment is a non-entity, true enlightenment in turn loses its significance too. [That is to say, they are simply relative.]

In blindness\textsuperscript{1} there arose non-enlightenment of which three aspects are to be noted. These three are not independent.

The first aspect is ignorant action (\textit{avidyakarma}).\textsuperscript{2} A disturbance\textsuperscript{3} of the mind [i. e., \textit{ālaya-vijñāna}] caused by non-enlightenment characterises the beginning of karma. When enlightened, the mind is no more dis-

\textsuperscript{1}Rather "carelessness." This is missing in the older translation.

\textsuperscript{2}The term "ignorant action" reminds us of Schopenhauer's "blind will" and we might translate the Chinese terms \textit{fu chiao} ignorant or unconscious, by "blind." On the other hand, the expression reminds one of Goethe's words in Faust: "Im Anfang war die That," i. e., in the beginning there was karma; and this karma starting in an unenlightened condition was blind or ignorant, it was as yet unconscious of its goal which is the attainment of the eternal truth, the discovery of enlightenment \textit{a priori}. Cf. also the \textit{Chândogya Upanisad}, VI, 2.

\textsuperscript{3}By "disturbance" is meant that the mind or soul, awaking from a state of perfect sameness and tranquillity, discriminates the subject and the object, me and not-me. The "disturbance" itself, however, is neither good nor bad; the fault lies in clinging to this dual aspect of existence as absolute, utterly ignoring their fundamental identity. Efface the clinging from your mind, and you are purified and saved.
turbed. But by its disturbance misery \( (duhkha) \) is produced according to the law of causation.

The second aspect is that which perceives [i. e., the ego or subject]. In consequence of the disturbance of the mind there originates that which perceives an external world. When the mind is not disturbed, perception does not take place.

The third aspect is the external world. Through perception an unreal external world originates. Independent of that which perceives [i. e., the ego or subject], there is no surrounding world [or the object].\(^1\)

Conditioned by the unreal external world, six kinds of phenomena arise in succession.

The first phenomenon is intelligence [i. e., sensation]. Being affected by the external world the mind becomes conscious of the difference between the agreeable and the disagreeable.

The second phenomenon is succession [i. e., memory]. Following upon intelligence, memory retains the sensations agreeable as well as disagreeable in a continuous succession of subjective states.

The third phenomenon is clinging. Through the retention and succession of sensations agreeable as well as disagreeable, there arises the desire of clinging.

The fourth phenomenon is an attachment to names

\(^1\)This is the idealistic phase of the Mahâyâna Buddhism. Berkeley says: "Take away the perceiving mind and you take away the objective world."
[or ideas, *samjñā*], etc.¹ By clinging the mind hypostasises all names whereby to give definitions to all things.

The fifth phenomenon is the performance of deeds (*karma*). On account of attachment to names, etc., there arise all the variations of deeds, productive of individuality.

The sixth phenomenon is the suffering due to the fetter of deeds. Through deeds suffering arises in which the mind finds itself entangled and curtailed of its freedom.

Be it therefore known that all defiled things do not exist by themselves, for all of them have arisen from ignorance.

Now there is a twofold relation between enlightenment and non-enlightenment: (1) identity; (2) non-identity.

The relation of identity may be illustrated by the

¹ Here is again a strange agreement with Western philosophy. The nominalists speak of names as mere *flatus vocis* and the things-in-themselves (i.e., what is conceived by names) are declared to be unknowable by Kant. Dr. Paul Carus goes one step further by declaring that there are no things-in-themselves, but forms-in-themselves, viz., the eternal types of beings or Plato's ideas. The clinging to names is based on the metaphysical error of interpreting names as entities or things-in-themselves, which exhibits the nominalistic phase of Buddhism. On the other hand, the strong emphasis laid on the reality of suchness, or what Dr. Carus calls the purely formal, shows the realistic phase of Buddhism. The word "'hypostasises" used in the next passage means literally in the younger translation "'firmly builds a basis for," in the older one we read literally "'one sets separately forth what is unreal, i.e., names and words."
simile of all kinds of pottery which though different are all made of the same clay. Likewise the undefiled (anācraiva) and ignorance (avidya) and their various transient forms come all from one and the same entity. Therefore Buddha teaches that all beings are from all eternity ever abiding in Nirvāna. In truth enlightenment cannot be manufactured, nor can it be created; it is absolutely intangible; it is no material existence that is an object of sensation.

The reason why enlightenment nevertheless assumes tangible material form is that it suffers defilement which is the source of all transient forms of manifestation. Wisdom itself has nothing to do with material phenomena whose characteristic feature is

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1 A dharma not subject to the transformation of birth and death is called 無漏 wu lou in Chinese and anācraiva in Sanskrit. It is commonly used in contrast to 有漏 yu lou and sācraiva, which means "defiled" or "conditional."

2 This teaching is set forth in the fourth chapter of the Vimalakirtinirdeśa Sūtra, one of the most popular Mahāyāna texts in China as well as in Japan. There are several Chinese translations still extant, the earliest of which was produced during the first half of the third century of the Christian era.

3 Observe that Nirvāna is here used as a synonym of suchness (bhūtatathatā).

4 That is to say, being mixed up in the material world. "Defilement" does not necessarily mean evil or immorality. Anything that does not come directly from the fountain-head of suchness, but is in some way or other "perfumed" by ignorance, the principle of individuation, is called defiled or impure. From the ethical point of view it may be good or bad, according to our subjective attitude towards it. All that should be avoided is a clinging to the phenomenal existence.
extension in space, and there are no attributes there by which wisdom can become tangible. This is the meaning of Buddha's brief statement just referred to.

The relation of non-identity may be illustrated by the difference that obtains among the various kinds of pottery. The relation among the undefiled and ignorance and their various transient forms of manifestation is similar to it.

And again, by the law of causation (*hetu-pratyaya*) in the domain of birth-and-death (*samsâra*) we mean that depending on the mind [i.e., *âlaya-vijñâna*] an evolution of the ego (*manas*) and consciousness (*vijñâna*)\(^1\) takes place in all beings.

What is meant by this?

In the all-conserving mind (*âlaya-vijñâna*) ignorance obtains; and from the non-enlightenment starts that which sees, that which represents, that which apprehends an objective world, and that which constantly particularises. This is called the ego (*manas*).

\(^1\) *Manovijnâna* in the older translation. Now *vijñâna* (or *manovijnâna*), *manas* and *citta* are to a certain extent synonymous and interchangeable, as all designating that which feels, thinks and wills, or what is commonly called mind. According to a general interpretation of Mahâyânists, the following distinction is made among them: *citta*, mind, is more fundamental, somehow corresponding to the conception of the soul, for it has the inherent capacity for ideation as well as for the power of storing up within itself the results of experience; the most characteristic feature of the *manas*, the ego, is to constantly reflect on itself and to unconsciously assert the existence of the ego; the *vijñâna*, consciousness, is principally the faculty of feeling, perceiving, discriminating, judging, etc., in short, general mental activity or consciousness.
Five different names are given to the ego [according to its different modes of operation].

The first name is activity-consciousness \((Karma-vijñāna)\) in the sense that through the agency of ignorance an unenlightened mind begins to be disturbed [or awakened].

The second name is evolving-consciousness \(\text{[pravṛtti-vijñāna, i. e.], the subject}\), in the sense that when the mind is disturbed, there evolves that which sees an external world.

The third name is representation-consciousness, in the sense that the ego \((\text{manas})\) represents [or reflects] an external world. As a clean mirror reflects the images of all description, it is even so with the representation-consciousness. When it is confronted, for instance, with the five objects of sense, it represents them at once, instantaneously, and without any effort.

The fourth name is particularisation-consciousness, in the sense that it discriminates between different things defiled as well as pure.

The fifth name is succession-consciousness [i. e., memory], in the sense that continuously directed by the awakening consciousness [or attention, \(\text{manaskara}\)] it \([\text{manas}]\) retains and never loses or suffers the destruction of any karma, good as well as evil, which had been sown in the past, and whose retribution, painful as well as agreeable, it never fails to mature, be it in the present or in the future; and also in the
sense that it unconsciously recollects things gone by, and in imagination anticipates things to come.

Therefore the three domains\(^1\) (*triloka*) are nothing but the self-manifestation of the mind [i. e., *ālaya-vijñāna* which is practically identical with suchness, *bhūtatatthatā*].\(^2\) Separated from the mind, there would be no such things as the six objects of sense.

Why?

Since all things, owing the principle of their existence to the mind (*ālaya-vijñāna*), are produced by subjectivity (*smṛti*), all the modes of particularisation are the self-particularisation of the mind. The mind in itself [or the soul] being, however, free from all attributes, is not differentiated. Therefore we come to the conclusion that all things and conditions in the phenomenal world, hypostasised and established only through ignorance (*avidya*) and subjectivity (*smṛti*) on the part of all beings, have no more reality than the images in a mirror.\(^3\) They evolve simply from

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\(^1\) They are: (1) Domain of feeling (*kāmaloka*); (2) Domain of bodily existence (*rūpaloka*); (3) Domain of incorporeality (*arūpaloka*).

\(^2\) The mind or *ālaya-vijñāna* is suchness (or, as Dr. Carus would say, "purely formal thought," ) in its operation, where it may be called the rational principle in nature or the *Gesetzmäßigkeit* of the cosmos. It manifests itself not only in human reason, but appears also as the principle of individuation, determining all particular forms of existence, as will be explained in the following lines.

\(^3\) Compare Schopenhauer's conception of the world as *Vorstellung*. 

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the ideality of a particularising mind. When the mind is disturbed, the multiplicity of things is produced; but when the mind is quieted, the multiplicity of things disappears.

By ego-consciousness (manovijnāṇa) we mean that all ignorant minds through their succession-consciousness cling to the conception of I and not-I [i.e., a separate objective world] and misapprehend the nature of the six objects of sense. The ego-consciousness is also called separation-consciousness, or phenomena-particularising-consciousness, because it is nourished by the perfuming influence of the prejudices (ācārava), intellectual as well as affectional.

The mind [or consciousness, vijñāṇa] that starts from the perfuming influence of ignorance which has no beginning cannot be comprehended by the intellect of common people (prthagjana), Črāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas.

It is partially comprehended by those Bodhisattvas at the stage of knowledge-and-practice, who discipline themselves, practise contemplation and become the Bodhisattvas of the Dharmakāya; while even those who have reached the highest stage of Bodhisattvahood cannot thoroughly comprehend it.

The only one who can have a clear and consummate knowledge of it is the Tathāgata. 2

1 The term will be explained later.

2 The same idea is expressed in the Crīmālā Sūtra as well as in the Lankāvatāra Sūtra where Buddha preaches the unfathom-
Why?

While the essence of the mind is eternally clean and pure, the influence of ignorance makes possible the existence of a defiled mind. But in spite of the defiled mind, the mind [itself] is eternal, clear, pure, and not subject to transformation.

Further as its original nature is free from particularisation, it knows in itself no change whatever, though it produces everywhere the various modes of existence.

When the oneness of the totality of things (dharma-dhatu) is not recognised, then ignorance as well as particularisation arises, and all phases of the defiled mind are thus developed. But the significance of this doctrine is so extremely deep and unfathomable that

ableness of the nature of suchness which, though pure in its essence, is yet subject to defilement or conditionality,—the mystery that can be comprehended only by a fully enlightened mind. Referring to this incomprehensibility of the relation of suchness and ignorance, let me quote what Herbert Spencer says in his *First Principles* (American ed., p. 45): "For every religion, setting out though it does with tacit assertion of a mystery, forthwith proceeds to give some solution of this mystery; and so asserts that it is not a mystery passing human comprehension. But an examination of the solutions they severally propose, shows them to be uniformly invalid. The analysis of every possible hypothesis proves, not simply that no hypothesis is sufficient, but that no hypothesis is even thinkable. And thus the mystery which all religions recognise, turns out to be a far more transcendent mystery than any of them suppose—not a relative, but an absolute mystery." Is not the relation of suchness and ignorance the very mystery to which Spencer makes the allusion here? Açvaghosha's solution is that only Buddha can grasp it.
it can be fully comprehended by Buddhas and by no others. Now there are six different phases of the defiled mind thus developed:

1. Interrelated [or secondary] defilement by attachment, from which Črāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas and those Bodhisattvas at the stage of faith-adaptation can be freed.

2. Interrelated [or secondary] defilement by succession, from which Bodhisattvas with strenuous efforts at the stage of faith, can partially be freed, and at the stage of pure-heartedness, completely.

3. Interrelated [or secondary] defilement by the particularising intelligence, from which Bodhisattvas are gradually freed during their advancement from the stage of morality to the stage of wisdom, while upon reaching the stage of spirituality, they are eternally freed from it.

4. Non-interrelated [or primary] defilement by be-

1 The defilement which is the product of the evolution of the ālaya-viññāna, is of two kinds, primary and secondary. The primary defilement is \textit{a priori}, originating with the birth of the mind. There is as yet no distinct consciousness in it of the duality of the subject and the object, though this is of course tacitly asserted. Ācāghosha calls the primary defilement "non-interrelated," meaning that there is no deliberate reflexion in the ego to assert itself. The secondary defilement called "interrelated" on the other hand explicitly assumes the ego in contradistinction to the non-ego and firmly clings to this conception, which brings forth all selfish desires and actions on the part of the defiled mind. The former being more fundamental than the latter is completely effaced from the mind only after going through all different stages of religious discipline.
belief in an external world, which can be exterminated at the stage of matter-emancipation.

5. Non-interrelated [or primary] defilement by belief in a perceiving mind, which can be exterminated at the stage of mind-emancipation.

6. Non-interrelated [or primary] defilement by the fundamental activity, which can be exterminated in entering upon the stage of Tathāgatahood, passing through the highest stage of Bodhisattvahood.

From not recognising the oneness of the totality of things (dharmadhātu), Bodhisattvas can partially be liberated by passing first from the stage of faith and the stage of contemplation to the stage of pure-heartedness; while when they enter upon the stage of Tathāgatahood, they can once for all put an end [to the illusion].

By "interrelated" we mean that there is [in this case] a distinction [or consciousness of a duality] between the mind in itself and particularisation, that there is [here] a distinction [or consciousness of a duality] between the defiled and the pure, [and therefore] that there is [here] an interrelation between that which perceives and that which determines.

By "non-interrelated" we mean that the mind [in this case] is perfectly identified with non-enlightenment, so that there is no distinction [or consciousness of a duality] between these two, [and therefore] that there is no consciousness of interrelation between that which perceives and that which determines.
The defiled mind is called affectional hindrance (kleśāvarana), because it obscures the fundamental wisdom of suchness (bhūtatatatātā). Ignorance is called intellectual hindrance (jñeyāvarana), because it obscures the spontaneous exercise of wisdom from which evolve all modes of activity in the world.

What is meant by this?

On account of the defiled mind attachment affirms itself in innumerable ways; and there arises a distinction [or consciousness] between that which apprehends and that which is apprehended. Thus believing in the external world produced by subjectivity, the mind becomes oblivious of the principle of sameness (samatā) that underlies all things.

The essence of all things is one and the same, perfectly calm and tranquil, and shows no sign of becoming; ignorance, however, is in its blindness and delusion oblivious of enlightenment, and, on that account, cannot recognise truthfully all those conditions, differences, and activities which characterise the phenomena of the universe.

Further we distinguish two phases of the self-manifestation of the mind [i.e., ālaya-vijñāna, under the law of causation] as birth-and-death (samsāra). The first is the cruder phase, being the state of an interrelated mind; the second is the more refined phase, being the state of a non-interrelated mind. The crudest phase is the subjective condition of common people (prthajjana); the more refined of the crude or
the cruder of the refined is the subjective state of a Bodhisattva. These two phases [of the ālaya-vijñāna as the principle of birth-and-death] originate through the perfuming power of ignorance.

The birth-and-death (samsāra) has its raison d'être (hetu) and its cause [or condition, pratyaya]. Non-enlightenment is the raison d'être, and the external world as produced by subjectivity is the condition. When the raison d'être is annihilated, the condition is annihilated [i.e., loses its conditioning power]. When the condition is annihilated, the state of an interrelated mind is annihilated. When the raison d'être is annihilated, the state of a non-interrelated mind [too] is annihilated.

It may be asked: If the mind be annihilated, how can there be mentation? If mentation really occurs, how can there be annihilation?

In reply we say that while the objection is well founded, we understand by the annihilation, not that of the mind itself, but of its modes [only].

To illustrate: the water shows the symptoms of disturbance when stirred up by the wind. Have the wind annihilated, and the symptoms of disturbance on the water will also be annihilated, the water itself remaining the same. Let the water itself, however, be annihilated, the symptoms of disturbance would no more be perceptible; because there is nothing

1 The older translation adds: The most refined of the refined is the spiritual state of a Buddha.
there through which it can show itself. Only so long as the water is not annihilated, the symptoms of disturbance may continue.

It is even the same with all beings. Through ignorance their minds become disturbed. Let ignorance be annihilated, and the symptom of disturbance will also be annihilated, while the essence of the mind [i.e., suchness] remains the same. Only if the mind itself were annihilated, then all beings would cease to exist, because there would be nothing there by which they could manifest themselves. But so long as the mind be not annihilated, its disturbance may continue.

A constant production of things defiled and pure is taking place on account of the inter-perfuming of the four different powers which are as follows: the first is the pure dharma, that is, suchness (bhūtatatātā); the second is the principle of defilement, that is, ignorance (avidya); the third is the subjective mind, that is, activity-consciousness (karmavijnāna?); the fourth is the external world (vishaya) of subjectivity, that is, the six objects of sense.

By “perfuming” we mean that while our worldly clothes [viz., those which we wear] have no odor of their own, neither offensive nor agreeable, they acquire one or the other according to the nature of the substance with which they are perfumed.

Now suchness is a pure dharma free from defilement. It acquires, however, a quality of defilement owing to the perfuming power of ignorance. On the
other hand, ignorance has nothing to do with purity. Nevertheless, we speak of its being able to do the work of purity, because it in its turn is perfumed by suchness.

How are defiled things continually produced by perfuming?

Determined by suchness [in its relative aspect], ignorance becomes the *raison d'etre* of all forms of defilement. And this ignorance perfumes suchness, and, by perfuming suchness, it produces subjectivity (*smrta*). This subjectivity in its turn perfumes ignorance. On account of this [reciprocal] perfuming, the truth is misunderstood. On account of its being misunderstood, an external world of subjectivity appears [viz., a conception of particulars as particulars]. Further, on account of the perfuming power of subjectivity, various modes of individuation are produced. And by clinging to them, various deeds are done, and we suffer as the result miseries, mentally as well as bodily.

There are two senses in what we call "the perfuming power of the external world of subjectivity": (1) that which strengthens particularisation;¹ (2) that which strengthens attachment.

There are again two senses in what we call "the perfuming power of the subjective mind": (1) that

¹The older translation has "subjectivity" instead of "particularisation." These two terms are synonymous and frequently interchanged in the later translation as well as in the older one.
which strengthens the fundamental activity-consciousness, whereby Arhats, Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas are subject to the miseries of birth and death; (2) that which strengthens the phenomena-particularising-consciousness, whereby all common people (prthagjana) are subject to the miseries of being fettered by prior deeds (karma).

There are also two senses in what we call "the perfuming power of ignorance": (1) a fundamental perfuming, in the sense that the activity-consciousness is thereby actualised; (2) a perfuming of intellect and affection, in the sense that the phenomena-particularising-consciousness is thereby actualised.

How are pure things constantly produced by perfuming?

Suchness perfumes ignorance, and in consequence of this perfuming the mind involved in subjectivity is caused to loathe the misery of birth and death¹ and to seek after the blessing of Nirvāṇa. This longing and loathing on the part of the subjective mind in turn perfumes suchness. On account of this perfuming influence we are enabled to believe that we are in possession within ourselves of suchness whose essential nature is pure and immaculate; and we also recognise that all phenomena in the world are nothing but the illusory manifestation of the mind (ālaya-vijñāna) and have no reality of their own. Since we

¹ Birth and death do not necessarily refer to our life only, but in their widest sense to the phenomenal world.
thus rightly understand the truth, we can practise the means of liberation, can perform those actions which are in accordance [with the Dharma]. Neither do we particularise, nor cling to. By virtue of this discipline and habituation during the lapse of innumerable asamkhyeyakalpas,¹ we have ignorance annihilated.

As ignorance is thus annihilated, the mind [i.e., álaya-vijñāna] is no more disturbed so as to be subject to individuation. As the mind is no more disturbed, the particularisation of the surrounding world is annihilated. When in this wise the principle and the condition of defilement, their products, and the mental disturbances are all annihilated, it is said that we attain to Nirvāṇa and that various spontaneous displays of activity are accomplished.²

¹ Literally, countless ages, but it has a technical meaning. Childer's Pali Dictionary, sub voce: "The term kalpa is given to certain vast periods or cycles of time, of which there are three, Mahākalpa, Asamkhyeyakalpa and Antarakalpa. All the Cakravātas are subject to an alternate process of destruction and renovation, and a Mahākalpa is a period which elapses from the commencement of a cakravāta to its complete destruction. Each Mahākalpa is subdivided into four Asamkhyeyakalpas... Each Asamkhyeyakalpa contains twenty Antarakalpas, an Antaraka-lpa being the interval that elapses while the age of man increases from ten years to an asamkhyeya, and then decreases again to ten years; this period is of immense duration." See also the third Koṣathāna (chapter) of the Abhidharmakoṣa by Vasubandhu.

² Notice that Nirvāṇa is not inactivity or nothingness as commonly supposed. It is, according to Ācārya, the annihilation
There are two senses in what we call "the perfuming of the subjective mind": (1) the perfuming of the phenomena-particularising-consciousness, whereby all common people (*prthagjana*), Črāvakas, and Pratyekabuddhas are induced to loathe the misery of birth and death, and, each according to his own capacity, to step towards the most excellent knowledge (*bodhiparinishpatti*); (2) the perfuming of the ego (*manas*), whereby courageously making up their minds, Bodhisattvas unhesitatingly step towards and enter into Nirvâna, that has no fixed abode.

There are also two senses in what we call "the perfuming of suchness": (1) essence-perfuming, and (2) activity-perfuming.

*The Essence-Perfuming.—* Embracing in full from all eternity infinite spotless virtues (*anâgrava*) and incomprehensibly excellent spiritual states that can efficiently exercise an eternal and incessant influence upon all beings, suchness thereby perfumes the minds of all beings.¹

In consequence of this perfuming power, they are caused to loathe the misery of birth and death, and to long for the blessing of Nirvâna, and believing that they are in possession within themselves of the true, of the ego-conception, freedom from subjectivity, insight into the essence of suchness, or the recognition of the oneness of existence.

¹ The older translation: "'(1) Embracing from all eternity things spotless and possessing in full some inconceivable activity and (2) being capable to objectify itself, suchness through these two attributes constantly and eternally exercises its perfuming power.'"
valid Dharma, to call forth their aspiration (*cittotpāda*)\(^1\) and to discipline themselves.

Here a question arises: If all beings are uniformly in possession of suchness and are therefore equally perfumed by it, how is it that there are some who do not believe in it, while others do; and that there are such immeasurable stages and inequalities among them, which divide the path from the first stage of aspiration up to the last stage of Nirvāṇa, while according to the Doctrine all these differences should be equalised?

In reply we say this: Though all beings are uniformly in possession of suchness, the intensity [of the influence] of ignorance, the principle of individuation, that works from all eternity, varies in such manifold grades as to outnumber the sands of the Ganges. And it is even so with such entangling prejudices (*kleśa* or *ācārava*) as the ego-conception, intellectual and affectional prejudices, etc. [whose perfuming efficiency varies according to the karma previously accumulated by each individual],—all these things being comprehended only by the Tathāgata. Hence such immeasurable degrees of difference as regards belief, etc.\(^2\)

\(^1\) This has a technical sense and is explained below.

\(^2\) The view here set forth is illustrated in the fifth chapter of the *Saddharma-pundarika Sūtra* by the relation of the rain and plants. "Then, Kācyapa, the grasses, shrubs, herbs, and wild trees in this universe, such as have young and tender stalks, twigs, leaves, and foliage, and such as have middle-sized stalks, twigs, leaves, and foliage, and such as have the same fully developed, all those grasses, shrubs, herbs, and wild trees, smaller and greater
Further, there is made in the doctrine of all Buddhas a distinction between *raison d'être* (*hetu*) and cause (*pratyaya*). When both are fully satisfied, the final goal [of Buddhism] is attained and actualised.

To illustrate: the combustible nature of the wood is the *raison d'être* of a fire. But if a man is not acquainted with the fact, or, though acquainted with it, does not apply any method [whereby the potential principle can be actualised], how could he produce a fire and burn the wood?

It is even so with all beings. Although they are in possession of suchness as the perfuming *raison d'être*, yet how could they attain to Nirvâna, if they do not happen, as the cause, to see Buddhas or Bodhisattvas, or good sages, or even if they see them, do not practise good deeds (*caryā*), do not exercise wisdom (*prajñā*), do not destroy prejudices (*kleça*)?

Conversely, by the cause alone, i.e., by their mere happening to see all good sages, it is not sure for them that they will be induced to loathe the misery (other) trees will each, according to its faculty and power, suck the humid element from the water emitted by that great cloud, and by that water which, *all of one essence*, has been abundantly poured down by the cloud, they will each, according to its germ [i.e., karma], acquire a regular development, growth, shooting up, and bigness; and they will produce blossoms and fruits, and will receive, each severally, their names. Rooted in *one and the same* soil, *all those [different] families* of plants and germs are drenched and vivified by water of *one essence throughout*.¹

(Kern’s English Translation, p. 119. The italics and words in brackets are by the present translator.)
of birth and death and to long for the blessing of Nirvâna, unless indeed they were in possession within themselves of the intrinsic perfuming principle as the *raison d'être*. It is, therefore, only when both the *raison d'être* and the cause are fully actualised that they can do so.

How are the *raison d'être* and the cause to be fully actualised?

Now, there is an inherent perfuming principle in one's own being, which, embraced and protected by the love (*maitri*) and compassion (*karunā*) of all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, is caused to loathe the misery of birth and death, to believe in Nirvâna, to cultivate their root of merit (*kuçalamûla*), to habituate oneself to it, and to bring it to maturity.

In consequence of this, one is enabled to see all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, and, receiving instructions from them, is benefited, gladdened, induced to practise good deeds, etc., till one attain to Buddhahood and enter into Nirvâna.

*The Activity-Perfuming.*—By this is meant nothing else than the perfuming influence of the external cause over all beings. It asserts itself in innumerable ways. Briefly speaking we may distinguish two kinds of it: (1) individual; and (2) universal.

*The Individual Cause.*—All beings since their first aspiration (*cittotpâda*) till the attainment of Buddhahood are sheltered under the guardianship of all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas who, responding to the re-
quirements of the occasion, transform themselves and assume the actual forms of personality.

Thus for the sake of all beings Buddhas and Bodhisattvas become sometimes their parents, sometimes their wives and children, sometimes their kinsmen, sometimes their servants, sometimes their friends, sometimes their enemies, sometimes reveal themselves as devas or in some other forms.

Again Buddhas and Bodhisattvas treat all beings sometimes with the four methods of entertainment,\textsuperscript{1} sometimes with the six pāramitās,\textsuperscript{2} or with some other deeds, all of which are the inducement for them to make their knowledge (bodhi) perfect.

Thus embracing all beings with their deep compassion (mahākarunā), with their meek and tender heart, as well as their immense treasure of blissful wisdom, Buddhas convert them in such a way as to suit their [all beings'] needs and conditions; while all beings thereby are enabled to hear or to see Buddhas, and, thinking of Tathāgatas or some other personages, to increase their root of merit (kuṭalamūla).

This individual cause is divided into two kinds: (1) that which takes effect immediately, enabling one without delay to attain to Buddhahood; (2) that which takes effect gradually, enabling one to attain to Buddhahood only after a long interval.

\textsuperscript{1}Catvāri-sangrahavastūni in Sanskrit. They are (1) dāna, charity; (2) priyavacana, endearing speech; (3) arthacaryā, beneficial action; (4) samādnārthd, co-operation.

\textsuperscript{2}This is explained below.
Each of these two is further divided into two kinds: (1) that which increases one's root of merit; (2) that which induces one to enter into the path (mārga).

The Universal Cause.—With universal wisdom (samatājñāna?) and universal wishes (samatāpranidhāna?) all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas desire to achieve a universal emancipation of all beings. This desire is eternal and spontaneous on their part. And now as this wisdom and these wishes have the perfuming power over all beings, the latter are caused to think of or to recollect all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, so that sometimes hearing them, sometimes seeing them, all beings thereby acquire [spiritual] benefits (hitatā). That is, entering into the samādhi of purity, they destroy hindrances wherever they are met with, and obtain all-penetrating insight,¹ that enables one to become conscious of the absolute oneness (samatā) of the universe (sarvaloka) and to see innumerable Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.²

Again, this perfuming of the essence and the activity may be divided into two categories: (1) that which is not yet in unison [with suchness]; (2) that which is already in unison [with suchness].

By that perfuming which is not yet in unison [with suchness] we understand the religious discipline of

¹ Literally, an unimpeded eye.

² The older translation differs a little, but without any considerable change in the meaning.
common people (prthagjana), Črâvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and novice Bodhisattvas. While their strength of faith (craddhâbala) perfumed by the ego (manas) and the ego-consciousness (manovijñâna) enables them to continue their religious discipline, they have not yet attained to the state of non-particularisation, because their discipline is not yet in unison with the essence of suchness; nor have they yet attained to the spontaneity of action (svayamkarma?)\(^1\), because their discipline is not yet in unison with the activity of suchness.

By that perfuming which is already in unison [with suchness], we understand the religious discipline of Bodhisattvas of the Dharmakâya. They have attended to the state of non-particularisation, because their discipline is in unison with the self-essence of all Tathâgatas; they have attained to the spontaneity of action, because their discipline is in unison with the wisdom and activity of all Tathâgatas. Allowing them-

\(^1\) The spontaneity of action means action without attachment or free from the ego-conception. It is somewhat similar to Lao-Tze’s idea of wu wei, non-assertion. Cf. also the following passages from the Bhagavadgîtâ, Chap. IV., p. 59: “Actions defile me not. I have no attachment to the fruit of actions.” P. 60: “He is wise among men, he is possessed of devotion, who sees inaction in action and action in inaction.” . . . “Forsaking all attachment to the fruit of action, always contented, dependent on none, he does nothing at all, though he engages in action.” P. 64: “He . . . who identifies his self with every being, is not tainted though he performs (action).” “Action in inaction and inaction in action” exactly coincides with the practical side of Aćvaghosha’s doctrine of suchness (bhûtatathatâ).
selves to be influenced only by the power of the Dharma, their discipline acquires a nature of spontaneity and thereby perfumes suchness and destroys ignorance.

Again the incessant perfuming of the defiled dharma [i. e., ignorance] from all eternity works on; but when one attains to Buddhahood, one at once puts an end to it.

The perfuming of the pure dharma [i. e., suchness] works on to eternity, and there is no interruption of it. Because by virtue of the perfuming of the Dharma, that is, suchness, subjectivity is on the one hand annihilated, and the Dharmakāya is on the other hand revealed, and the perfuming process of the activity [of suchness] thus originated forever goes on.

c. The Threefold Significance of the Mahāyāna Explained.

Again the quintessence and the attributes of suchness (bhūtatatthatā) know no diminution or addition, but remain the same in common people (prthagjana), Črāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, Bodhisattvas, and Buddhas. It was not created in the past, nor is it to be annihilated in the future; it is eternal, permanent, absolute; and from all eternity it sufficingly embraces in its essence all possible merits (punya).

That is to say, suchness has such characteristics as follows: the effulgence of great wisdom; the universal illumination of the dharmadhātu [universe]; the true and adequate knowledge; the mind pure and
clean in its self-nature; the eternal, the blessed, the self-regulating and the pure;\(^1\) the tranquil, the immutable, and the free. And there is no heterogeneity in all those Buddha-dharmas which, outnumbering the sands of the Ganges, can be neither identical (ekārtha) nor not-identical (nānārtha) [with the essence of suchness], and which therefore are out of the range of our comprehension. Accordingly suchness is called the Tathāgata’s womb (tathāgatagarbha) or the Dharmakāya.\(^2\)

It may be questioned: While it was stated before that suchness is devoid of all characteristics (lakṣaṇa), how can it now be said without contradiction that it embraces in full all such merits?

In reply it would be said that though suchness in truth abundantly embraces all merits, yet it is free in its nature from all forms of distinction; because all objects in the world are of one and the same taste, are of one reality, have nothing to do with the modes of particularisation, and are not of dualistic character. Depending on the principle of birth-and-death, such as the activity-consciousness (karmavijñāna?), etc., however, all signs of difference and individuation appear.

\(^1\) These four qualities are usually considered by Mahāyānists to be those of Nirvāṇa as well.

\(^2\) Observe here again that Dharmakāya is used in a sense quite different from its ordinary interpretation as the “Body of the Law.”
How are those qualifications to be assigned to suchness?

Though all things in their [metaphysical] origin come from the soul alone and in truth free from particularisation, yet on account of non-enlightenment there originates a subjective mind [i.e., ālaya-vijñāna] that becomes conscious of an external world (vishaya). This we call ignorance (avidya). Nevertheless the essence of the mind [or the soul] is perfectly pure, and there is no awakening of ignorance in it. Thence we assign to suchness this quality, the effulgence of great wisdom.

If the mind being awakened perceive an external world, then there will be something that cannot be perceived by it. But the essence of the mind has nothing to do with perception [which presupposes the dual existence of a perceiving subject and an object perceived]; so there is nothing that cannot be perceived by it, [that is, the world of relativity is submerged in the oneness of suchness]. Thence we assign to suchness this quality, the universal illumination of the universe (dharmadhātu).

When the mind is disturbed, it fails to be a true and adequate knowledge; it fails to be a pure, clean essence; it fails to be eternal, blissful, self-regulating, and pure; it fails to be tranquil, etc. On the contrary, it will become transient, changeable, unfree, and therefore the source of falsity and defilement, while its modifications outnumber the sands of the
Ganges. But when there is no disturbance in the essence of the mind, we speak of suchness as being the true, adequate knowledge, etc., and as possessing pure and clean merits that outnumber the sands of the Ganges.

When the mind is disturbed it will strive to become conscious of the existence of an external world and will thus betray the imperfection of its inner condition. But as all infinite merits in fact constitute the one mind which, perfect in itself, has no need of seeking after any external things other than itself, so suchness never fails to actualise all those Buddha-dharmas, that, outnumbering the sands of the Ganges, can be said to be neither identical nor non-identical with the essence of the mind, and that therefore are utterly out of the range of our comprehension. On that account suchness is designated the Tathâgata's womb (*tathâgatagarbha*) or the Tathâgata's Dharma-kâya.

What is meant by the activity of suchness is this: all Buddhas, while at the stage of discipline, feel a deep compassion (*mahâkarunâ*) [for all beings], practise all pâramitâs, the four methods of entertainment (*catvâri-sangrahavastûni*), and many other meritorious deeds; treat others as their own self, wish to work out a universal salvation of mankind in ages to come, through limitless numbers of kalpas; recognise truthfully and adequately the principle of equality (*samatâ*)
among people; and do not cling to the individual existence of a sentient being.¹

By virtue of such a great wisdom that works means of emancipation (upāyajñā?),² they annihili te ignorance that knows no beginning; recognise the Dharma-kāya in its original purity; spontaneously perform incomprehensible karma³ as well as various unfettered moral activities; manifest themselves throughout the universe (dharma-dhatu), identify themselves with suchness, and leave no traces of compulsion.⁴

And how is this?

Because all Tathāgatas are the Dharma-kāya itself,⁵ are the highest truth (paramārthasatya) itself,

¹ The older translation reads: "For they consider all sentient beings as their own self and do not cling to their individual forms. How is this? Because they know truthfully that all sentient beings as well as their own self come from one and the same suchness, and no distinction can be established among them."

² Cf. the second, third, fourth, fifth, and seventh chapter of the Saddharma-pundarikā Sūtra, in which Buddha preaches about the means of salvation.

³ That is, "action in inaction and inaction in action."

⁴ Aśvaghosha’s conception of religious life as identical in its essence with poetry or fine art, I think, closely resembles that of Kant who says in his Critique of Judgment that the production of fine art should appear as if the work of nature. To quote his own words: "Als Natur aber erscheint ein Produkt der Kunst dadurch, dass zwar alle Pünktlichkeit in der Übereinkunft mit Regeln, nach denen allein das Produkt das werden kann, was es sein soll, angetroffen wird, aber ohne Pünktlichkeit, d. i., ohne eine Spur zu zeigen, dass die Regel dem Künstler vor Augen geschwebt und seinen Gemüthskräften Fesseln angelegt habe." (Kritik der Urtheilskraft, Kirchmann’s edition, p. 169.)

⁵ Cf. Vajracchedikā, Chap. XVII: "And why, O Subhūti, the
and have nothing to do with conditionality (samvrtti-satya) and compulsory actions; whereas the seeing, hearing, etc. [i.e., the particularising senses] of the sentient being diversify [on its own account] the activity of Tathāgatas.

Now this activity [in another word, the Dharma-kāya] has a twofold aspect. The first one depends on the phenomena-particularising-consciousness, by means of which the activity is conceived by the minds of common people (prthagjana), Črāvakas, and Pratyekabuddhas. This aspect is called the Body of Transformation (nirmānakāya).

But as the beings of this class do not know that the Body of Transformation is merely the shadow [or reflection] of their own evolving-consciousness (pravrtil-vijñāna), they imagine that it comes from some external sources, and so they give it a corporeal limitation. But the Body of Transformation [or what amounts to the same thing, the Dharmakāya] has nothing to do with limitation and measurement.¹

The second aspect [of the Dharmakāya] depends on the activity-consciousness (karmaviññāna) by means of which the activity is conceived by the minds of name of Tathāgata? It expresses true suchness (bhūtatathatā). . . . It expresses that he had no origin. . . . It expresses the destruction of all qualities (dharma). . . . It expresses one who had no origin whatever. . . . Because, O Subhūti, no-origin is the highest goal."

¹ The older translation reads simply: "They cannot thoroughly understand it [i.e., the true nature of the Nirmānakāya]."
Bodhisattvas while passing from their first aspiration (cittotpāda) stage up to the height of Bodhisattvahood. This is called the Body of Bliss (sambhogakāya).

The body has infinite forms. The form has infinite attributes. The attribute has infinite excellencies. And the accompanying rewards of Bodhisattvas, that is, the region where they are predestined to be born [by their previous karma], also has infinite merits and ornamentations. Manifesting itself everywhere, the Body of Bliss is infinite, boundless, limitless, un-intermittent [in its action], directly coming forth from the mind.²

All these merits being actualised through the perfuming of such spotless deeds as the pāramitās, etc., as well as through the incomprehensible perfuming power [of enlightenment a priori], the Sambhogakāya

¹Buddhists distinguish two kinds of the retribution which we receive as the fruit of karma previously accumulated by ourselves: the first one called "principal" is our bodily existence; the second called "accompanying" is the region where we are destined to be born.

²The older translation has: "It is boundless, cannot be exhausted, is free from the signs of limitation. Manifesting itself wherever it should manifest itself, it always exists by itself and is never destroyed or lost."

³The six Pāramitās are commonly enumerated: (1) charity (dāna); (2) morality (śīla); (3) patience (ksānti); (4) energy (vīrya); (5) meditation (dhyāna); (6) wisdom (prajñā)

An explanation of the six Pāramitās is given below.
embraces infinite attributes of bliss and merit. Therefore it is also called the Body of Reward.

What is recognised by common people (prthag-jana), etc., is the coarsest form of the activity of the Dharmakâya. There is a variety of it according to the six different states of creation.¹ It has no attributes of infinite merits and blessings.

What is recognised by Bodhisattvas at the first stage is a finer form of the activity of the Dharmakâya. As they firmly believe in suchness, they can have a partial insight into it, and understand that the Body of the Tathâgata is not departing, is not coming, is free from arrest² [i.e., the Tathâgata’s work is eternal and constant], that everything is but a reflected shadow of the mind, not independent of suchness. But these Bodhisattvas have not yet freed themselves from the finest form of particularisation, because they have not yet entered into the order of the Dharmakâya.

Bodhisattvas at the stage of pure-heartedness are able to recognise the finer form of the activity of the Dharmakâya. Their insight is more penetrating than the former. When they reach the height of Bodhisattvahood their insight becomes perfect.

By the finer form of the activity we understand

¹ The six states of creation (gati) are: (1) Deva (gods); (2) Manushya (men); (3) Asura (demons); (4) Preta (ghosts); (5) Tir-yagyoni (animals); (6) Nâraka (inhabitants of hell).

² Cf. the Vajrachchedikâ Sûtra, Chap. XXIX (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XLIX., p. 142).
the Body of Bliss (sambhogakāya). As long as they are possessed by the activity-consciousness, they would conceive the Body of Bliss. But when they are liberated from it, all traces of individualization would become obliterated. Because all Tathāgatas come from [one and the same] Dharmakāya, have no distinction of this-ness and that-ness, have no corporeal forms that are characterised by reciprocal limitation.

A question arises here: If the Dharmakāya of Buddhas is devoid of variously differentiated corporeal forms, how is it that it can manifest itself in various corporeal forms at all?

In reply we say: The Dharmakāya can manifest itself in various corporeal forms just because it is the real essence of them. Matter (rūpa) and mind (citta) from the very beginning are not a duality. So we speak of [the universe as] a system of rationality (prajñākāya), seeing that the real nature of matter just constitutes the norm of mind. Again we speak of [the universe as] a system of materiality (dharma-kāya), seeing that the true nature of mind just constitutes the norm of matter.

Now depending on the Dharmakāya, all Tathāgatas manifest themselves in bodily forms and are inces-

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1 The last two sentences are missing in the older translation.

2 Cf. the following passages from the Prajñā-pāramitā-hṛdaya Sūtra: "Form (rūpa) is emptiness (śūnyatā), and emptiness is indeed form. Emptiness is not different from form, form is not different from emptiness. What is form that is emptiness, what is emptiness that is form."
santly present at all points of space.¹ And Bodhisattvas in the ten quarters, according to their capabilities and wishes, are able to manifest infinite Bodies of Bliss and infinite lands of ornamentation, each one of which, though stamped with the marks of individuality, does not hinder the others from being fused into it, and this [mutual fusion] has no interruption.

But the manifestation of the Dharmakāya in [infinite] bodily forms is not comprehensible to the thought and understanding of common people; because it is the free and subtlest activity of suchness.²

Again, in order that all beings might be induced to step forward from the gate of birth-and-death to that of suchness, we endeavor to let them understand that those modes of existence such as matter (rūpa), etc. [i.e., the five skandhas]³ are imperfect.

Why are they imperfect?

When we divide some gross [or composite] matter, we can reduce it to atoms (anu). But as the atom will also be subject to further division, all forms of material existence, whether gross or fine, are nothing but the shadow of particularisation produced by a subjective mind, and we cannot ascribe any degree of [absolute, or independent] reality to them.

¹ The older translation: "Therefore it is preached that the Dharmakāya is omnipresent. The corporeal forms by which it manifests itself have no limitation."

² This passage is missing in the older translation.

³ They are matter (rūpa); sensation (vedanā); idea (samjñā); action (samskāra); and consciousness (vijñāna).
Let us next go over to and examine the other skandhas [that have temporal existence]. We find there too that we can gradually reduce them to kshanas [i.e., infinitesimal divisions of time], whose nature, however closely scrutinised, does not give any sign of [indivisible] oneness.

It is even the same with the objects of non-aggregate (asamskṛta-dharma).\(^1\) They cannot have their own existence independent of the universe (dharma-dhātu). Be it therefore understood that the same may be said in regard to all objects without exception in the ten quarters of space.\(^2\)

As a lost man who takes the east for the west,

\(^1\)All phenomena in the world, physical as well as mental, are divided into two great classes: (1) Samskṛta-dharma, i.e., that which consists of parts temporal or spatial; (2) Asamskṛta-dharma, i.e., that which does not consist of parts. The first class is subdivided into four principal departments which are also subject to a further subdivision, seventy-two in the Hīnayāna system (according to the Abhidharma-kośa-çāstra), and ninety-four in the Mahāyāna (according to the Vijñānamātrasiddhi-çāstra). The four principal departments are: (1) Rūpa (physical phenomena); (2) Citta (thought or understanding); (3) Cittadharma or Cittasamprayuktasamskāra (mental phenomena); (4) Cittaviprayuktasamskāra (that which does not belong to the former, namely, relation that obtains among things). As for the second class, Asamskṛta-dharma, Mahāyānists subdivide it into six while Hīnayānists subdivide it into three. For details see the two Çāstras above mentioned.

\(^2\)The last five paragraphs are missing in the older translation which has simply this instead: "The external world which consists in the six objects of sense does not exist independently of our mind, and the mind having no forms and attributes cannot be grasped even if we search for it throughout the ten quarters."
while the quarter is not changed on account of his confusion, so all beings, because of their misleading ignorance, imagine that the mind is being disturbed, while in reality it is not.

But when they understand that the disturbance of the mind [i.e., birth-and-death] is [at the same time] immortality [viz., suchness], they would then enter into the gate of suchness.

2. The Refutation of False Doctrines.

All false doctrines invariably come out of the ātman-conception. If we were liberated from it, the existence of false doctrines would be impossible.

There are two kinds of the ātman-conception: (1) Belief in the existence of a personal ātman [or ego-soul]; (2) Belief in the existence of ātman in things [or things-in-themselves].

a. Five False Views Held by Those Who Believe in a Personal Atman.

There are five different views springing from it [belief in the ego], which are held by common people (prthagjana).

First, hearing that it is said in the Sūtra that the

1 This denial of the existence of things-in-themselves is one of the principal features of the Mahāyāna as distinguished from the Hīnayāna Buddhism.

2 It is not exactly known to what Sūtra or Sūtras this refers, but the analogy of this kind is frequently met with in most of the Mahāyāna texts.
Dharmakâya of the Tathâgata is perfectly tranquil and may be likened unto space (äkâsa), yet not understanding its purport, ignorant people cling to the view that the nature of the Tathâgata is eternal and omnipresent in the same sense as space is.

In order that this clinging to the false doctrine may be eliminated, be it clearly understood that space is nothing but a mode of particularisation and that it has no real existence of its own. Where there is a perception of space, there is side by side a perception of a variety of things, in contradistinction to which space is spoken of as if existing independently. Space therefore exists only in relation to our particularising consciousness.

Further since matter (rûpa) as stated before, is merely a particularisation of the confused mind, it is clear enough that space cannot have any independent existence. In a word all modes of relative existence, our phenomenal world as a whole, are created simply by the particularisation of the confused mind. If we become dissociated from the latter, then all modes of relative existence vanish away by themselves; while the soul alone, in its truth and suchness, pervades the whole universe. The soul, therefore, that constitutes the essential nature of the Tathâgata, cannot be compared with space, though the latter may be said to be in a certain limited sense eternal and real.

Secondly, hearing that it is said in the Sûtras that all things in the world without exception are per-
fect emptiness (*atyantacûnyatâ*), that even Nirvâna\(^1\) or suchness is also perfect emptiness, is devoid in its true nature of all characteristics (*lakshanâ*), yet not understanding its purport, ignorant people cling to the view that Nirvâna or suchness is a nothing, devoid of contents.

In order that this clinging may be eliminated, be it clearly understood that suchness or Dharmakâya in its self-nature (*svabhâva*) is not a nothing (*çûnyatâ*) but envelopes in full immeasurable merits (*guna*) which make up its true nature.

Thirdly, hearing that it is said in the Sûtras\(^2\) that the Tathâgata’s womb (*tathâgatagarbha*) envelopes in full all kinds of merits which constituting its true nature do neither suffer augmentation nor diminution, yet not understanding its purport, ignorant people cling to the view that there is in the Tathâgata’s womb itself an inherent and fundamental distinction between the two objects, matter (*rûpa*) and mind (*citta*).

In order that this clinging may be eliminated, be

\(^1\) Fa-tsang, a commentator of the present Discourse, quotes the *Mahâprajñâ-pâramitâ-Sûtra* as here referred to. The Sûtra says: “Even Nirvâna is like a mirage, like a dream. Nay, if there be something superior to Nirvâna, I declare it is also like a mirage, like a dream.”

\(^2\) For instance, we read in the second volume of the *Lankâvatara Sûtra* (translated into Chinese by Çiksânanda): “The Tathâgatagarbha is in its intrinsic nature pure, clean, eternal, permanent, intermittent, and immutable; it embraces the thirty-two excellent qualities, and abides within the body of all sentient beings,” etc.
it clearly understood that suchness (bhūtatathatā) has nothing to do with any form of distinction produced by defilement, and that even in case we speak of its possessing innumerable meritorious characteristics, they are free from the traces of defilement.

Fourthly, hearing that it is said in the Sūtras¹ that even all impure and defiled things in the world are produced through the Tathāgata's womb (tathāgata-garbha), and that all things in the world are not at variance with suchness, yet not understanding its purport, ignorant people imagine that the Tathāgata's womb all-containingly envelopes all objects of defilement in the world.

In order that this clinging may be eliminated, be it clearly understood that the Tathāgata's womb all-containingly envelopes pure and spotless merits (guna) which, outnumbering the sands of the Ganges, are not at variance with suchness; that the prejudices (ācāra or kleśa) and defiled objects, which also outnumber the sands of the Ganges are nothing but non-entity, have from the first no self-existence (svabhāva), have never been in correspondence with the Tathāgata's womb; that there is no reason to suppose that the Tathāgata's womb had been corresponding with defiled objects, but has now by virtue of intellectual intuition been freed from falsity and defilement.

¹ Though not exactly known to what Sūtra or Sūtras the reference is made here, we can easily find similar passages in the Mahāyāna texts, such as the Lankāvatāra, the Cūḍāmatā, etc.
Fifthly, hearing that it is said in the Sūtras¹ that depending on the Tathāgata’s womb, there is birth-and-death (samsāra) as well as the attainment of Nirvāṇa, yet not understanding its purport, ignorant people imagine that depending on the Tathāgata’s womb there is a beginning for birth-and-death, and that since there is the beginning, Nirvāṇa is in turn subject to extinction.

In order that this clinging may be eliminated, be it clearly understood that as the Tathāgata’s womb has no beginning, ignorance and birth-and-death depending on it have also no beginning; that it is a view held by the tīrthaka² [i.e., the followers of the Vaiṣe-

¹ These are not also exactly known.

² It is not precisely known how many philosophical schools, called tīrthakas by Buddhists, were flourishing just at the time of Ācārya. The Nirvāṇa Sūtra and the Vimalakīrtti-nirdeśa Sūtra mention six of them which were existing at the time of Buddha: (1) Pūrana Kācyapa; (2) Maskarin Goçāliputra; (3) Sañjāyin Vairaçīputra; (4) Ajita Keçakambala; (5) Kakuda Kātyāyana; (6) Nirgrantha Jñātiputra. In a commentary on the Viññānamātra-çāstra, however, which is a later production than this Discourse, twelve different tīrthaka schools are enumerated. They are: (1) the Samkhya school; (2) the Vaiṣeṣika school; (3) the school which believes in Maheçvara as the creator; (4) the school which believes in Mahābrahma as the creator; (5) the school which maintains that Time is the creator; (6) the school which maintains that Space is the creator; (7) the school which maintains that Water is the creator; (8) the school which says that the world exists by itself; (9) the school which says that the creation comes from Quarters; (10) the school which maintains that the Ego is the principle of existence; (11) the school which maintains the immortality of articulate sounds, i.e., the Mīmāṃsā school; (12) the Lokāyatika school, an Indian materialism. For further references
sika] and not taught by the Buddha, to say that there are outside of the three worlds\(^1\) (*triloka*) some other beings coming into existence; that the Tathâgata’s womb has no future [i. e., time of extinction]; and that those who have an insight into it, will eternally destroy the seeds of birth-and-death and attain to Nirvâna which has also no future [i. e., time of extinction].

These four\(^2\) erroneous views have thus arisen from the conception of a personal âtman, and so we have laid down the four refutations as above mentioned.\(^3\)

\(b. \) Belief in the Existence of Atman in Things.

As the World-honored One (*Bhagavat*), considering the inferior intellectual calibre of Črâvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, taught them only the doctrine of non-personal âtman, [and did not make any further

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\(^1\) They are the world of desire (*kâmaloka*), the world of form (*rûpaloka*), the world of formlessness (*arûpaloka*). (See also p. 77). The *kâmaloka* is divided into hells (*naraka*), region of ghosts (*preta*), animal life (*tîryâgyoni*), human life (*manushyaloka*), and region of gods (*deva*); the *rûpaloka* into 17 heavenly abodes corresponding to the three stages of Dhyâna; the *arûpaloka* into four heavenly abodes. For details see the second chapter of the *Abhidharma-kösa-Câstra*, by Vasubandhu.

\(^2\) The number "four" in this paragraph should be "five," for the author enumerates five misunderstandings and their refutations, as we have seen.

\(^3\) The whole passage is missing in the older translation.
demonstration of the doctrine], the people have in the meantime formed a fixed idea on the transitoriness of the five skandhas,¹ and, being terrified at the thought of birth and death, have fanatically craved for Nirvāṇa.

In order that this clinging may be eliminated, be it clearly understood that the essence of the five skandhas is uncreate, there is no annihilation of them; that since there is no annihilation of them, they are in their [metaphysical] origin Nirvāṇa itself; that if one be absolutely freed from particularisation and attachment, one will understand that all things both pure and defiled have only relative existence.

Be it therefore known that all things in the world from the beginning are neither matter (rūpa), nor mind (citta), nor intelligence (prajñā), nor consciousness (vijñāna), nor non-being (abhāva), nor being (bhāva); they are after all inexplicable. The reason why the Tathāgata nevertheless endeavors to instruct by means of words and definitions is through his good and excellent skilfulness [or expediency, upāya-kau-çalya].² He only provisionally makes use of words and definitions to lead all beings, while his real object is to make them abandon symbolism and directly enter

¹ See p. 104, footnote.
² See the second chapter of the Saddarmapundarika Sūtra, in which Buddha teaches how the only one yāna (vehicle) is split through his transcendental upāya (skilfulness or expediency) into three yānas: Črāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna.
into the real reality (tattva). Because if they indulge themselves in reasonings, attach themselves to sophistry, and thus foster their subjective particularisation, how could they have the true wisdom (tattvajñāna) and attain to Nirvāṇa?

3. Ways of Practising the Right Path.

By this we mean that all Bodhisattvas, by their aspiration (cittotpāda)\(^1\) and discipline (caryācarana), will be able to attain to the reason that made all Thāgatas perceive the path (mārga).

Briefly stated, there are three kinds of aspiration: (1) Aspiration through the perfection of faith; (2) Aspiration through knowledge and practice; (3) Aspiration through intellectual intuition.

By whom, and by which deeds, can faith (praddhā) be perfected and can the aspiration be awakened?

Now the people who belong to the group of incon-

\(^1\)Aspiration which does not exactly correspond to the Chinese fah hsin and Sanskrit cittotpāda, has been retained for lack of a fitter term. It has a technical sense in Buddhism. Literally, fah or utpāda means producing, raising, or awakening, while hsin or citta as noticed elsewhere is mind, thought, or consciousness. Cittotpāda, however, is more than the raising of one’s thought to a higher religious life; it means the recognition of the truth that one is in possession within oneself of the highest perfect knowledge (samyaksamādhi); it is the birth within oneself of a higher ethical impulse constituting the essence of religion. A fuller form of fah hsin is fah bodhi hsin or fah anuttarasaṃyaksambodhi hsin. See the Mahāyāna Sūtras such as the Saddharma Pundarīka, Vajracchedikā, Sukhāvatī Vyuha, Lankāvataara, Avatamsaka, etc.
stancy (aniyatarāṭī),¹ by virtue of their root of merit (kuśalamūla), which has a perfuming power, firmly believe in the retribution of karma, practise the ten virtues (daṇḍakuśalānī),² loathe the sufferings of birth and death, seek after the most excellent enlightenment (Samyaksambodhi), and seeing Buddhas and Bodhisattvas they wait on them, make offerings to them, discipline themselves in many [meritorious] deeds; and after the lapse of ten thousand kalpas (eons), their faith will finally be perfected.

Since then either by virtue of the instruction received from Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, or on account of their deep compassion (mahākarunā), or from their desire to preserve the right doctrine (saddharma) against its corruption, their aspiration [to the highest truth] will be awakened.

After having awakened the aspiration they will

¹ There are three groups of people: (1) Those who are constantly abiding in absolute truth (samyaktvaniyata-rāṭī); (2) Those who are constantly abiding in falsehood (mithyātvaniyata-rāṭī); (3) Those who are inconstant (anīyata-rāṭī).

² The ten virtues (daṇḍakuśalānī) consist in not committing the ten evils (daṇḍokuśalānī) which are as follows: (1) Killing a living being (prāṇātityā); (2) Stealing (adattādāna); (3) Committing adultery (kāmamithyācāra); (4) Lying (mrṣhāvāda); (5) Slander (paigunya); (6) Insulting speech (pārushyā); (7) Frivulous talk (sambhinnaprālāpa); (8) Avarice (abhidhāya); (9) Evil intent (vyāpāda); (10) False view (mithyādrśthi). The ten evils here enumerated should be avoided by the lay members of Buddhism. For the Cāramaneras there is a different set of precepts specially intended for them, called the Daṇḍakikṣapada, with which the ten virtues must not be confused as they are by some.
enter into the group of constant truth (samyaktvani-yata-rāci) and never relapse, always abiding in the essence of the Buddha-seed and identifying themselves with its excellent principle.

There is, however, a certain class of people whose root of merit (kuñalamula) from time immemorial is poor, and whose prejudices (kleça or áçrava) are intense, deeply veiling their minds. Such people, even if they see Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, wait on them, and make offerings to them, will sow merely the seeds of men (manushya) and gods (deva) [i. e., they will be born in the future as men or gods], or the seeds of the enlightenment of Črāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas [i. e., their attainment would not be higher than that of Črāvakas or Pratyekabuddhas].

Some of them may even aspire to seek after the Mahâbodhi,1 but owing to the instability of their character, they will ever oscillate between progress and retrogression.

Some of them, happening to see Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, may make offerings to them, wait on them, practise many [meritorious] deeds, and, while ten thousand mahâkalpas (æons) are not yet elapsed, may meantime come into some favorable circumstances and thereby awake aspiration. What are those favorable circumstances? For instance, they may witness the personal figure of a Buddha, or may make some offerings to the congregation of priests

1 The older translation reads "Mahâyâna."
(samgha), or may be instructed by Črāvakas or Pratyekabuddhas, or may be moved by seeing others aspire [to the highest truth].

But this kind of aspiration as a rule is not constant. In case they come into unfavorable circumstances, they may happen to fall down to the stage of Črāvakahood or Pratyekabuddhahood.

Now, briefly speaking, three faculties of the soul will be awakened by the perfection of faith: (1) rightness of comprehension [lit., right, straight mind], for it truthfully and intuitively contemplates suchness (bhūtatathatā); (2) profundity of virtue [lit., deep, heavy mind], for it rejoices in accumulating all good deeds; (3) greatness of compassion (mahākarunā), for it desires to uproot the miseries (duḥkha) of all beings.

It may be asked whether there is ever any need for one to discipline oneself in all good deeds and to try to save mankind, since all sentient beings (sarvasattva) as well as all things (sarvadharma) in the world, abiding in the oneness of the universe (dharmaḥatū) that has no second, will, as can be logically inferred, have nothing to do but calmly to contemplate suchness.

In reply we say, yes. Because the mind may be likened unto a precious jewel which is pure and bright in its essence but buried in a gross veinstone. Now there is no reason to suppose that one can make it clean and pure only by contemplating it, and without
applying any means [of purification] or a degree of workmanship.

It is even the same with suchness. Though it is pure and bright in its essence and sufficiently envelops all merits (guna), yet it is deeply buried in infinite external defilements. And there is no reason to suppose that a man can make it pure and clean only by earnest contemplation on it, and without trying any means [of emancipation] or of discipline.

It is therefore an urgent necessity that all good deeds should be accumulated, that all beings should be delivered, that those infinite external defilements and impurities should be cast off, that the true doctrine should be revealed.

With regard to "means" [or "skilfulness," upāya] there are, briefly stated, four kinds.

The first one is called the means of practising the fundamental [truth, mūla]. That is to say, by contemplating the true essence of all dharmas, which, being uncreate and free from imagination, is not concerned with the metempsychosis of birth and death, and by contemplating the truth that all things originate from the co-operation of the principle (hetu) and the causes (pratyaya), and that the retribution of karma is irrevocable, one will evoke deep compassion, discipline oneself in all good deeds, embrace and convert all beings, and not dwell in Nirvāṇa, since suchness [in its absolute aspect] has nothing to do with Nirvāṇa or with birth-and-death. As this attitude
[towards all objects] is in accord [with the nature of suchness], it is called the means of practising the [fundamental] truth.

The second one is called the means of abeyance. That is, by feeling shame and remorse, one may put an end to all evils and not let them grow, since suchness is free from all marks of imperfection. Thus to be in accord with suchness and to put an end to all evils is called the means of abeyance.

The third one is called the means of strengthening the root of merits (kuçalamûla). By raising reverential feelings toward the Triple Treasure (triratna), one will revere, make offerings to, pay homage to, praise, rejoice in, and beseech the Triple Treasure; and thereupon one's orthodox faith being strengthened, one will at last awake a desire for the most excellent knowledge (bodhiparinîshpatti). Through the protection of the majestic power of the Buddha, Dharma, and Samgha, one's karma-hindrances (karmâvarana) will now get purified and one's root of merit firmly established; because suchness is free from all hindrances and envelopes all merits. Thus to be in accord with suchness and to practise good deeds is called the means of strengthening the root of merits.

The fourth one is called the universal means of great vows (mahâpranidhâna). That is, one may make the vow that in ages to come all beings should universally be delivered and take refuge at ease in the
Anupadhiṣesa Nirvāṇa,¹ because the true nature of all objects is free from relativity, is one and the same, making no distinction between this and that, and is absolutely calm and tranquil. Thus to be in accord with the three attributes [i.e., non-relativity, sameness, tranquillity] of suchness and to make such a great vow is called the universal means of great vows.

[Now to return to the former subject], when the Bodhisattva thus aspires to the highest truth, he is able to have a partial insight into the Dharmakāya of the Buddha; and according to the power of the vow (pranidhānavaça), he performs eight things, to wit, his descent from the palace in the Tushita heaven²

¹ Mahāyānists in general distinguish four aspects of Nirvāṇa; (1) Nirvāṇa that is pure and spotless in its self-nature, i.e., absolute suchness, possessed equally by all beings; (2) Nirvāṇa that has remnant (upadhiṣesa), i.e., a state of relative suchness, which, though freed from the affectional hindrance (kleśavarana), is still under the fetter of materiality, which causes suffering and misery; (3) Nirvāṇa that has no remnant (anupadhiṣesa), i.e., a state of relative suchness which is free from the misery of birth and death, being entirely liberated from the fetter of materiality; (4) Nirvāṇa that has no fixed abode, i.e., a state of suchness in its spontaneous activity which is free from the intellectual hindrance (jneyavaranā) and full of love and wisdom, believes neither in birth-and-death nor in Nirvāṇa, but eternally abiding in the suchness of things benefits all sentient beings. Črāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas can recognise the first three aspects of Nirvāṇa, but the last one is known only to Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. For further details see the tenth volume of the Vijnanamātrasiddhi Cāstra, translated into Chinese by Hūan-tsang.

² One of the six heavenly abodes of the Kāmaloka (world of desire). The heavenly abodes are: (1) Region of the four kings of the cardinal points (mahārājakāyika); (2) that of the thirty-
[to this world], his entrance into the human womb, his stay therein, his birth, his renunciation, his attainment of Buddhahood, his revolution of the Dharma-wheel (dharma-cakra), and lastly his Parinirvāṇa.

He is not, however, as yet to be called absolute Dharmakāya, for he has not yet completely destroyed the impure1 karma that has been accumulated during his numberless existences in the past; perchance by the influence of the evil karma he may suffer a little amount of misery. But he suffers it only for a short time, and this not because of his being fettered by the evil karma, but because of his own vow-power (pranidhāna-vaśa) [which he made for the universal emancipation of mankind].

It is sometimes said in the Sūtra2 that even those Bodhisattvas who aspired [to the highest truth] through the perfection of their faith might relapse and fall down to the evil creation (apāyagati).3 But this was three gods (trīyāstrinī); (3) the Yāmā; (4) the Tushita; (5) the Nīrmānī; (6) the Paranirmita-vaśavatins.

1 The term impure does not mean immoral, but relative, conditional, dualistic or material, in contradistinction to pure, absolute, unconditional, spiritual, etc.

2 For instance, it is stated in the second fasciculus of the Bodhisattva-kusumamālā-pūrvakarma Sūtra (? P'u-sa ying-lo pên-yeh Ching in Chinese, translated by Fo-nien towards the end of the third century) that those Bodhisattvas who have not yet entered on the eighth stage (there are ten stages) of Bodhisattvahood may happen to relapse in his religious course, if not be able to receive instruction in the Dharma from some fully enlightened teachers.

3 Three of the six gatis are the apāyagati (evil path): Hell
only said to encourage those novices who are apt to give themselves up to indulgence and so may fail to enter into the right order [i.e., samyaktvaniyata], though they may not really fall down [into the evil path].

Further the Bodhisattva has since his first aspiration disciplined himself in those deeds which are beneficial both to himself and others, and thereby his heart has become free from timidity, inasmuch as he would not shudder even at the thought of falling down to the stage of Çràvakahood or Prayekabuddhahood, any more than to the evil creation (apâyagati).

If he learn that he is able to attain to Buddhahood only after an assiduous observance of various rules of austerity and mortification during immeasurable asamkheyâ-kalpas, he will never be frightened nor will he falter. How then could he ever raise such thoughts as cherished by Çràvakas or Pratyekabuddhas? How then could he fall down to the evil creation (apâyagati)? He has a firm faith in the truth that all things (sarvadharma) from the beginning are in their nature Nirvâna itself.

(nâraka); ghost (preta); and animal life (tiryagyoni). Sometimes demon (asura) is added to make the fourth.

1 For an explanation see. 87, footnote.

2 The same monistic idea is expressed also in the following famous phrases: "Âçràvas (desires or prejudices) are nothing but Bodhi (enlightenment), and birth-and-death (or this world of transformation) is nothing but Nirvâna." Individuation is the product of subjectivity; the universe in reality is one great whole.
This sort of aspiration (*cittotpāda*) is more excellent than the former, because the first asamkheya-kalpa of Bodhisattvas of this class is approaching to an end, because they have attained a thorough knowledge of suchness, because all their acts are performed without any stain of attachment.

As they know that the nature of the Dharma, being free from the trace of covetousness, is the perfection of pure and stainless charity (*dānapāramitā*), they in conformity to it practise charity (*dānapāramitā*).

As they know that the nature of the Dharma, being free from the influence of the five sensual passions, and, having nothing to do with immorality, is the perfection of pure and stainless morality (*śīlapāramitā*), they in conformity to it practise morality (*śīlapāramitā*).

As they know that the nature of the Dharma, having nothing to do with grievance and being free from malice, is the perfection of pure and stainless patience (*ksāntipāramitā*), they in conformity to it practise patience (*ksāntipāramitā*).

As they know that the nature of the Dharma, being free from physical and mental limitations and having nothing to do with indolence, is the perfection of pure and stainless energy (*vīryapāramitā*), they in conformity to it practise energy (*vīryapāramitā*).

As they know that the nature of the Dharma, having nothing to do with disturbance or confusion, is the perfection of pure and stainless tranquilisation
(dhyānapāramitā), they in conformity to it practise tranquillisation (dhyānapāramitā).

As they know that the nature of the Dharma, being free from the darkness of ignorance, is the perfection of pure and stainless wisdom (prajñāpāramitā), they in conformity to it practise wisdom (prajñāpāramitā).

What is the object of which the Bodhisattva from the stage of pure-heartedness up to the height of Bodhisattvahood has attained an intellectual intuition? The object is no less than suchness itself. We call it an object on account of the evolving-consciousness (pravṛtti-vijñāna). But in truth there is no object in perfect intellectual intuition, neither is there a subject in it; because the Bodhisattva by means of his wisdom of non-particularisation intuitively perceives suchness (bhūtatathatā) or Dharma-kāya, which is beyond the range of demonstration and argumentation.

Thus he is able in a moment to go over all the worlds in the ten quarters and to make offerings to all Buddhas and to beseech them to revolve the Wheel of the Dharma (darmacakrapravartana). His sole desire being to benefit all beings, he does not care for any melodious sounds or words [which he can enjoy in his heavenly abode].¹ In order to encourage weak-hearted people, he shows great energy and

¹In the older translation we read: "Having in view only the emancipation and beneficence of all beings, he [Bodhisattva] does not rely on words and characters."
attains to perfect enlightenment (anuttarasamyaksambodhi), all at once annihilating the lapse of immeasurable asamkheyakalpas. Or in order to instigate indolent people, he sometimes attains to Buddhahood only after long discipline and mortification through the period of immeasurable asamkheyakalpas. The reason why he achieves in this wise infinite methods (upāya) [of salvation] is that he wishes thereby to benefit all beings.¹

But in fact the intrinsic nature, the faculties, the aspiration, and the intellectual attainment of all Bodhisattvas are equal [in value] and there is not any scale of gradation in them. Because they will all equally and assuredly attain to the most perfect enlightenment, only after the elapsing of three asamkheyakalpas. Yet as there are differences in various states of existence regarding their objects of seeing, hearing, etc., as well as regarding their faculties, their desires, and their character; so there are correspondingly many different forms of religious discipline [destined to] them.

Three different operations of the mind are revealed in this aspiration by means of intellectual intuition: (1) Pure consciousness originating in the mind as it becomes free from particularisation; (2) moral consciousness [lit., upāya-citta?] originating in the mind

¹ The older translation reads: "It is out of [human] comprehension that he [Bodhisattva] can achieve such innumerable methods [of salvation]."
as it spontaneously performs those deeds which are beneficent to others; (3) unconscious activity (karma-vijnanacitta) originating in the mind as it achieves a most hidden mode of activity.

Again the Bodhisattva, having attained to the perfection of bliss and wisdom, which are his two marks of adornment, has in reaching the height of evolution (akanishtha) also obtained the most venerable and excellent body in the whole universe. By means of that knowledge which intuitively identifies itself [with enlightenment a priori], he has all at once uprooted ignorance; and thus obtaining omniscience (sarvakarajñana),¹ he spontaneously achieves incomprehensible [or divine] deeds (acintyakarma), reveals himself in immeasurable worlds in the ten quarters, and works out the universal emancipation of mankind.

A question arises here. As space is infinite, worlds are infinite. As worlds are infinite, beings are infinite. As beings are infinite, the modes of mentation are also infinitely diversified. And as all these objects and conditions (vishaya) have no limits, they can hardly be known or understood [in all their multitudinousness]. If, now, ignorance being destroyed, all modes

¹ A distinction is sometimes made between Sarvakarajñana, Sarvajñana and Mårgajñana: Sarvakarajñana is the knowledge by which we are enabled to know all forms and manifestations in their fundamental oneness; Sarvajñana is simply the knowledge of all things, or omniscience; Mårgajñana is the knowledge by which we can recognise the path leading to final emancipation. But they are practically the same.
of mentation are entirely annihilated as well, how can the Bodhisattva understand all things and complete his omniscience (sarvākāraṇājñāna)?

In reply we say: All so-called illusory phenomena are in truth from the beginning what they are; and their essence is nothing but the one soul [or mind]. Though ignorant minds that cling to illusory objects cannot understand that all things are in their nature the highest reality (paramārtha), all Buddha-Tathāgatas being free from clinging [or particularising] are able to have an insight into the true nature of things. And by virtue of their great wisdom they illuminate all distinctions between the defiled and the pure; through their immeasurable and inexhaustible sources of expediency (upāyakaučalya), which is good and excellent, they benefit and gladden all beings according to the latters' various necessities and capabilities. Therefore the mind that is saturated with subjectivity is annihilated, while all things are understood and omniscience (sarvākāraṇājñāna) is attained.1

1 The older translation reads: "In reply we say: All phenomenal objects (vishaya) are from the beginning [or in their metaphysical origin] of the one mind which is free from imagination and subjectivity. As all beings illusively perceive the existence of the phenomenal world (vishaya), they impose limitations on the mind. As they thus illusively cherish imagination and subjectivity, which are not in accordance with the nature of the Dharma, they cannot thoroughly understand it. All Buddha-Tathāgatas are, however, free from illusive perception, and [therefore their knowledge is] omniscient, because the mind constituting the principle of all things is true and valid. The self-essence [of all Buddhas] illuminates all illusive phenomena, possesses a great wisdom-activity and in-
Another question presents itself here: If all Buddhas who are in possession of infinite expediencies (upāya) can spontaneously benefit all beings in the ten quarters, why is it that the latter cannot always see Buddhas in person, or witness their divine transformations, or hear their instructions in the Doctrine?

The reply is: Tathāgatas are really in possession of those expediencies, and they are only waiting to reveal themselves to all beings as soon as the latter can purify their own minds.¹

When a mirror is covered with dust, it cannot reflect images. It can do so only when it is free from stain. It is even the same with all beings. If their minds are not clear of stain, the Dharmakāya cannot reveal itself in them. But if they be freed from stain, then it will reveal itself.

IV. PRACTICE OF FAITH.

In what does the practice of faith (praddhā) consist?

This part of the Discourse is intended for those beings who have not yet entered into the order of constant truth (samyaktvaniyata-rāci).

numerable means [of salvation], whereby, according to the intellectual capacity of all beings, they can reveal to them various significances of the Doctrine. Therefore it is called the Sarvākāraṇāna."

¹In the older translation we read: "The Dharmakāya of all Buddha-Tathāgatas is universal (samatā) and pervades every thing; it is free from compulsion and therefore spontaneous, manifesting itself through the minds of all beings."
What is meant by faith? How should one practise faith?

There are four aspects of faith. [As to faith in general]: (1) To believe in the fundamental [truth], that is, to think joyfully of suchness (bhūtatathatā). [As to particular faiths:] (2) To believe in the Buddha as sufficingly enveloping infinite merits, that is, to rejoice in worshipping him, in paying homage to him, in making offerings to him, in hearing the good doctrine (saddharma), in disciplining oneself according to the doctrine, and in aspiring after omniscience (sarvajñāna). (3) To believe in the Dharma as having great benefits, that is, to rejoice always in practising all pāramitās. (4) To believe in the Samgha as observing true morality, that is, to be ready to make offerings to the congregation of Bodhisattvas, and to practise truthfully all those deeds which are beneficial at once to oneself and others.

Faith will be perfected by practising the following five deeds: (1) charity (dāna); (2) morality (cīla); (3) patience (kshānti); (4) energy (vīrya); (5) cessation [or tranquillisation, cāmata] and intellectual insight (vidarçana or vīpaçyana).

How should people practise charity (dāna)?

(1) If persons come and ask them for something, they should, as far as their means allow, supply it ungrudgingly and make them rejoice in it. (2) If they see people threatened with danger, they should try every means of rescuing them and impart to them a
feeling of fearlessness (*vaiśīrādya*). (3) If they have 
people who come to them desiring instruction in the 
Doctrine, they should, so far as they are acquainted 
with it, and, according to their own discretion, de­
liver speeches on religious discipline.

And when they are performing those three acts of 
charity, let them not cherish any desire for fame or 
advantages, nor covet any worldly rewards. Only 
thinking of those benefits and blessings that are at 
once for themselves and others, let them aspire to the 
most excellent, most perfect knowledge (*anuttarasam-
yaksambodhi*).

How should they practise morality (*cīla*)?

Those Bodhisattvas who have families [i. e., lay 
members of Buddhism] should abstain from killing, 
stealing, adultery, lying, duplicity, slander, frivolous 
talk, covetousness, malice, currying favor, and false 
doctrines.¹

In the case of Čramanas, they should, in order to 
vanquish all prejudices (*kleça* or *ḍṛava*), retire from 
the boisterousness of worldly life, and, abiding in 
solitude (*aranya*), should practise those deeds which 
lead to moderation and contentment as well as those 
of the Dhūtaguna.² Even at the violation of minor

¹ Açvaghosha evidently refers to the ten virtues (*dāpakusā-
lānī*), for which see p. 114, though this list counts more than ten.

² There are twelve dhūtagunas or dhūtagangas to be observed 
by Bhikshus; *dhūta* means shaking off, that is, shaking off the 
dust of evil passions: (1) *Paṁḍapatīka*, the rule to live on what-
ever food they can get by begging from door to door, that they
rules (cīla) they should deeply feel fear, shame, and remorse. Strictly observing all those precepts given by the Tathāgata, they should not call forth the blame or disgust of the outsider, but they should endeavor to induce all beings to abandon the evil and to practise the good.¹

How should they practise patience (kṣhānti)?

If they meet with the ills of life they should not

may become free from egotism. (2) Traidvarīka, the rule allowing the possession of three clothings: Samghāti, dress made of scraps; Uttarasamghāti, outer robe; Antaravāsaka, something like skirt. (3) Khalupācādabhaktika, the prohibition of taking any food or beverage when the proper time is over, lest their attention should be disturbed. (4) Naishadhikīka, to be in a sitting attitude while sleeping, that they may not become over-indolent. (5) Yathōsamstarīka, spreading a night-couch where they happen to be. (6) Vrkṣhamālīka, sitting under a tree. (7) Ekāsanīka, taking one meal in a day, that their mental energy may not be weakened by eating too often. (8) Abhyavakāśika, living in an unsheltered place. (9) Aranyāka, leading a solitary, retired life in the wood. (10) Ĉnāsānāka, abiding in or by a cemetery, that they may constantly ponder on the transiency and uncleanliness of bodily existence. (11) Pāmskālīka, the wearing of the dress made of rags or remnants, that they may have no attachment to luxury. (12) Ĉamatīka, wearing cloth made of hair. There is a Sūtra named Twelve Dhātugunas among the Chinese collection of the Tripiṭaka. The list in that book is a little different from what we have here; the fifth and twelfth are dropped and instead of them we have the rule of begging in due order, corresponding to Sapadāna-cārikā in the Pāli list, and the rule of prohibiting taking too much food at one time, which overtaxing the stomach will obscure the clearness of mind.

¹ The reference is to the threefold precept (trīvidhācīla) which is (1) the precept of good behavior (sambhāračīla); (2) the precept of accumulating virtues (kuṭalasamgrāhačīla); (3) the precept of being benevolent towards all beings (saṭtvārthakriyāčīla).
shun them. If they suffer sufferings, they should not feel afflicted. But they should always rejoice in contemplating the deepest significance of the Dharma.¹

How should they practise energy (virya)?

Practising all good deeds, they should never indulge in indolence (kausidya). They should think of all their great mental and physical sufferings, which they are now vainly suffering on account of their having coveted worldly objects during their existences in innumerable former ages (kalpa), and which do not give the least nourishment to their spiritual life. They should, therefore, in order to be emancipated from those sufferings in the future, be indefatigably energetic, and never raise the thought of indolence, but endeavor, out of deep compassion (mahākaruna), to benefit all beings. Though disciplining themselves in faith, all novice Bodhisattvas, on account of the hindrances of their evil karma (karmāvarana) produced by the violation of many important precepts in their previous existences, may sometimes be annoyed by evil Māras, sometimes entangled in worldly engagements, sometimes threatened by various diseases. As these things will severally disturb their religious course and make them neglect practising good deeds, they should dauntlessly, energetically, uninterruptedly, all

¹The older translation reads: "Patiently bearing evils inflicted by others, they should not cherish any idea of revenge. They should also bear such [worldly vicissitudes] as prosperity and decline, reprehension and commendation, renown and defamation, worry and ease, etc."
six watches, day and night, pay homage to all Buddhas, make offerings (pujā) to them, praise them, repent and confess (kshamā) to them, aspire to the most excellent knowledge (samyaksambodhi), make great vows (mahāpranidhāna); and thereby annihilate the hindrances of evils and increase the root of merit (kuṣalamūla).

How should they practise cessation [or tranquillisation, ānathā] and intellectual insight (vidarçana or vipaçyana)?

To bring all mental states that produce frivolous sophistries to a stand is called cessation. To understand adequately the law of causality and transformation is called intellectual insight. Each of them should be practised separately by the beginner. But when by degrees he obtains facility and finally attains to perfection, the two will naturally become harmonised.¹

Those who practise cessation should dwell in solitude (āranyaka) and, sitting cross-legged,² rectify the

¹ Observe that cessation should be practised by the beginner, and for a time only, for the purpose of affording the mind an appreciation of suchness in its purity; the conception of this state of abstraction should then be harmonised with intellectual insight. Observe also that the methods of Indian recluses, such as fixing the breath and going into trances by fixing the thoughts on objects, are rejected as improper. The practice should assist a beginner to understand that suchness, though all particulars are dependent on it, is in its purity a reality.

² Those who practise this have to place the left leg above the right with both close to the body, so that the toes of the left foot shall rest on the right thigh, and those of the right foot on the left thigh, while the soles are turned upwards. This posture is con-
attitude and pacify the mind.1 Do not fix the thoughts on the breath (anāpānasmṛti)2; do not fix the thoughts on the forms (samjñā)3 and colors; do not fix the

1 Among the followers of the Dhyāna sect both in Japan and China, it is customary, while sitting cross-legged and meditating on religious subjects, to expand the abdomen outwards and to breathe very slowly, by which they can, in their opinion, most effectively concentrate their attention and gain perfect mental equilibrium. Prof. J. M. Baldwin in his Mental Development says in connexion with bashfulness and modesty, p. 205 footnote: "The only way that I, for one, can undo this distressing outgo of energy, and relieve these uncomfortable inhibitions, is to expand the abdomen by a strong muscular effort and at the same time breathe in as deeply as I can. . . . The comparative relief found in expanding the abdominal muscles is probably due to the fact that it allows the contents of the body to fall, and so relieves the heart from any artificial pressure which may be upon it from the surrounding organs. Further the increased heart-action which is itself a part of shyness requires all the space it can get."

2 One of the eight subjects of recollection (anusmṛti), or of the five methods of mental pacification. The eight subjects are: (1) Buddha; (2) dharma; (3) samgha; (4) āśā, morality; (5) cāda or tyāga, liberality; (6) deva, gods; (7) anāpāna, regulation of inspiration and respiration; (8) marana, death. The five methods are: (1) Ācūbhābāvānā, contemplation on the impurity of the body; (2) maitṛkāraṇa, love and compassion; (3) anāpānasmṛti, the regulation of inspiration and respiration; (4) nīdāna, law of transformation; (5) buddhāsmyt, recollection on Buddha.

3 There are nine Ācūbhāhasamjñās, notions arising from the contemplation of the impurity of a dead body, which is intended to convince one of the fact that our body is not worth while clinging to: (1) Swelling (vyādhmataka); (2) fissuring from decay (vipāyaka); (3) bloody (vīlohitā); (4) festering (vipādumakā); (5) blackish (vinīlaka); (6) being devoured by animals (vikhāditaka); (7) scattering (vikkhipta); (8) bone (asti); (9) burned up (vīdagdha). The Pāli Ācūbas count one more.
thoughts on space (ākāśa); do not fix the thoughts on earth, water, fire, and ether; do not fix the thoughts on what you see, hear, learn, or memorise (vijñānakṛṣṭnāyatana). All particularisations, imaginations and recollections should be excluded from consciousness, even the idea of exclusion being excluded; because [the suchness of] all things is uncreate, eternal, and devoid of all attributes (alakshana).

[Now in the constant flux of thoughts,] that which precedes [i.e., a sensation] has been awakened by an external object; so the next [step to be taken by the practiser] is to abandon the idea of an external world. Then that which succeeds [in that constant flux of thoughts] is elaborated in his own mind; so he should in turn abandon reflexion [or thought]. In short, as his attention is distracted by the external world [outer vishaya], he is warned to turn it to inner consciousness [inner citta]; while as his retrospection in turn calls forth a succession of thoughts [or ideal associations], he is again warned not to attach himself to the latter; because, independent of suchness, they [thoughts] have no existence of their own.

At all times, while moving, standing, sitting, or

1 These constitute the ten Kṛṣṭnāyatanas which are: (1) Blue (nīla); (2) yellow (pīta); (3) red (lohiśa); (4) white (avatā); (5) earth (ṛtivī); (6) water (āp); (7) fire (tejas); (8) air (vāyu); (9) space (ākāśa); (10) consciousness (vijñāna). The term Kṛṣṭnāyatana means an universal object or element on which the attention of a samādhī-practiser is to be fixed.
lying, the practiser should constantly discipline himself as above stated. Gradually entering the samâdhi of suchness,¹ he will finally vanquish all prejudices (*kleça or âçrava*), be strengthened in faith (*graddhâ*), and immediately attain to the state of never-returning (*avaivartikatva*). But those who are sceptical, sacrilegious, destitute of faith, encumbered with the hindrances (*âvarana*) of karma, arrogant, or indolent, are not entitled to enter therein.

And again when the practiser by virtue of his samâdhi² attains an immediate insight into the nature of the universe (*dharmadhâtu*), he will recognise that the Dharmakâya of all Tathâgatas and the body of all beings are one and the same (*samatâ*), are consubstantial (*ekalakshana*). On that account it is also called the samâdhi of oneness (*ekalakshanamasamâdhi*). By disciplining oneself in this samâdhi, one can obtain in-

¹ That is, perfect identification of oneself with suchness.

² *Samâdhi* is commonly rendered by ecstasy, trance, concentration, or meditation, all of which are misleading. The term means mental equilibrium, and the reasons why Buddhism recommends the practising of it are, that it helps us in keeping our minds free from disturbance, that it prepares us for a right comprehension of the nature of things, that it subjugates momentary impulses, giving us time for deliberation. Ecstasy or trance, instead of producing those benefits, will lead us to a series of hallucinations, and this is the very opposite of mental quietude. Rhys Davids thinks samâdhi corresponds to faith in Christianity (*S. B. E.*, XI., p. 145), and S. Beal agrees with him in his translation of Acâvaghsa’s *Buddhacarita*; but I doubt its correctness for the above-stated reasons.
finite samâdhis, because suchness is the source of all samâdhis.

Some people scantily supplied with the root of merit (kuţalamūla) may yield to the temptation of Mâras, tirthakas, or evil spirits. [For instance] those evil ones sometimes assuming horrible forms may frighten the practiser; sometimes manifesting themselves in beautiful figures, they may fascinate him; sometimes appearing in form of a deva, or of a Bodhisattva, or even of a Buddha with all his excellent and magnified features, they may speak about dhârani or the pâramitâ, or may give instructions about various means of emancipation (mukti), declaring that there is no hatred, no friendship, no causation, no

1 The older translation has the following passage inserted here: “If he [the practiser] remembers that these are merely subjective, the phenomena will disappear by themselves and will no more trouble him.”

2 Buddha is supposed to have thirty-two general and eighty minor marks of bodily perfection. For particulars see the Dharmasamgraha, pp. 18, 19, 51 et seq., edited by Kasawara Kenjiu.

3 Dhârani, which comes from the root dhr, meaning to hold, to maintain, to retain, to support, etc., is the name given to any concise statement describing Buddha’s virtue, or stating some essential points of Buddhist teachings, or expressing supplication, or containing the exclamations of a vehement feeling; and it implies many significances in a few words, it is a kind of epigram. But later Buddhists came to use the term in quite a different sense; they called a dhârani any tantric expression which was considered to have some mysterious, supernatural powers to bring wealth to destroy enemies, to keep away calamities, etc., etc. Here dhârani means simply any epigrammatic proposition which will serve as a key to the deep significance of the Doctrine.
retribution, or declaring that all things in the world are absolute nothingness (*atyantaçūnyatā*), that they are in their essence Nirvāṇa itself. Or they may reveal to the practiser his own past and future states of existence, they may teach him to read the thoughts of others,¹ may grant him incomparable power of eloquence, may induce him to crave covetously for worldly fame and advantages.

Further, through the influence of those evil ones the practiser may sometimes be inordinately susceptible to dissatisfaction or delight; he may sometimes be too misanthropic or too philanthropic; he may sometimes be inclined to enjoy drowsiness; he may sometimes not sleep for a long time; he may sometimes be affected by diseases; he may sometimes remain discouraged and indolent; he may sometimes rise all on a sudden with full energy, but only to sink down again into languor; he may sometimes, being over-sceptical, not believe in anything; he may sometimes, abandoning the excellent religious observance, enjoy himself in frivolous occupations, indulge in worldly affairs, gratify his desires and inclinations;

¹ Some of these miraculous powers here mentioned are considered to be possessed by the Arhat. Six supernatural faculties (*abhijñā*) are commonly enumerated: (1) divine eyes (*divyacakṣhu*) by which the Arhat perceives all that is occurring in the world; (2) the divine hearing (*divyāçūtra*), by which he hears all sounds in the world; (3) reading the thoughts of others (*paracittajñāna*); (4) memory of his former lives (*pārvanivāsānu-smṛti*); (5) miraculous powers (*rddhi*); (6) knowledge how to destroy evil passions (*āfravakshaya*).
he may sometimes attain to the samâdhi of heretics [i.e., tîrthaka] and, remaining in a state of trance a day or two, or even seven, and being supplied imaginarily with some palatable food and drink, and feeling very comfortable mentally and physically, he may have no sensation of hunger or thirst; 1 he may sometimes be induced to enjoy female fascinations; he may sometimes be very irregular in taking meals, either too much or too little; he may sometimes look either very handsome or very ugly in appearance.

If the practiser get enraptured by those visions and prejudices (kleça), he will lose his root of merit (kuçalamûla) accumulated in his previous existences. Therefore he should exercise a deep and thorough contemplation, thinking that all those [heretical states of samâdhi] are the temptations of Mâras or evil spirits that take advantage of his deficiency in merits and his intensity of karma-hindrances (karmâvarana).

After this thought he should make another thought, viz., that all these are nothing but mental hallucinations. When he makes these thoughts, the visions and imaginations will instantly disappear, and, becoming free from all attributes [of limitation], he will enter into the true samâdhi. He has then not only liberated himself from all modes of subjectivity, he has also effaced the idea of suchness. Even when

1 This apparently alludes to the Yoga-praxis, by which man is said to be able to perform several sorts of miracles beside those mentioned here.
he rises up from a deep meditation, no visionary images, no prejudices will take possession of in his mind, since he has destroyed the root of illusion through the power of the samâdhi. On the contrary, all the excellent and virtuous deeds which are in conformity with suchness will be constantly performed by him, while all hindrances without exception will be removed by him, who now exhibiting great spiritual energy will never become exhausted.¹

Those who do not practise this kind of samâdhi will not be able to enter into the essence of the Tathâgata, for all other samâdhis practised in common with the tîrthakas have invariably some attributes [of imperfection] and do not enable one to come into the presence of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. Therefore let Bodhisattvas [who aspire to the highest knowledge] assiduously apply themselves to the discipline and attain to the perfection of this samâdhi.

¹ The two preceding paragraphs read in the older translation as follows: "On this account, the practiser, always exercising intellectual insight, should save his mind from being entangled in the netting of falsity; he should, dwelling in right contemplation, not cling or attach [to any object], and thereby he will be able to liberate himself from all kinds of karma-hindrance. It should be known that all samâdhis practised by heretics [i. e., tîrthaka] are invariably the production of the [egoistic] conception and desire and self-assumption, that they are hankering after worldly renown advantages, and reverence. The samâdhi of suchness [on the other hand] has nothing to do with subjectivity and attachment. If one is free from indolence even when rising from meditation one's prejudices will by degrees get attenuated."
Those who practise this samādhi will procure in their present life ten beneficial results:

1. They will always be remembered and guarded by all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas in all quarters.
2. They will not be molested by Māras or evil spirits.
3. They will not be led astray by false doctrines.¹
4. They will be free from disparaging the deepest Doctrine (gambhiradharma). Their serious misdemeanors as well as their karma-hindrances will be attenuated.
5. They will destroy all doubts, sinful recollections, and contemplations.
6. They will be strengthened in their belief in the spiritual state of Tathāgata.
7. They will be liberated from gloomy remorse; they will be courageous and unflinching in the face of birth and death.
8. Being free from arrogance and presumptuousness, they will be meek and patient and will be revered by all the world.
9. If not practising deep meditation, those prejudices (ācrava) which are now getting weaker, will not assert themselves in them.
10. While practising meditation, they will not be disturbed by any external objects, such as voices, sounds, etc.

¹ The older translation reads: "the ninety-five heretical doctrines."
But mind: when the practiser is trained only in cessation (çamatha), his mind will sink down into stu­pidity, and acquiring a habit of indolence, cannot re­joice in doing good acts, as he will estrange himself from deep compassion (mahâkaruna). Accordingly he should discipline himself in intellectual insight (vidarçana) as well.

In what does this discipline consist?

The practiser should contemplate that all things in the world are subject to a constant transformation, that since they are transient they are misery, that since they are misery they are not things-in-themselves [i. e., âtman].

He should contemplate that all things in the past are like a dream, those in the present are like the lightning, those in the future are like clouds that sponta­neously come into existence.

He should contemplate that all that has a body is impure, being a lodging place of obnoxious vermin and the intermixture of prejudices (âgrava).

Contemplate that ignorant minds, on account of their groundless imagination, take the unreal as they see it, for reality.

Contemplate that all objects which come into ex­istence by a combination of various causes (prat-

1 The idea is: that which is transient is dependent, conditional and not self-regulating; and that which is without freedom is nec­essarily miserable, that is to say, it has no self-regulating ātman within itself.
are like a chimera, having [only a transitory existence and] no [genuine] realness at all.

Contemplate that the highest truth (paramārtha-satya) is not a production of mind [or subjectivity], cannot be [fully] illustrated by analogy, cannot be [exhaustively] treated by reasoning.¹

Contemplate that on account of the perfuming power of ignorance (avidya) all beings from eternity suffer great mental and physical sufferings in immeasurable ways; that those immeasurable and innumerable sufferings are suffered in the present and will be suffered in the future; that while it is extremely difficult to disentangle, to emancipate themselves from those sufferings, all beings always abiding in the midst of them are not conscious of the fact, and this makes them the more pitiable.

After these contemplations the practiser should awake positive knowledge [or unerring understanding], feel the highest and deepest compassion (karuna) for all suffering beings, rouse dauntless energy, and make great vows (mahāpranidhāna) as follows:

"May my mind be freed from all contradictions; may I abandon particularisation; may I personally attend on all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, whom I shall pay homage to, make offerings to, revere and praise, and to whose instructions in the good Doctrine (sad-dharma) I shall listen; may I truthfully discipline myself according to their teachings, and to the end of

¹The last three clauses are missing in the older translation.
the future never be negligent in self-discipline; may I with innumerable expediencies (upâya) [of salvation] deliver all beings who are drowned in the sea of misery, and bring them to the highest bliss of Nirvâna.”

After these vows the practiser should at all times, so far as his energy permits, practise those deeds which are beneficial both to himself and others. While moving, standing, sitting, or lying, he should assiduously meditate what should be done and what should be avoided. This is called the practising of intellectual insight (vidarçana or vipaçyana).

And again when the practiser disciplines himself only in intellectual insight his mind may lack tranquillisation, and becoming too susceptible to scepticism, may not be in accord with the highest truth, may not attain to the wisdom of non-particularisation. Therefore cessation and intellectual insight should be practised side by side. He should consider that nothing is self-existent (svabhâva), and things [in their essence] are uncreate, eternally tranquil, and Nirvâna itself. But at the same time let him not forget to reflect that karma and its retribution, both good and evil, being produced by a co-operation of principle and conditions, will neither be lost nor destroyed. He should thus ponder on the law of causation, both in its good and evil karma and retribution, but at the same time let him not forget to perceive that all things, though in their essence uncreate, have no self-existence, etc., they are Nirvâna.
By practising cessation, common people (prthag-jana) will be cured of finding pleasures in worldliness, while Çrâvakas and Pratyekabuddhas will be cured of feeling intimidation at the thought of birth and death.

By practising intellectual insight common people will be cured of not cultivating their root of merit (kuçalamûla), while Çrâvakas and Pratyekabuddhas will be cured of narrow-mindedness whereby they cannot raise deep compassion [for mankind].

Therefore, cessation and intellectual insight are supplementary to, not independent of, each other. If one of the two is wanting, the practiser will surely be unable to attain to the most excellent knowledge (bodhiparinishpatti).

And again when those novice Bodhisattvas who are living in this present life [sahâlokadhåtu, i.e., the enduring world of actual existence], may sometimes suffer misfortunes that are caused by climate, weather, unforeseen famine, or what not; and when they witness those people who are immoral, fearful, infatuated with the three venomous passions (akuçalamûla), cling to false and self-contradictory doctrines, desert the good law and acquire evil habits; they [that is, novice Bodhisattvas], living in the midst of them, may feel so discouraged that they may come to doubt whether they can see Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, whether they can actualise their pure and spotless faith (çraddhå).

Therefore, it is advisable for those novices to cher-
ish this thought: All Buddhas and Bodhisattvas in the ten quarters having great, unimpeded supernatural powers (abhiññā), are able to emancipate all suffering beings by means of various expediencies that are good and excellent (upāyakauçalya).

After this reflection, they should make great vows (mahāpranidhāna), and with full concentration of spiritual powers think of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. When they have such a firm conviction, free from all doubts, they will assuredly be able to be born in the Buddha-country beyond (buddha-ksetra), when they pass away from this present life, and seeing there Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, to complete their faith and to eternally escape from all evil creations (apāya).1

Therefore, it is said in the Sūtra2 that if devoted

1 The same idea of salvation is expressed in the Bhagavad-gītā, Chap. VIII., p. 78: “And he who leaves this body and departs (from this world) remembering me in (his) last moment, comes into my essence. There is no doubt of that. . . . Therefore at all times remember me. . . . Fixing your mind and understanding on me you will come to me, there is no doubt. He who thinks of the supreme divine being, O son of Prithâ! with the mind not (running) to other (objects), and possessed of abstraction in the shape of continuous meditation (about the Supreme) goes to him.’

2 It is not exactly known from what Sūtra this passage is taken, but it is not difficult to discover similar passages in the Sūtras which constitute the canonical books of the Sukhāvatī sect, i.e., in the larger or smaller Sukhāvatī-vyāha, or in the Amitāyurdhyāna. I here quote such a passage from Max Müller’s English translation of the larger Sukhāvatī-vyāha-Sūtra, Sec. XXVII.: ‘And if, O Ānanda, any son or daughter of a good family should wish—What?—How then may I see that Tathāgata Amitâbha visibly, then he must raise his thought on to the highest perfect knowledge, he must direct his thought with perseverance and excessive
men and women would be filled with concentration of thought, think of Amitâbha Buddha in the world of highest happiness (sukhâvatî) in the Western region, and direct (parinâma) all the root of their good work toward being born there, they would assuredly be born there.

Thus always seeing Buddhas there, their faith will be strengthened, and they will never relapse therefrom. Receiving instruction in the doctrine, and recognising the Dharmakâya of the Buddha, they will by gradual discipline be able to enter upon the state of truth [i. e., Buddhahood] (samyaktva-râçi).

V. BENEFITS.

In what does this part [treating] of the benefits consist?

Such as above presented is the spiritual significance of the Mahâyâna, and I have finished elucidating it.

Those who, desiring to produce pure and spotless faith in, and knowledge of, the deepest spiritual con-

*desire towards that Buddha country, and direct the stock of his good works towards being born there." As I noticed elsewhere, if those Mahâyâna texts had been considered at the time of Ācâvaghosha, that is, in the first century after or before Christ, as a genuine teaching of Buddha, then it would have to be admitted, it seems to me, that the Mahâyâna system existed at an early stage of the development of Buddhism, most probably side by side with Hinayânism, which is generally supposed by Pâli scholars to be more primitive. But the history of Buddhism in India as a whole is still veiled with dark clouds of uncertainty, in spite of the fact that quite a few original Sanskrit texts have been recovered.
dition and the greatest Dharma of the Tathâgata, so that they have no hindrances in entering upon the Mahâyâna path (mârga), will diligently pursue this brief discourse, contemplate it, discipline themselves in it, and thus they can surely and unhesitatingly attain to the knowledge of all forms and manifestations (sarvâkârajñâna).

And if they do not awake a feeling of fear in hearing this Doctrine, they will surely be qualified to inherit the Buddha-seeds and immediately receive the prophecy (vijâkarana)\(^1\) from the Buddha. Even if there be a person who could convert all beings in three thousand great chiliocosms (trisâhasramahâsâhasra),\(^2\) and could induce them to observe the ten precepts of morality (daçakuçalamârga), his merits will not be su-

\(^1\) This is not a mere prophecy of one's destiny, but Buddha's assurance for those Bodhisattvas who, having accumulated sufficient amount of merits, are qualified to attain in the future the most excellent, perfect knowledge and to achieve final salvation both for themselves and for all other beings. See how five hundred disciples received this assurance from Buddha in the Sâdharmapundarîka Sûtra, Chap. VIII.

\(^2\) Our earth which was supposed by ancient Indians to be flat, infinitely extending in space, is not the only region inhabited by sentient beings; but there are innumerable worlds outside of this Manushyalokadhâtû, which exist above as well as below us. Now according to the Abhidharmakoṣa-çâstra by Vasubandhu, a small chiliocosm (sâhasralokadhâtû) consists of one thousand of Rûpa-lokas and of the first Dhyâna heavens, and one thousand of small chiliocosms make a middling chiliocosm, a thousand of which in turn making a great chiliocosm. So we may take the great chiliocosm (mahâsâhasralokadhâtû) as including all possible heavenly bodies which fill up this boundless space.
perior to those of the person who will truthfully comprehend this Doctrine even for a second; because the merits of the latter immeasurably and infinitely surpass those of the former.

If one practise this doctrine as it is instructed for one whole day and night, the merits thereby produced will be so immeasurable, infinite, inconceivable that all Buddhas in the ten quarters could not exhaust them, even if each of them continued to praise them for innumerable asamkheyakalpas. As the merits of suchness have no limits, so the merits of the discipline are also without limit.

Those who slander this doctrine, on the other hand, commit immeasurable faults and suffer great sufferings for asamkheyakalpas. Accordingly all beings should cherish a firm faith in the Doctrine and never slander it, for this will lead to the destruction of oneself as well as others, nay, even to the destruction of the seeds of the Triple Treasure (triratna).

By practising this Doctrine all Buddhas have attained the most excellent knowledge (anuttarajñānā). By practising this Doctrine all Bodhisattvas have obtained an insight into the Dhamarakāya of the Tathāgata.

By practising this Doctrine Bodhisattvas in the past consummated, Bodhisattvas in the future will consummate, pure and spotless faith (craddhā) in the Mahāyāna. Therefore those who desire to practise

1 For an explanation see the footnote to kalpa, p. 87.
those excellent virtues that are beneficial at once to themselves and others should diligently study this Discourse.

I have now finished elucidating
The deepest and greatest significance [of the Dharma].
May its merit be distributed among all creatures,
And make them understand the Doctrine of Suchness.
GLOSSARY.

Activity-consciousness 業識 yeh shih, karmavijnāna? the assertion of the "Will to Live."

Affectional hindrance 煩惱障 fan nao chang, kleśāvarana, hindrance to the attainment of Nirvāṇa, arising from the assertion of the "Will to Live."

Affirmation, or Non-emptiness, 不空 pu k'ung, açñayatā, suchness as constituting the basis of reality; it is equivalent to the Tathāgata's Womb.

All-conserving mind, The, 阿難耶識 a lai ya shih, or tsang shih, or 阿槃耶 a li ya, 無沒識 mu mo shih, ālaya-vijñāna, a stage in the evolution of suchness, in which consciousness is awakened to recognise a distinction between suchness and birth-and-death.

Aspiration 發心 fa hsīn, cittotpāda, desire to attain the most perfect knowledge.

Âtman 我 wu, (1) ego-soul; (2) noumenon or thing-in-itself. Anâtman is a negative form of the same.

Birth-and-death 生滅 shēng mieh, samsāra, the material principle in contradistinction to the formal principle, suchness.

Consciousness 識 shih, vijñāna, mentation in general.

Defilement 染 jan, a cognisance of dual aspect of suchness; not necessarily moral or intellectual fault.

Dharma 法 fa, (1) that which subsists, or substance; (2) law, doctrine, or regulative principle.

Dharmakāya 法身 fa shēn, absolute being, or absolute knowledge when considered from the idealistic point of view.

Ego 意 i, manas, the subjective mind which believes consciously or unconsciously in the existence of the ego-soul.
Ego-consciousness 意識 i shih, manovijnāna, egocentric thoughts in general; the mind that makes a deliberate assumption of a dualistic existence of the ego and the non-ego.

Enlightenment 觉 chiao (buddhi?), another name for suchness, psychologically considered.

Evolving-consciousness 轉識 chuan shih, pravṛtti-vijnāna, a state of suchness out of which mentation in general evolves.

Ignorance 無明 wu ming, avidya, a state of suchness in its evolution; practically the same as birth-and-death.

Intellectual hindrance 所知障 so chih chang, jneyāvarana, the hindrance to the attainment of Nirvāṇa, which arises from intellectual prejudices.

Interrelated defilement 相應業 hsiang ying jan, a conscious assertion of dualism.

Karma-hindrance, 业障, karmāvarana, the hindrance in the way to Nirvāṇa, that is brought forth by evil deeds done in previous lives.

Mahāyāna 大乘 tai chang, literally, great conveyance, another name for suchness.

Means, or expediency 方便 fang pien, upāya, when philosophically considered, the process of evolution, whereby the unconditional suchness becomes conditional.

Mind 心 hsin, citta, relative aspect of suchness. Soul, mind, and suchness are to a certain extent synonymous, but in this translation the following distinction is made: Suchness, when unqualified, signifies its absolute aspect and is practically the same with the soul, while the term mind is used to denote a state of suchness in its operation or evolution.

Negation, or emptiness 空 k'ung, tanyatā, an aspect of suchness as transcending all forms of relativitity.

Nirvāṇa 涅槃 nichough, the recognition of the truth or suchness.

Non-enlightenment 不覺 tuchiao (nirbuddhi?), another name for ignorance, psychologically considered. Non-enlightenment, defilement, birth-and-death, and ignorance, are more or less synonymous and interchangeable.

Non-particularisation 無分別 wu fén tich, the subjective attitude that is free from a deliberate assertion of dualism; is similar in a sense to Lao-Tze's "Non-assertion."
Not-interrelated defilement 不相應染 pu hsiang ying jan, an unconscious assertion of dualism.

Particularisation-consciousness 分別識 fèn piēh shīh, the consciousness that adheres to the dual aspect of existence; a synonym of phenomena-particularising-consciousness.

Prejudice 煩惱 fan nao, âcrava or kleça, the subjectivity that averts the due exercise of will and intellect.

Samādhi 三昧 san mei, or 定 ting, literally equilibrium, a state of consciousness in which all modes of mental activity are in equilibrium.

Soul 心 hsin, hrdaya or citta, that which constitutes the kernel of things, but not in the Christian conception of the word; a synonym of absolute suchness.

Soul as birth-and-death, 心生識 hsin shēng mieh, relative aspect of suchness as material principle; a synonym of ignorance.

Soul as suchness 心真如 hsin chen ju, absolute aspect of suchness as purely formal.

Subjectivity 妄念 wang nien, or 妄念心 wang nien hsin, or 心念 hsin nien, or simply 念 nien, smṛti, literally, recollection or memory, or 分別 fèn piēh, particularisation; the mentation that is not in accordance with the conception of suchness.

Suchness 真如 chên ju, bhūtatathatā, the highest reality, or the "purely formal" aspect of existence.

Tathāgata's womb 如來藏 ju lai tsang, tathāgata-garbha, a state of suchness as containing every possible merit.

Totality of things 法界 fah chieh, dharma dhātu, literally, the basis of things, that is, the universe as a whole.

Vow 願 yūan, or 誓願 shīh yūan, pranidhāna, commonly translated prayer, but not in the Christian sense, for Buddhists think that a vow or vehement desire has power enough to achieve what is desired, according to their idealistic conception of the world.
CORRIGENDA.

Page 3, line 2, read gāṭhā for ghāṭās.

" 5, " 8, " Fo for Fa.

" 12, " 13, " peace for piece.

" 12, " 20, " 3 for 1.

" 18, " 22, " fasciculus for fasciculi.

" 24, " 12, " conversion for conversions.

" 36, " 4, " non-ātman for none-ātman.

" 60, " 5, " cānyatā for cānjatā.

" 60, " 10, insert that after understanding.

" 119, " 1, read Anupadīṣesa for Anupadīṣesa.

" 126, " 17, " latter's for latters'.
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